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Abstract 
 
The Colombian conflict is one of the world’s longest running civil wars. The 
country is home to the highest number of internally displaced people in the 
world, estimated to be up to 5.5 million in 2012. Spanning almost seven 
decades, the undeclared war has cost the lives of millions. However, despite 
these alarming figures, Colombia remains one of the least studied of the 
major Latin American countries.  
 
The conceptualisation of the Colombian conflict has been overwhelmingly 
shaped by two theories of civil conflict, “New Wars” and “Greed vs. 
Grievance”. Whilst these studies have provided an insight into some of the 
dynamics of Colombian conflict, such as the drugs trade, the historical 
continuities of violence and internal drivers of insecurity have been largely 
ignored. This study re-interprets the long-standing Colombian conflict with an 
emphasis on a history ‘from below’. It addresses this lacuna in the current 
literature and offers an alternative historical analysis of the conflict by 
exploring government policies and local dynamics. 
 
This research contributes the existing literature by providing local nuances to 
the two parallel theories of civil war that have dominated the discourse of 
violence in Colombia. The “new” characteristics of modern civil war are not 
new to Colombia. For almost seven decades, Colombia has seen high levels 
of violence against a civilian population, paramilitary and criminal activity. The 
idea that “greed” fuels violent conflict fails to explain why thousands have 
joined various guerrilla movements and endure harsh living conditions in 
which they risk their lives for a political cause. Importantly, this theory neglects 
the internal socio-economic problems in countries with persistent levels of 
violence. 
 
Using an area studies approach and drawing upon recently declassified 
material from the US and UK governments, press clippings and fieldwork in 
Colombia, this study highlights the historical continuities of violence in 
Colombia, which are characterised by economic and security grievances. It 
examines the conflict from the ‘forgotten civil war’, known as la Violencia, and 
goes on to illustrate how persistent failures by the Colombian government to 
solve the rural and agrarian problem and the political exclusion of those 
claiming to represent the rural population have constituted the fundamental 
motor of violence over several decades. 
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Introduction 
 
Colombia: The Latin American Anomaly or the Future of 
Democracy in the Region? 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Latin America today is known as a region of relative peace. This has not 
always been the case. Between 1930 and 1990 this was a continent 
characterised by coups d’état. Bolivia alone suffered four coups in one year 
and for much of this period, almost the entirety of the continent was ruled by 
authoritarian regimes that readily resorted to armed force.1 From Central 
America to the Southern Cone, military dictatorships declared war on their 
civilian populations in the name of freedom and Christian values, leading to 
the systematic killing, torture and incarceration of hundreds of thousands of 
civilians. The practice of state sponsored terrorism across the region created 
‘societies of fear’.2  Most Latin American states developed intimidating state 
security apparatuses to counter wide-ranging internal threats from leftist 
dissents and insurgents. By 1975, the continent witnessed a connected 
campaign of political repression and terror. This involved intelligence 
operations and the assassination of opponents focused on regime security. 
Known as “Operation Condor”, some estimates suggest that 60,000 deaths 
resulted across six countries.3 
 
Yet remarkably, by the end of the 1980s, many of Latin America’s military 
dictatorships had crumbled. The region experienced an unprecedented wave 
of change that has been linked to a wider global phenomenon known as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Juan E. Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen and Manuel Antonio Garretón, (eds.) Fear at 
the Edge, State Terror and Resistance in Latin America (Oxford: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
2 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, (eds.) Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, 
Violence and Terror in Latin America (London: Zed Books, 1999). 
3 Zakia Shiraz, ‘Drugs and Dirty Wars: Intelligence Cooperation in the Global South,’ 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 10 (2013) pp. 1749-1766. 
 2 
‘third wave of democratisation’.4 According to Larry Diamond, the “third wave” 
began as early as 1974 in Portugal, and was followed by various democratic 
transitions in Latin America and the Asia Pacific countries in the 1980s, and in 
Eastern Europe post-1989. However, many of these newer democracies were 
not fully "consolidated" and their electoral institutions remain fragile. Recent 
events, most prominently the Arab Spring, have been hailed as the beginning 
of fourth wave.5 
 
The conceptualisation of the “third wave” suggested that democracy is 
inextricably linked to economic growth, social progress and security. The 
economies of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Peru are undoubtedly 
growing exponentially and Latin America is seen to be reaping the benefits of 
economic stability. Across the region some 580 million people were ‘lifted out 
of poverty’ with income distribution becoming ‘a bit less unequal’ between 
2002 and 2008.6 One leading Latin Americanist commentator notes how the 
region which was previously ‘a byword for financial instability mostly sailed 
through the recent recession’ that followed the financial turbulence of 2008.7 
According to the chief economist of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IBD), Santiago Levy, ‘after Latin America’s lengthy education in getting 
macroeconomic policy right’, the region’s economic performance during the 
recent recession ‘may have been the final exam and the graduation party’.8 
This exaggerated air of optimism is shared by Latin American leaders and 
now extends to the realm of security. 
 
Latin American leaders celebrate their region’s security success story. In a 
UN security council meeting led by current Argentine President, Cristina 
Fernández, she and other leaders suggested that ‘regions in turmoil could !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Frances Hagopian and Scott 
P. Mainwaring, (eds.) The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: 
Advances and Setbacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 Larry Diamond, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3 
(1996) pp. 20-37. 
6 Michael Reid, ‘So Near and Yet so Far,’ The Economist, September 9, 2010. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
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learn from the way in which Latin America and the Caribbean have settled 
long-standing internal conflicts’.9 In recent times, the successful military action 
against the world’s longest insurgency in Colombia has been hailed a 
‘neglected success story’.10 In foreign policy and military circles Colombia’s 
counterinsurgency programme is referred to as a ‘model counterinsurgency’ 
with lessons for eager political scientists and think tanks to copy and paste to 
far-flung failing states such as Afghanistan.11 With little fanfare, the Colombian 
authorities are today training the army and police forces of their South and 
Central American counterparts that are battling their own internal security 
dilemmas. International recognition of this ‘success’ is now set to roll out the 
Colombian model of delivering security outside of Latin America and to other 
troubled regions in the global South. 
 
Does this mean that the Colombian war has ended?12 This is certainly the 
perception outside of Colombia. Recent security advances against the 
country’s armed insurgent groups such as Las Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, FARC-EP or FARC for short) and El Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (the National Liberation Army, ELN), as well as the 
demobilisation of the paramilitary organisation, Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC) are cited as 
evidence that the Colombian civil conflict is finally drawing to an end. 
According to official figures released by the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia 
(National Directorate of Intelligence, DNI) and the Colombian government, the 
armed offensive against the FARC and ELN has dramatically reduced the 
number of irregular combatants. The country’s largest insurgent group, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 ‘UN, Latin American Leaders Stress Regional Cooperation for Global Peace,’ Miami 
Herald, June 8, 2013. 
10 Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Colombia’s Neglected Story,’ Foreign Policy, July 29, 2010.  
11 Robert Haddick, ‘Colombia Can Teach Afghanistan (and the United States) How to 
Win,’ Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2010); Also see: Thomas A. Marks, 
‘A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002 – 2006) vs. FARC,’ Military 
Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (2007) pp. 41-56; Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army 
Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2002). 
12  For a recent debate on this topic see: Kyle Johnson and Michael Jonsson, 
‘Colombia: Ending the Forever War?,’ Survival, Vol. 55, No.1 (2013) pp. 67-86. 
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FARC, has seen its numbers cascade from an estimated 20,766 members in 
2002 to 7168 by 2013.13 The ELN at its apex commanded an army of close to 
5,000. 14  Today its numbers are estimated at 1,380.15  The Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme with the paramilitary 
group, AUC, had seen over 40,000 combatants demobilised with 18,000 
weapons surrendered by 2007.16 
 
The figures quoted by international organisations and Latin American 
governments flatter to deceive. The establishment of democratic 
governments, impressive figures of economic growth and security 
advancements obscure the murky reality of Latin American security. The 
largest economies of the region, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are afflicted 
with hideous rates of criminality, homicides and human insecurity. Indeed, 
Latin America is the only region of the world with a rising homicide rate.17 
Official employment figures have historically obscured the fact that the 
informal economy is the main source of employment for the vast majority of 
the region’s population. According to International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
47 per cent of Latin America’s non-agricultural employment is in the informal 
sector.18 The income distribution in Latin America is the most unequal in the 
world and the root cause of unrest and political conflict. The recent wave of 
protests in Brazil,19 Mexico,20 Argentina21 and Colombia22 received little press 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Juan Guillermo Mercado, ‘Desmovilización, Principal Arma Contra las Guerrillas,’ 
El Tiempo, September 22, 2013. 
14 ‘ELN,’ Insight Crime, http://www.insightcrime.org/groups-colombia/eln.  
15 Juan Guillermo Mercado, ‘Desmovilización, Principal Arma Contra las Guerrillas.’ 
16 Douglas Porch and María José Rasmussen, ‘Demobilization of Paramilitaries in 
Colombia: Transformation or Transition?,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, 
No. 6 (2008) p. 520. 
17 ‘Latin America Accounts for more than 30% of the World’s Homicides,’ The World 
Bank, March 5, 2014; Steven Dudley, ‘Criminal Evolution and Violence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean,’ Insight Crime, June 26, 2014. 
18‘ILO Head in Latin America: More, but also Better Jobs are Needed,’ ILO, January 
30, 2013. 
19 Tim Padgett, ‘What Brazil’s Protests say about Latin America’s Fumbling Elites,’ 
Time Magazine, June 19, 2013; Akemi Nitahara, ‘Manifestações de Junho Tiraram o 
Foco dos Grandes Eventos que o Brasil Recebeu em 2013, Avaliam Pesquisadores,’ 
Agência Brasil, September 18, 2013. 
20  ‘Protestas en la Víspera del Informe Presidencial en México, BBC Mundo, 
September 1, 2013. 
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coverage outside the Spanish-speaking world but reveal much about the 
social troubles bubbling just beneath the surface of the largest and most 
vibrant economies in the region.23 
 
The pressing needs of Latin America have been largely ignored over the past 
decade. The attention of Western states, and in particular scholarly work, has 
switched to terrorism in the Middle East and poverty and conflict across 
Africa. Latin Americanists have frequently lamented the lack of attention paid 
to the region. 24  The problems facing countries in Latin America appear 
eternally unfashionable and so have not evoked the West’s moral crusade, 
which has been the case for Africa’s poor, and the security issues facing the 
region are rarely seen outside of the prism of the drugs trade.25 Nowhere is 
this persistent myopia more troubling than in Colombia. 
 
Traditionally, Colombia has been seen as the Latin American anomaly.26 The 
political and economic trajectory of the country is markedly different from 
other Latin American states. Colombia boasts the oldest democratic tradition 
in the continent. The Armed Forces, unlike Colombia’s Latin American 
counterparts, have steered away from direct political intervention. In terms of 
the economy, the country has an impressive record with an almost an 
unbroken economic growth over decades. The nation’s foreign debt has not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 ‘Multidinaria Protesta en Argentina Contra el Gobierno de Cristina Fernández,’ El 
País, April 19, 2013. 
22 ‘Las Verdaderas Razones de las Protestas en Colombia,’ El País, September 3, 
2013. 
23 For a wider discussion on social protest in economically successful countries see 
Moisés Naím, ‘In Brazil, Turkey, and Chile, Protests Follow Economic Success,’ 
Bloomberg Businessweek, June 27, 2013. 
24 Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul (London: 
Yale University Press, 2009); David Bushnell, ‘South America,’ Hispanic American 
Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (1985) pp. 772, 783-785. 
25 Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, (eds.) Drugs and Democracy in Latin 
America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Scott B. 
MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade (London: 
Praeger, 1988); Mary P. Lassiter, (ed.) Economics, Politics and Social Issues in Latin 
America (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007). 
26 Robert H. Dix, The Politics of Colombia (New York: Praeger, 1987) p. 11; David 
Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1993) p. vii; Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in 
Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 
1989) p. ix. 
 6 
generated severe economic crises as it has done repeatedly in other Latin 
American states. Yet puzzlingly, and despite these political and economic 
successes, Colombia has been beset by violence throughout its history. Since 
1946, the country has consolidated its position as one of the world’s most 
violent nations. According to data collected by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, ‘Colombia remains the country with the highest number of internally 
displaced persons in the world, with a total between 4.9 and 5.5 million’. 27 
These figures are put into context when compared with the country’s total 
population, which reveal that 10.3 to 11.6 per cent of the country’s population 
are internally displaced. This astonishing figure is set to grow. In 2012, the 
most recent wave of the internal armed conflict forced 230,000 to flee their 
homes.28 Despite recent celebrations of ‘Colombia’s neglected success story’ 
and its ‘model counterinsurgency’, the conflict is far from over and the human 
cost remains intolerably high. 
 
Colombia’s conflict is increasingly emblematic of violent conflict in the global 
South. The country’s relatively successful democratic and economic trajectory 
has not been reflected in the nation’s social development. The case of 
violence in Colombia offers stark lessons to democratising and developing 
states in Latin America and beyond. The history of violent conflict in this 
country, which has run parallel with democracy and economic success, 
challenges the conventional developmental models of achieving peace in the 
global South.  
 
Colombia’s paradoxical democracy – a successful failed state – could well be 
the future for other Latin American nations. Symptoms of the possible 
trajectory can already be observed in the region. Alongside democracy and 
economic growth, huge social and political troubles run just beneath the 
surface. Social unrest has ranged from protests and strikes across wide-
ranging sectors of Latin American  society relating to the economy, public 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Global Overview 2012: People Internally Displaced 
by Conflict and Violence,’ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, April 2013. 
28 ibid. 
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reactions to human rights abuses, political scandals, widespread criminality 
and a booming contraband trade of oil, drugs, gold and other commodities.29  
 
Colombia is no longer the Latin American anomaly. Violent democracies are 
now the Latin American norm. Brazil and Mexico, the two largest economies 
of the region and democratically functioning countries, are experiencing 
spiralling levels of violence and social unrest.30 A 2013 report from Brazil’s 
Forum of Public Security and the Open Society Foundations concluded that 
the country’s security forces are beset by a ‘culture of violence’ with almost 
2000 people killed by the police in 2012.31 In Mexico, most estimates of the 
death toll of violence since late 2006 are numbered around 60,000.32 It comes 
as no surprise that Latin America is the only region in the world where the 
overall homicide rates increased between 2000 and 2010.33  
 
Despite the fact that Colombia is home to one of the world’s longest running 
conflicts, the relative lack of scholarly attention this country is striking. For 
decades Colombia did not fit the Latin American economic and political 
models. However, today parallels can be drawn across this increasingly 
economically successful but violent region. Not only has Colombia suffered 
the misfortune of being ‘the least studied of the major Latin American 
countries’ within the realm of area studies, the very subject of Colombia’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Robert L. Ayres, (ed.) Crime and Violence as Development Issues (New York: 
World Bank Publications, 1998); Nizah Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political 
Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2002); Rob Glastra, Cut and Run: Illegal Logging and Timber Trade in the 
Tropics (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998); Roberto 
Briceño-León and Verónica Zubillaga, ‘Violence and Globalization in Latin America,’ 
Current Sociology, Vol. 50, No.1 (2002) pp. 19-37; Pablo Fanjnzylber, Norma Loayza 
and Daniel Lederman, Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: 
An Empirical Assessment (New York: World Bank Publications, 1998). 
30 João Feres Junior and Fábio Kerche, ‘Social Unrest and Political Reform in Brazil,’ 
North American Congress on Latin America, July 4, 2013; Kyle Barron, ‘Protests in 
Brazil Reflect Ongoing Disparities,’ North American Congress on Latin America, June 
25, 2013; Hank Johnston and Paul Almeida, (eds.) Latin American Social 
Movements: Globalization, Democratization and Transnational Networks (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 
31 Miriam Wells, ‘Why do Brazilian police kill?,’ Insight Crime, November 21, 2013. 
32 ‘Q&A: Mexico’s drug-related violence,’ BBC News, November 25, 2013. 
33 UNDP, ‘Seguridad Ciudadana con Rostro Humano: Diagnostic y Propuestas para 
América Latina,’ Informe Regional de Desarrollo Humano 2013-2014, November 
2013. 
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insecurity has arguably been misappropriated by others fields of social 
science.34 
 
In recent times, the conceptualisation of the Colombian conflict has been 
shaped by a generalised debate about post-modern conflicts in an era of 
globalisation and identity. The dominating theories in this area of scholarship 
are “new wars”35 and “greed vs. grievance”.36 In both academic and policy 
circles, the forces of globalisation and in particular “greed” are hailed as the 
most important causal factors for civil conflict in the global South. 
Undoubtedly, these classifications have been useful in shedding light on the 
dynamics of intra-state conflict in a globalised world. In particular, they have 
helped to theorise an important element of violent conflict: criminality. 
However, criminality is hardly an unexpected symptom of war. Political, social 
and economic upheaval gives way to black markets in almost all situations of 
violent conflict. In focusing on a universal phenomenon, these theories have 
corroded our specific understanding of violent conflict as they unduly focus on 
criminality in an attempt to establish broad causal factors that link a wide 
range of civil conflicts across the world as a homogenous phenomenon. In 
reality, there is no single type of violent conflict. The origins, motivations and 
objectives of violence in countries vary considerably and are often dependent 
on particular local factors as a driving force of internal insecurity. 
 
The debate over “new wars” has played a major role in framing our 
understanding of violence in Colombia. Mary Kaldor, the instigator of “new 
wars” theory, has asserted that the core drivers of these “new” types of 
conflict are closely related to globalisation, which simultaneously fragments 
the nation-state and renders identity-processes increasingly insecure. Despite 
ten years of writing and discussion, the debate over the nature of “new wars” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, p. vii. 
35 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999).  
36 Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’ in Mats Berdal and 
David M. Malone, (eds.) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Paul Collier, ‘Causas Económicas de las 
Guerras Civiles y sus Implicaciones para el Diseño de Politicas,’ El Malpensante, 
Vol. 30, May-June (2001) p. 28-53. 
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remains active.37 Kaldor’s theory of “new wars” is representative of broader 
shifts within academia and policy-making circles in a post-Cold War world. 
There is an emerging consensus that the complexity of intra-state conflict in 
the countries of the global South could no longer be explained through 
traditional interstate power relations. In their rush to claim new paradigms that 
critique the impact of globalisation, academics have arguably been drawn into 
a process that parallels globalisation itself.  
 
By contrast, this thesis asserts that Colombia is not a “new war”. It is instead 
an old and long war with a complex lineage, which has been undoubtedly 
impacted by the forces of globalisation. However, the characteristics hailed as 
“new” by conflict theorists are not new to area studies specialists who are 
familiar with the history of Colombia. Indeed, the country has experienced 
paramilitary activity and high civilian death tolls intermingled with widespread 
criminality throughout its history. Colombia’s war, one of the longest and 
oldest globally, has emerged in the context of a paradoxical democracy where 
dysfunctional democratic institutions have served as a de facto oligarchy, 
masking deep social, political and economic insecurities for decades. 
 
The most provocative theory of civil conflicts to have emerged in recent times 
is that of “greed vs. grievance”. This approach has been led by Paul Collier of 
the World Bank. He argues that the distinction between “greed” and 
“grievance” is important in understanding the motivation for civil war. 38 
Drawing on an impressive range of statistical data on civil wars since 1945, 
the rather generalised conclusion of Collier’s work is that ‘grievance-based 
explanations of civil war’ were ‘seriously wrong’.39 In short, he asserts that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars,’ Stability: International Journal of Security 
and Development, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013) pp. 1-16. 
38 For literature on the greed school of thought see: Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 
‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War,’ Policy Research Working Paper, Paper No. 2355 
(Washington D.C: World Bank, 2001); Paul Collier, ‘Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal 
Activity,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2002) pp. 838-852; James 
Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,’ American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003) pp. 91-106; Mats Berdal and David Malone, 
(eds.) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000). 
39 Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War,’ p. 91. 
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economic motivations for conflict are more important than political or 
ideological explanations.  Indeed, the conclusions of his study had a major 
impact upon policy prescriptions that address civil wars as well as academic 
debates. The long-standing view that civil strife related to political grievances, 
such as rising expectations and relative deprivation, 40  the disruption of 
traditional social structures through modernisation, 41  inequality, 42  ethnic 
cleavages and nationalism, 43  was fundamentally called into question by 
Collier.  
 
Is the Colombian conflict a “greedy” war? There are indeed strong links 
between criminal economic activities, paramilitary groups and rebel 
organisations. Criminality and war have gone hand in hand for centuries. But, 
to suggest that greed fuels conflict is a gross simplification of any conflict. The 
theory fails to provide a credible explanation as to why thousands of people 
would risk their lives and live in harsh living conditions, often much worse than 
they would have otherwise experienced in rural Colombia, in order to 
generate an armed uprising. Most importantly, this theory gives no significant 
attention to the lack of legal economies in war torn countries. This thesis 
argues that widespread criminality and “greed” in Colombia is a mere 
symptom of political exclusion and economic and security grievances. It 
illustrates persistent failures by the Colombian government to address issues 
such as rural poverty, unemployment, political exclusion and the protection 
the basic human rights of its citizens. These are instead the key drivers for 
internal insecurities, criminality and violent conflict. 
 
The main prism through which Colombia has been viewed has been 
America’s “War on Drugs”. Almost all the literature in this field relates to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, University of Princeton Press: 1970). 
41 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London, Yale University 
Press, 1968). 
42 Barrington Moore Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White 
Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1978); Edward N. Muller, ‘Income Inequality, Regime 
Repressiveness, and Political Violence,’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 
1 (1985) pp. 47-61. 
43  Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
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counter-narcotics. The increasing prevalence of drug use in America and the 
cultivation and production of narcotics in Colombia has been at the forefront of 
the political agenda between the two states and accordingly the focus of much 
of the scholarly work in this area. This body of scholarship on the Colombian 
conflict in the English-speaking world is considerable and much of it is well 
researched. It has provided detailed insights in US-Colombian relations and 
the implications of this bilateral relationship for the internal conflict, however 
the overt emphasis on the drugs trade is deeply problematic.44 Colombian 
security has been repeatedly framed in terms of Cold War counter-subversion 
programmes, the War on Drugs and most recently the Global War on Terror. 
This has led the subject of Colombia to be embedded in a debate that is 
ultimately about the security of the United States. 
 
Accordingly, Colombian security is never for Colombia. Instead, it is for and 
about the safety of the United States. As a result, the substantial body of 
literature on Colombian security suffers from two main problems. Firstly, the 
Colombian conflict has been dehistoricised in this scholarship. As the US is 
seen as the main perpetuator in the conflict, either in terms of its intervention 
through military aid and training or as the world’s foremost consumer of illegal 
narcotics, Colombia’s conflict is seen to have begun during the 1960s. For US 
foreign policy practitioners and detractors of US foreign policy alike, the 1962 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44  Richard Downes, Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenges of 
Colombia in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 1999); Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy 
of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability (Washington DC: 
Rand Inc., 2001); David Passage, The United States and Colombia: Untying the 
Gordian Knot (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000); 
Raphael Perl, ‘US-Andean Drug Policy’ in Bruce Bagely and William Walker, (eds.) 
Drug Trafficking in the Americas (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1995); Bruce 
Bagely and Juan Tokatlian, ‘Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of US-Latin 
American Drug Policies’ in Jonathon Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz and Augusto Varas, 
(eds.) The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War 
(London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Russell Crandall, Driven by 
Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Doug Stokes, 
America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed Books, 2005). 
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counterinsurgency programme known as “Plan LASO” marks the beginning of 
the contemporary Colombian conflict.45  
 
This is particularly problematic in a number of respects. Firstly, it does not 
take into account one of the bloodiest periods of violent conflict that preceded 
Plan LASO. Known simply as la Violencia (the Violence), from 1946 to 1958 
an estimated 200,000 people were killed in a conflict that engulfed almost the 
entirety of the country. The social, political and economic changes that were 
brought in by this period of violence are rarely discussed in foreign policy 
literature. This thesis repositions the beginning of the Colombian civil conflict 
and brings La Violencia out of the shadows of a neglected history in order to 
connect it with the lineage of later developments. It argues that only by 
looking at violence in its wider context can we understand the reality of current 
violence and social unrest in Colombia.  
 
Secondly, the literature ignores the role of the Colombian state. The 
Colombian government and the country’s democratic institutions are highly 
regarded in Washington. The Colombian two-party system is hardly alien to 
the US and other Western states. It is certainly not seen as a possible 
contributor to Colombian insecurity. In US foreign policy accounts, the 
Colombian government is portrayed only as a willing recipient of foreign 
military aid. There is little attention paid to the inner-workings of the 
Colombian political system and most importantly the dysfunctional relationship 
between the elected Colombian government and the Colombian people. This 
thesis addresses this disconnect by exploring the conflict through an 
examination of the role of the Colombian state in the implementation of 
various policies that have failed to alleviate the situation of the rural poor over 
decades and highlights how persistent failures have led to a spiralling of 
violence. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 On the origins of this see: Dennis M. Rempe, 'The Origin of Internal Security in 
Colombia: Part I — A CIA Special Team Surveys la Violencia, 1959–60,’ Small Wars 
& Insurgencies, Vol.10, No. 3 (1999) pp. 24-61.  
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The goal of this research is therefore twofold. Firstly, it seeks to escape the 
Americanisation of the conflict. Secondly, it challenges the dominating 
theories of civil conflict advanced by political economists determined to apply 
numbers. Importantly, none of these areas of scholarship and research have 
focussed on the internal dynamics of the Colombian conflict, despite the fact 
they have shaped the conceptualisation of violence in both academic and 
policy terms. Therefore, this thesis seeks to resist these twin incursions by 
deploying approaches derived from history and area studies in an attempt to 
rediscover the real face of Colombian insecurity.  By shifting the focus of the 
scholarship to the local and the microcosmic, this hopefully provides a 
platform for an alternative view of Colombian security, which is rooted in the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. 
 
Why has an area studies approach been selected? First, area studies is an 
intrinsically interdisciplinary approach, perhaps even transdisciplinary. It 
allows research to encompass various disciplines across the social sciences 
and humanities, which has given this study the scope to draw significantly 
from both historical and political insights to explain the problem of Colombian 
security. Area studies scholars are often ‘foreign’ specialists looking from 
outside, but are nevertheless committed to celebrating the uniqueness of the 
places they study, not the wind-tunnel of statistical regression. Area studies 
offers a ‘bottom-up’ approach that challenges recent theories by focusing on 
the internal dynamics of violence at a local level.46  
 
Secondly, it has allowed me to leverage my existing research skills and 
previous experience in Latin America. During my undergraduate degree I was 
fortunate to have the opportunity to spend twelve months in Argentina. This 
time was used to build up my proficiency in the Spanish language and write 
my dissertation on the ground using local data. This project examined the role 
of human rights organisations in the democratisation of Argentina from 1976 
to 1983. Despite little knowledge of Spanish or how to build research 
networks, during the year I was able to make significant links with human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  Robert H. Bates, ‘Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible 
Synthesis,’ Africa Today, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1997) pp. 123-131. 
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rights organisations, namely Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo and by the end 
of my time in Argentina I was fluent in Spanish. This experience was 
incredibly beneficial, not only in terms of gaining important linguistic and 
research skills but also in exposing me to the realities of modern Latin 
America.  
 
During my visit in 2007, Argentina was reeling from the collapse of its 
economy. For Argentinians, democracy and a free market economy had not 
lived up to its promises of providing security for its people. During the historic 
trials of various military generals who ruled the country and were responsible 
for the disappearance of an estimated 30,000 people, the hidden hand of the 
security state reappeared. Jorge López was a key witness in this trial. During 
the military dictatorship he was tortured by security officials and detained for 
three years until 1979. In 2007, almost 30 years after his horrifying 
experience, he once again disappeared. Thousands marched in the streets of 
Buenos Aires during this trial demanding answers to his whereabouts. Fingers 
were pointed at many directions, however his disappearance remains a 
mystery. The events resonated for me and underlined the way in which the 
personal related to the political with Latin American security. 
 
My interest in human rights naturally led me to the case of Colombia, the Latin 
American anomaly. In the course of my current research project it has 
dawned on me that Colombia’s experience could well be the future for other 
democratic Latin American states. The banality of human rights abuses under 
the guise of democracy in this region of the world shocked me in 2007 and 
continues to have this effect today. One of the great difficulties in carrying out 
modern historical research in Latin America is the lack of archival material 
available - this is not uncommon in developing countries. There is a significant 
lack of resources to carry out declassification, even of inert records, as well as 
a desire of the authorities not to disclose their more controversial activities to 
the public. 
 
While Colombian history is littered with violence the written record is elusive. 
Many of the human rights abuses in this country have taken place at the 
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hands of the government or government aligned paramilitary groups who 
control the written record. Meanwhile, investigative journalists, academics, 
activists and out-spoken members of Colombian society who might generate 
an alternative account have been repressed. Many have been victims of 
sexual violence, torture and in many cases death. 47  Lack of official 
governmental material, together with an absence of what we might call a 
counter-archive, makes contemporary historical research in Colombia a 
difficult task.  
 
The University of Warwick also placed limits on the work for this project out of 
an appropriate concern for researcher safety. These restrictions did not 
impede my work unduly. During my two-month research trip, I was required to 
keep my work limited to the capital city, Bogotá. Although Bogotá is not the 
centre of violence in Colombia, it is the political and academic epicentre of the 
country. Here I was able to work as a visiting Research Fellow at the Centro 
de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (Conflict Analysis Research 
Centre, CERAC). CERAC is one of the leading research institutes in 
Colombia. The centre collects valuable data on violence in the country using 
press and local sources. This centre was vital in providing primary material in 
the form of press clippings from a wide variety of sources from 1946 to 
present day as well as secondary literature from Colombian sources. Both of 
these resources are costly and difficult to come by from outside of Colombia. 
In addition, CERAC also provided me with access to their archives, which 
contain useful insights and conflict analysis from a wide-range of Colombian 
academics and on the ground information from local sources in the various 
conflict-ridden areas of the country.  
 
This thesis attempts an ambitious historical analysis of Colombian security 
from 1946 to present day in an effort to demonstrate the unchanging nature of 
the conflict. The intention behind this ‘longue durée’ is to resist the tendency !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Jineth Bedoya Lima is one of Colombia’s most well known journalists. She was 
abducted at a state prison during a work related visit. She was subsequently raped 
and tortured. See Jineth Bedoya Lima, ‘Outlook,’ BBC World Service, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p0139wl2/Outlook_Jineth_Bedoya_Lima/.  
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to divide Colombia in to epochs imposed by phases of American security 
concerns – first counter-communism then counter-narcotics, then finally 
counter-terrorism. This has, in turn, imposed a demanding research schedule. 
Whilst it would have been desirable to have spent longer in Colombia and 
travelled widely for local data collection, this was not possible due to funding 
and security constraints. Even with the widest geographical access, the 
political constraints on declassification in Colombia ensured that most of the 
pertinent files for security in the period after 1946 remain closed.  
 
Fortunately, archival material from the US and UK diplomatic records has 
offset this shortfall. Both of these countries have had long histories of 
economic and political interest in Latin America. The governments of the US 
and UK have enjoyed diplomatic representation in various forms in 
Colombia’s main cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali for decades. Their 
diplomats not only sent home volumes of local documentation but also spoke 
confidentially to key government personnel, and in some cases even to 
resistance figures, recording their opinions. As a result, a huge amount of 
information relating to the internal politics of Colombia has been amassed in 
Washington and London.  
Diplomacy is an almost universal institution, generating diplomatic records of 
a remarkable consistency for regions of the world that otherwise present area 
studies with demanding problems. They offer avenues of study for countries 
where the governments conspire to resist the study of their own recent 
history. Arguably, the methods and content of diplomatic history have much to 
offer other areas of scholarship, including area studies, but as a field 
diplomatic history is perceived as being somewhat detached from other areas 
of political-scientific study. Some have argued that the departure of diplomatic 
history from the philosophical mainstream of both political science and of 
history in general, is problematic and ‘has left the field in dire straits’.48 This 
thesis has sought to create a methodological alliance between area studies 
and diplomatic history. Indeed, one suspects that new inter-disciplinary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Karl W. Schweizer & Matt J. Schumann, 'The Revitalization of Diplomatic History: 
Renewed Reflections,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2008) pp. 149-186. 
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alliances across a range of fields will assist diplomatic history in finding new 
traction and even a new vision.49 !
The research approach taken by this thesis therefore contains a certain 
amount of irony. At a theoretical level it seeks to escape the “Americanising” 
notions of US foreign policy specialists and the globalising notion of political 
scientists. Yet it is, at one and the same time, dependent on the diplomatic 
representatives of the very same phenomena for its primary sources. Perhaps 
this is not so strange. Latin American studies itself is largely a projection of 
US government initiatives.50 Moreover, government representatives in foreign 
lands in many ways resemble area studies scholars. They spend long periods 
of time in a country, learn a language, read local newspapers, work with the 
local population in various capacities and as a result gather types of 
information that are not always available from other means of historical data 
collection, such as interviewing. In this regard, the use of US and UK archival 
sources, some of which have been obtained early through FOI requests, has 
been a major factor in supporting this research project. As it develops further, 
the UK shift from a 30-year rule to a 20-year rule will hopefully uncover yet 
more pertinent material.51 !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Laura McEnaney, 'Personal, Political, and International: A Reflection on Diplomacy 
and Methodology,’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012) pp. 769-772. 
50  Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, 'Latin American Studies and United States Foreign 
Policy,’ II Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012) pp. 8-12. 
51 Ravi Arvind Palat, 'Fragmented Visions: Excavating the Future of Area Studies in a 
Post-American World,’ Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 19, No. 3, Social 
Science Concepts (1996) pp. 269-315. 
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Chapter One 
Representations of the Colombian Conflict 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
The Colombian conflict has persisted for almost seventy years. For decades, 
it has been by far the most troubling humanitarian crisis in the Western 
Hemisphere. Colombia has emerged as the archetypal conflict of the global 
South – a long, intractable internal war with a myriad of irregular armed 
actors. Across the academic sub-disciplines of the social sciences that relate 
to the study of security and conflict in the global South, the representation of 
violence is varied. For scholars of international security, the understanding of 
violence in the global South has been shaped by the various epochs that 
relate to broader international dynamics such as the Cold War, War on Drugs 
and the Global War on Terror. Within the field of global governance, scholarly 
attention has focussed on the impact of the forces of globalisation on the 
dynamics of intrastate conflict. For development economists, rational choice 
theory has underpinned the understanding of civil wars and a strong 
emphasis on the political economy of violence has emerged as a central point 
of reference.  
 
Contemporary explanations of conflict offer details insights into the dynamics 
of civil conflict in the global South. However, the heavy emphasis on 
generalised dynamics of conflict has resulted in the neglect of local dynamics 
and the internal histories of conflict-ridden countries of the global South. This 
thesis calls for a ‘bottom up’ approach to conflict analysis through the 
application of insights from the trans-disciplinary field of Area Studies. This 
allows the research to draw from a variety of literature and data that relates to 
the internal politics, society, economy, history and geography, which provides 
a more nuanced understanding to the development of conflict and violence. In 
terms of contemporary relevance, the anticipation is that through a localised 
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understanding of conflict we are better placed to consider policies for 
transitional justice and peace in conflict-ridden countries.  
 
Colombia makes an excellent case study for ‘bottom up’ conflict analysis. 
Firstly, there is a great deal of research in the disciplines of International 
Security, Governance and Development Economics that relate to the security 
dilemmas faced in Colombia. This provides an excellent insight into the 
broader theoretical debates as well as policy prescriptions that have been 
applied to dealing with insecurity and violence in the country. Secondly, 
although country studies of Colombia have featured less frequently in the 
realm of Latin Americanist literature, a wealth of research has been carried 
out by Colombian academics. This covers a wide variety of literature that 
relates to the internal politics, society, economy, history and geography. 
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges faced by scholars of International 
Security, Governance and Development Economics is the linguistic barrier – 
the vast majority of the literature in the Spanish language. This thesis 
overcomes this barrier by making use of rich local research. Finally, the 
duration of the conflict allows the thesis to offer a longitudinal analysis of 
internal developments of the conflict in Colombia from 1946 to the present day 
in a nuanced manner that takes into account both broader international 
dynamics, local and regional ones as well as continuities over time. 
 
This chapter addresses current approaches to the understanding of the 
Colombian conflict. It offers a critique of current approaches and highlights 
how an Area Studies approach that takes into consideration the internal 
politics, society, economy, history and geography can help us gain a better 
understanding of some of the key questions surrounding Colombian violence 
– what is the role of the Colombian state? How has the structure of Colombian 
society shaped the development of violence? What are the key features of the 
economy and how has this impacted the formation of armed groups? What 
can the history of violence in Colombia tell us about contemporary modes of 
violence? How has the geography of the country stimulated the growth of 
violence in certain regions? 
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Representations of the Colombian Conflict 
 
Colombian history is a history of war. Since 1946 it is estimated that 10 million 
people have died in this country as the result of a melange of violent activity 
that encompasses every kind of low intensity conflict. In their quests to find a 
solution to the Colombian problem, academics, journalists and policymakers 
alike have expended much ink on defining the conflict. In academic debates, 
Colombia can be represented as a “new war”,52 a “greedy” war,53 a fragile 
state,54 a society at war,55 or as an internal armed conflict.56 In journalistic 
accounts, the Colombian conflict is heralded as an imperialist war waged by 
the United States in its backyard.57  Governmental representations of the 
conflict analyse the violence from several perspectives that define the 
violence as armed groups struggling to take over power, a democratic nation-
state under the threat of narco-terrorism, and a low intensity armed conflict.58 
 
The plurality of definitions surrounding the conflict has important political 
consequences. Each definition has represented the conflict in a particular way 
and placed emphasis on specific dynamics. With every definition of the 
conflict comes a varying proposition on how to deal with the situation. 
Possible solutions range from military action to rid the country of the ‘enemy’ 
to political solutions involving negotiations with irregular armed groups. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999). 
53 Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’ in Mats Berdal and 
David M. Malone (eds.) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Paul Collier, ‘Causas Económicas de las 
Guerras Civiles y sus Implicaciones para el Diseño de Politicas,’ El Malpensante, 
Vol. 30, May-June (2001). 
54 James A. Piazza, ‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote 
Transnational Terrorism?,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2008) pp. 
469-488. 
55 Elsa Blair, Muertes Violentas: La Teatralización del Exceso, (Medellín: Universidad 
de Antioquia, 1999). 
56 Liliana Franco, ‘El Mercenarismo Corporativo y la Sociedad Contrainsurgente,’ 
Estudios Políticos, Vol. 21, July-December (2002) pp. 55-82. 
57 Mario A. Murillo, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization 
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004); Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia: Drugs, 
Democracy and War (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004). 
58 Josefina Echavarría, In/Security in Colombia: Writing Political Identities in the 
Democratic Security Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010) p. 3. 
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Definitions are powerful tools. They have the power to name, to qualify certain 
aspects as relevant and to disqualify others, therefore placing value on 
specific dynamics.59  According to Richard Jackson, definitions qualify the 
actors involved, the character of their struggle and the ways of dealing with a 
situation. Thus, ‘language has a reality making effect; it is a way of 
constructing reality and not merely reflecting it.’60  
 
No consensus has been reached on the definition of the Colombian conflict. 
The vast accumulations of policy, academic and journalistic texts that deal 
with this violent conflict illustrate the difficulties of grasping the Colombian 
reality through almost seven decades of violence. The emergence of various 
representations of the Colombian conflict is problematic for three reasons. 
Firstly, representations of conflict are largely driven by external factors, such 
as the end of the Cold War, the US declaration of the War on Drugs and the 
onset of the Global War on Terror. As a result, generalised international 
armed conflict classifications and developments within the study of wars and 
security have conceptually shaped analyses of the Colombian situation.  
 
Secondly, there is emphasis on change in the nature of violence rather than 
continuities. For instance, the representation of Colombia’s insurgent groups 
has shifted over time from communist guerrilla groups, drug lords, to 
terrorists. In more recent times the term ‘narco-terrorists’ has been employed 
to define the insurgent groups.61 Finally, representations of violence are used 
by the Colombian government, its allies and the internationally community to 
further political projects. The representation of the Colombian conflict as a war 
fuelled by the “greed” of armed groups through their involvement in the drugs 
trade has proved popular amongst the policy elite in the nation’s capital, 
Bogotá. As a result, counternarcotic and counterinsurgency operations and 
chemical fumigation have been the favoured methods of countering the 
cultivation and production of illegal narcotics and armed groups in Colombia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 ibid., p. 19. 
60 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-
terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) p. 23. 
61 Dario E. Teicher, ‘The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism,’ 
The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 28 (2005) pp. 1-45.  
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with catastrophic effects. Whilst the cultivation and production of drugs in 
Colombia poses the authorities with serious problems, the excessive 
emphasis on drugs does not reflect the complex linage of conflict and social 
unrest in the country. If the definitions of conflict do not reflect the Colombian 
reality, then the proposed measures to deal with the situation are misplaced. 
 
 
International Security Literature 
 
The role of the United States as the primary economic, cultural and political 
power in the Americas has been explored extensively in academic literature. 
Successive Colombian administrations have altered the representation of the 
conflict according to the perceived threats to US national security. This is 
partly due to the close relationship between the two states since Colombian 
support to the Korean War and the resources available to Colombia from its 
northern ally. Accordingly communism, drugs and terrorism are the three 
banners under which the Colombian conflict has been represented. Scholarly 
literature is largely representative of these three grand narratives, which have 
effectively divided contemporary Colombian history to the extent that it is not 
seen as one continuous cycle of violent conflict. The role of the US as a key 
driver in the Colombian situation is well documented in critical international 
relations literature.62 
 
 
New Wars Debate 
 
The conceptualisation of the Colombian conflict is greatly shaped by theories 
of civil conflict. Since the 1990s, two influential trends in scholarship have 
informed many of the academic and policy analyses of the Colombian conflict: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed Books, 
2005); Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: the Rule of Force in World Affairs 
(Cambridge: South End Press, 2000); Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson 
North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2001); Livingstone, Inside Colombia; 
Murrillo, Colombia and the United States. 
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“new wars”,63 and “greed vs. grievance”.64 Although these theories offer a 
useful insight in to the some of the dynamics of civil conflicts, they have also 
served to dehistoricise and delegitimise the political nature of rebellion in 
Colombia by focussing on “new” and “criminal” elements of the conflict. In 
addition, they have had a significant impact on the language and 
representation of the armed actors, which has periodically changed over 
almost seven decades of violent conflict according to external grand 
narratives. 
 
Mary Kaldor is the instigator of the “new wars” theory. Her study, New and Old 
Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, conceptualises the spate of 
contemporary civil wars during the 1990s, using Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
model. The main thrust of this theory is that the objectives, actors, impact, and 
organisation of these “new wars” seem to differ markedly from the 
Clausewitzean notion of war as battle between opposing forces. In contrast to 
“old” wars, Kaldor argues that the dynamics of globalisation are a key causal 
factor behind “new wars”. “New wars”, according to this study, are 
characterised by the following: state failure and a social transformation driven 
by the intensification of global interconnectedness and liberal economic 
forces; the breakdown of public authority leading to ‘irregular’ armies; an 
increase in ethnic conflicts rather than ideology and territory; a phenomenal 
rise in civilian casualties; the targeting of civilians as objects of war; a 
dependence on internal sources of finance, and massive international 
involvement in the form of foreign media, aid organisations, military advisers, 
and volunteer forces.65 
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Greed vs. Grievance Debate 
 
The second, and arguably most influential, school of thought for the analysis 
of the Colombian conflict is “greed vs. grievance”. Led by Paul Collier of the 
World Bank, this theory controversially argues that from an economic 
viewpoint armed groups are criminal organisations. In sharp contrast to 
previous “grievance”66 related theories, Collier argues that motives of armed 
groups are largely for personal gain and are not fundamentally about 
obtaining popular support. For Collier, every armed groups needs to infuse 
their warriors, and indeed the general population, with ideals that legitimise 
taking arms and dying for a cause. Injustice, oppression and grievances are 
therefore merely part of the discourse and serve to conceal the character of 
organised criminal activities. Rebel groups therefore invest in public relations 
to maintain the support of the warriors and of international financial sources 
and the grievance is largely a consequence of their own need for legitimation 
rather than the real cause for their struggle.67 
 
 
An Area Studies Approach to the Colombian Conflict 
 
The disciplinary divide between the Social Sciences and Area Studies has 
been an on-going debate in academic circles for decades.68 Social scientists 
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have an implicit focus on global trends and forces, whereas Area Studies 
specialists develop knowledge of specific countries and regions. This thesis 
seeks to bridge this divide by establishing a symbiotic relationship between 
the two areas. Area studies must build on the general theoretical frameworks 
that highlight global trends and complement this with insights from a country 
level analysis of violence and security. Equally, area specific knowledge can 
contribute to the understanding of wider dynamics by providing in depth 
analyses which social scientists rely on to produce accurate generalisations of 
global trends.69  
 
This thesis presents a strong case of the application of an Area Studies 
approach to the study of violence conflict and security of the global South. 
Scholarly work in the areas of International Security, “new wars” and “greed 
vs. grievance” have provided us insights into civil conflict and some of the 
wider factors at play – international power relations, globalisation and 
transnational criminality, which will be discussed at greater length in chapters 
two and three. However, generalised explanations of violence in global South 
fail to sufficiently provide explanatory framework as local dynamics are 
neglected. An Area Studies approach allows for a multifaceted and 
internalised analysis of conflict that can provide a more nuanced 
understanding of insecurity. In the case of Colombia, insights from the internal 
politics, society, economy, history and geography reveal a complex linage of 
violence that are rooted in the issue of land. 
 
 
History of Conflict in Colombia 
 
Colombia’s history is littered with bloody conflicts that continue until today. 
This is not an uncommon phenomenon for countries that experience civil war. 
The political, economic and humanitarian impact of conflict is devastating and 
makes states more susceptible to future problems. One of the main ways in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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this thesis challenges contemporary approaches to the study of conflict is by 
taking into account the impact of the history of violence in Colombia which 
have shaped the political, social and economic landscape of the country. 
 
The localised approach here takes into consideration the violent state-making 
process in the country.70 Colombia has been characterised by high levels 
since colonial times and has lamentably staggered from one type of collective 
violence to another ever since. The focus of this thesis is the most recent 
phase of chronic violence from 1946 to present day – the ‘longest spell of 
internal political violence anywhere in the modern world’. 71  It seeks to 
examine the conflict as a process of increasing radicalisation of the 
Colombian political system, which has resulted in a violent and dysfunctional 
democracy.  
 
There have been numerous civil wars throughout Colombian history. Kaldor’s 
assertion that liberal economic forces can drive conflict is correct, however 
this is far from a new phenomenon. For instance, the worldwide rise for the 
demand of coffee and the subsequent fall in prices was one of the main 
contributing factors for the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902), in which as 
estimated 100,000 Colombians perished.72 One of the main continuations of 
conflict in Colombia is the link between liberal economic development and 
violence. The commercialisation of agriculture has led to the emergence of 
conflicting interests between the peasantry and the landed elite since the 
creation of the republic.73 The breakdown in public authority must be seen in 
the context of the agrarian issue. The failure of the Colombian state to 
arbitrate agrarian conflict has entrenched the use of violence to settle 
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accounts in the country, well before the cultivation and production of narcotics 
and recent wave of globalisation. 
 
The War of Thousand Days, which saw an estimated 100,000 killed, ended in 
1902 with the signing of peace treaties between the Liberal and Conservative 
political parties. Following 44 years of relative peace, violence erupted in 1946 
and has never ended. Violence during the 1940s and 1950s is largely framed 
in terms of partisan loyalties. 74  Whilst Liberal and Conservative political 
parties existed elsewhere in Latin America, the depth of party affiliation is 
unique to Colombia. It is the only country in which the political parties that 
dominated politics in the nineteenth century continue to wield power today. 
Indeed, party affiliation was so strong in Colombia that loyalties were almost 
hereditary. Partisan violence was a key element of violence in the mid-1940s. 
In the elections of 1946, power switched from the hands of the Liberals to the 
Conservatives sparking violence across the country. 
 
Colombia’s political system has been historically divided over the issue of 
land. Indeed, this is a problem that continues to today. The question of 
agrarian reform has been at the core of Colombia’s violence and political 
agenda since the 1930s. During the presidency of Alfonso López Pumarejo 
(1934-1938) a series of social reforms, known as La Revolución en Marcha 
(The Marching Revolution) were introduced. 75  These included agrarian 
reform, the implementation of public education, universal male suffrage and 
trade union reform, which greatly alarmed the Colombian political parties. Not 
only did the reforms deepen the divides between the two leading parties, but 
they also sowed factionalism within the political system leading up to the 
bloody civil war that began in 1946. Popular unrest over socioeconomic 
grievances reveals the internal pressures between the landed elite and lower !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Daniel Pécaut, Orden y Violencia: Evolución Socio-Política de Colombia entre 
1930 y 1953 (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 2001); Paul Oquist, Violencia, Conflicto y 
Política en Colombia (Bogotá: Instituto de Estudio Colombianos, 1978); John C. 
Pollock, ‘Violence, Politics and Elite Performance: The Political Sociology of La 
Violencia in Colombia,’ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 10, 
No. 2 (1975) pp. 22-50. 
75 Alvaro Tirado Mejía, La Revolución en Marcha y la Reforma Constitutional de 
1936 (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1985). 
 28 
classes as well as the growing problem of rural disputes over land titles, 
tenant struggles and land invasions by peasant squatters to use large swaths 
of unused or underused parts of large estates. 
 
Repeated cycles of violence have resulted in the following: firstly, the 
consolidation of elite political power between the two warring political parties – 
the Liberals and the Conservatives. These two parties have signed power-
sharing agreements that have excluded ‘third way’ political movements and 
supressed democratic movements. Secondly, violence has exacerbated the 
issue of land tenure shifted social and political struggles in new directions. 
This has resulted in traits of class conflict and increasing hostility between 
campesinos and the Colombian elite. The consolidation of huge swaths of 
land have resulted in a marked increase of new social actors, such as an 
emerging independent workers movement and peasant struggles aligned with 
agrarian associations. Thirdly, political repression has become 
institutionalised in order to deal with future threats, a feature that has 
characterised violence in Colombia until present day. Finally, repeated cycles 
of violence have established the existence of organised criminal bands and 
new social actors. 
 
Through an exploration of the history of violence in Colombia a more complex 
picture of the security situation emerges. This challenges current explanations 
of violent conflict by emphasising the political nature of violence in the country 
with land as a central point of contention. For Kaldor, contemporary conflicts, 
or “new wars” mobilise citizens around identity politics rather than ideology. 
Identity-based conflicts are an unanticipated side effect of the globalisation 
process that has been nurtured under the loss of legitimacy of post-colonial 
states. Global integration not only eroded the autonomy of states and their 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force but also allowed non-state actors, 
such as organised criminal networks and paramilitary groups, to pursue their 
own selfish goals through exclusionist and nationalist policies. “New wars” are 
therefore involve state power as well as various private and non-state actors, 
in which ‘identity politics’ is a means by which political elites reproduce their 
power. Hence in “new wars” ethnic cleansing has been used to achieve 
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political control. Territories are purged of their minorities through the use of 
population displacement techniques and hearts and minds are now won 
through fear and hate. “New wars” are therefore not directed at opposing 
sides, but against civilian populations.76 Whereas in “old” wars these were 
considered to be undesirable and illegal side effects of conflict, identity politics 
and systematic violence are ‘central to the mode of fighting in “new wars”.77 
 
Kaldor is correct in the assertion that civil wars are directed at civilian 
populations. However, this is not a new phenomenon in Colombia. Millions of 
civilians have died as a consequence of Colombia’s numerous civil wars 
throughout the country’s history. The civilian population of this country has 
always suffered as a consequence of state policies and, in particular, the 
inability of successive governments to arbitrate agrarian conflicts has been a 
causal factor. Indeed, La Violencia reflects in many ways what Mary Kaldor 
defines as a “new war”. Arguably, state failure, social transformation driven by 
the intensification of global interconnectedness and liberal economic forces; 
the breakdown of public authority leading to ‘irregular’ armies; a phenomenal 
rise in civilian casualties; the targeting of civilians as objects of war are all 
characteristics that can be observed in La Violencia. 
 
For Kaldor and Collier, the element of criminality is central to violent conflict. 
The analysis of violence in Colombia on a historical basis lends credence to 
this argument. The emergence of armed groups has led to a need of raising 
funds to make funds, however the extent to which the high levels of criminality 
can be considered as “greed” is questionable and will be subject to greater 
discussion in chapter three. An examination of the dynamics of violence on a 
historical basis reveals the diversity of violence that has continued to shape 
the nature of conflict in the country: state sponsored terror, guerrilla activity, 
privatised paramilitary forces and criminality. The relationship between 
rebellion and criminality has been at the centre of a heated debate amongst 
scholars and has serious implications for the way the Colombian conflict is 
perceived. Kidnapping was one of the most common elements of bandit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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activity and subsequent armed Colombian groups have practised this to an 
aberrant extent. The conflation of activities between guerrillas and bandits is a 
real component of the conflict and demonstrates that the unstable boundaries 
between armed groups exists but must be seen in the context of the state’s 
role in the perpetuation of violence. 
 
Kaldor is correct in her assertion that liberal economic forces can drive social 
transformations and violence. This is arguably the case in Colombia since the 
late nineteenth century. This is linked to Colombia’s response to the 
spectacular rise in the price of coffee in the late 1880s and early 1890s and 
marks the beginning of the Colombian land struggle. Colombian land policy 
during this period privatised large swaths of public land, and rather than 
creating a large class of small farmers, this process led to the consolidation of 
large estates in the most economically productive regions of the country. 
Agricultural entrepreneurs asserted rights of private property over areas that 
were occupied by peasant settlers and gave rise to resistance movements 
and widespread confrontations in the form of rural protest and land 
invasions.78 According to a study by Catherine LeGrand, there were as many 
as 450 major confrontations between 1875 and 1930.79 Rural protest and land 
invasions have been a regular occurrence throughout the twentieth century 
and beyond. Criminal activities associated with rural protest include invasions, 
kidnapping and cattle rustling and have been used by various peasant 
movements, including insurgent groups, since the late nineteenth century to 
present day.80 
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Through the emphasis of broader trends and international dynamics the role 
of the Colombian state is a missing dimension of current explanatory 
frameworks. Through the examination of state responses and policies to the 
security dilemmas faced by the country, we able to reposition the state as an 
actor in the conflict. This is particularly important when considering the level of 
human rights abuses carried out at the hands of the state and the central role 
of land as a point of contention for violence in Colombia. In contrast to the 
nostrums of political scientists, class-based explanations have framed the 
work of Colombianist historians and Area Studies specialists. The role of 
Colombian elites and the choices made by them in almost seven decades of 
violence have shaped the dynamics of the conflict from issues of land tenures, 
the decision to implement a two-party power sharing pact, military-paramilitary 
collusion and the displacement of millions in the process of economic 
development. Whilst attempts at reform by some members of the Colombian 
elite illustrate their acknowledgement of the issue of land well into the 20th 
century; successive failures to deal with these deep-rooted problems led to 
the continuation and escalation of rural and urban violence. In line with the 
“greed” thesis, which undermines the role of the disruption of traditional social 
structures through modernisation, class-based explanations for insurgency 
and violence have also been largely overlooked in political science literature 
in recent years. 
 
 
Colombian Politics 
 
An internalised approach to the study of the Colombian conflict allows us to 
delve deeper into the role of the state and wider political dynamics. One of 
most peculiar features of Colombian politics is the democratic nature of 
politics. Elections have taken place every four years despite huge levels of 
security threats and the country has a functioning two party system. However, 
the two party system in itself has been the source of political insecurity. The 
Liberals and Conservatives have history of armed factions that have resulted 
in a series of bloody conflicts highlighted above. In the process of peace 
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making the two political parties have made power sharing pacts which have 
resulted in an exclusionary political system. 
 
For Collier, traditional grievance based approaches are misplaced. Drawing 
on an impressive range of statistical data on civil wars across the world since 
1945, the stark and unequivocal conclusion of Collier’s work suggested that 
‘grievance-based explanations of civil war’ were ‘seriously wrong’.81 According 
to his study, political exclusion is not a useful indicator for the probability of 
civil war. However, the localised approach used in thesis presents a strong 
challenge to this argument. Following the horrors of La Violencia the political 
elites of Colombia joined forces form a coalition power-sharing pact, the 
Frente Nacional. The Frente Nacional institutionalised the control of the two 
parties over political offices and formal political participation well into the 
1970s. This had the effect of trivialising the democratic process by dividing up 
government posts evenly between Liberals and Conservatives, regardless of 
electoral results. According to Jonathan Hartlyn, the result was that alternative 
political movements were excluded from the mainstream political process. In 
other words meaningful opposition became anti-systemic, fuelling leftist 
insurgencies.82  
 
Political exclusion from the democratic political process had two important 
effects on the development of violence. Firstly, it institutionalised state 
sponsored terror through the use of military repression to ‘pacify’ communities 
of Liberal and communist peasants – known as ‘independent republics’ – that 
organised to resist persecution and then fought to retain their autonomy. This 
is of particular significance as it led to the formation of the FARC, the world’s 
most powerful insurgent group during the 1960s. Secondly, political exclusion 
radicalised the populist ANAPO support into formation of yet another 
insurgent group, the M-19, as a result of the 1970 election, in which a broad 
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political ties between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the Frente 
Nacional coalition effectively abandoned the politically sensitive issue of 
agrarian question and rural grievances. Importantly, this led emergence of 
new armed actors and radicalised the peasantry, many of whom by the end of 
the 1970s had opted to cooperate with rural guerrilla organisations. 
 
The elitist nature and exclusionary policies of the Colombian political system 
reveal two important driving factors for violence. Firstly, it illustrates the role of 
the state in the perpetuation of violence – a factor that is not emphasised in 
current analyses of violence conflict; and secondly, that Collier’s argument 
that political exclusion does not have a significant impact is misplaced. 
Importantly, this analysis lends support to the wider argument presented in 
this thesis which illustrates the political nature of violence in Colombia. 
 
 
Colombian Society  
Within Colombia a wealth of research has examined the societal impact of 
violence in the country. Dedicated centres of research, such as the Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica and the Centro de Recursos para el Análisis 
de Conflictos have analysed a wide range of issues including the impact of 
violence on the Afro-Colombian community, women and children as well 
policy recommendations for the reintegration of tens of thousands of former 
combatants. The Colombian government defines the current situation within 
the country as a narco-struggle.83 However, Colombian scholars, such as 
Eduardo Piazza and William Ramírez, have questioned the classification of 
the conflict as a civil war and questioned whether it could be better 
understood as a ‘society at war.’84 For William Ramírez the lack of a social 
contract within Colombia is a key causal factor of the national situation: 
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La historia de nuestro país es la de un contracualismo coactivo nunca 
resuelto y, en consecuencia, caracterizado por el hecho de que desde 
varios ángulos del poder social dominante se han impulsado contradictorias 
alternativas de hegemonía nacional sin que desde ninguna de ellas se logre 
el monopolio legítimo de una fuerza que permita articular el inconexo tejido 
de la Nación.85 
 
The history of our country is of a coercive social contract, which has never 
been resolved. It is therefore characterised by various angles of the 
dominant social class that have pushed for contradictory alternatives of 
national hegemony. However, as none of the ruling classes can achieve a 
legitimate monopoly, it gives way to a disjointed nation. 
 
Through an examination of the Colombian situation as a ‘society of war’, mass 
violent conflict can be widely explored. The complicated nature of the 
Colombian conflict cannot be simply reduced to left-wing guerrillas fighting 
right-wing self-defence groups and the armed forces. The violence involves a 
myriad of actors, which includes non-combatants. Colombian citizens fight 
each other and often provide support, intelligence and assistance to various 
armed groups. Peace in a ‘society at war’ cannot be achieved by purely 
military means. Peace requires the state to address the economic and 
security grievances in the country, and therefore a socio-political solution to 
the violence is required. 
 
A localised approach to the study of conflict that has been applied to this 
thesis enables the exploration of the role played by a wide variety of social 
and political actors. In a country with deep inequalities in land tenure and 
where the agrarian question has led to the formation and widespread support 
for irregular armed groups, it is particularly important to explore the role of 
agrarian movements that are absent from current broad explanatory 
frameworks of violence conflict. 
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The neglect of this group of social actors in contemporary analysis is due to 
wider internal problems. Despite the condition of the rural peasants operating 
as the fundamental driver for much of the instability in Colombia and despite 
the fact that this sector of the population has endured the majority of human 
rights violations in the country, there are few serious analytical studies of the 
peasantry. The lack of scholarly attention in this area in part reflects the high 
illiteracy rates amongst the rural population; very few of them are able to write 
or contribute to the literature of their struggle and theirs is a ‘lost voice’ 
amongst Colombia’s diverse political constituencies. Many of those who were 
initially vocal figures in the peasant struggle either later took up arms with one 
of the country’s guerrilla groups or died during confrontations with the Armed 
Forces. Peasants also face unique difficulties regarding the organisation and 
representation of their interests.86 Their struggle is often occluded by being 
framed as a regional or particularly local issue, whereas in reality in a country 
like Colombia, the rural class are at the core of an agricultural economy.  
 
During the 1970s around half of the total population of Colombia lived in rural 
areas. Agriculture provided 30 per cent of the GNP and 70 per cent of 
Colombia’s export earnings. Poverty, the lack of state presence in rural areas 
and the abandonment of agrarian reform during this period led to 
radicalisation of the peasantry under the ANUC. Although spates of land 
invasions by rural campesinos were has occurred throughout Colombia’s 
history, those of the 1970s posed a serious threat to Colombia’s internal 
security. Between 1971 and 1975 alone around 2000 haciendas were 
invaded.87 This increasingly open confrontation between the peasantry and 
the political elite became one of the most prominent axes of the Colombian 
conflict. The exploration of the political actions of land activists sheds further 
light on the confrontations between the elite and the peasantry. Importantly 
this supports the wider argument of the importance of grievance-based 
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explanations of the conflict and provides a ‘bottom up’ approach to the 
understanding of social conflict in the country. 
 
 
Economy 
 
The political economy of war is a frequent point of reference for Development 
Economists. For Collier, the importance of exporting primary commodities in 
developing countries drives conflict. Primary commodities are more likely to 
be a good proxy for the availability of ‘lootable’ resources.88 This is measured 
as a share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP). 
Primary commodity production does not depend upon complex networks of 
information and transactions, as is the case for manufacturing. Furthermore, it 
is highly profitable as it is based on the exploitation of natural endowments. In 
many cases such exports usually originate from rural areas where organised 
military forces or rebel organisations are able to impose predatory taxation by 
targeting established trade routes. Rebel organisations in particular have an 
advantage over governments and organised military forces with regards to 
taxation over primary commodities, as they are able to levy higher taxation in 
kind. Tax is therefore collected in the form of a non-cash commodity. 
 
The relationship between the export of primary commodities and violent 
conflict is worthy of exploration. Rural violence in many countries, including 
Colombia, can be traced back to the cultivation and production of non-
manufacturing goods, such as coffee. In more recent times, the upsurge of 
violence in Colombia has been linked to the increase in the cultivation in coca, 
which is processed to make cocaine. Coca, like any other crop must be 
cultivated, which makes the importance of exploring the link between primary 
commodities and violence conflict through an agrarian perspective even more 
pressing. Whilst Collier’s work explores useful links between primary 
commodities and armed groups, it implies that resources simply exist for 
predation. The management of resources and specifically the role of the state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in this area are not addressed. This study proposes a more nuanced 
approach by taking into account the role of the state in the management of 
resources and land reform. 
 
The explanation for why young men join rebellions in tied to income-earning 
opportunities. If young men only face the option of poverty, they might be 
more inclined to join a rebellion for better opportunities. Collier approximates 
income-earning opportunities by the amount of the average number of years 
of education received. As education in the developing world is 
disproportionately supplied to young men, the differences in the average 
educational endowment between societies reflect much larger differences in 
the educational endowments of young males.!89 In short, Collier measures the 
economic agenda by primary commodities, the proportion of young men in the 
society, and the endowment of education. His study finds that whilst a higher 
proportion of young men in a society increase the risk of conflict, the greater 
the educational endowment, the lower the risk.90 
 
Collier’s theory assumes that rebellion offers economic opportunities. This is 
in stark contrast to the realities faced by combatants. Colombia’s largest 
insurgent group, the FARC, does not pay its combatants a salary. 91 
Combatants endure extremely difficult living conditions in the country’s rural 
areas, which are characterised by mountainous and jungle terrain. Perhaps 
more importantly, those who join the FARC do so for life. There are little 
material incentives for peasants to join such an insurgency. In terms of 
educational endowment, Collier’s study explores a useful indicator on the 
likelihood of a young Colombian male to join an insurgency, however, this 
study is severely limited in providing indicators on the likelihood of a female to 
join an insurgency. For instance, in Colombia it is estimated that as many as 
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40 per cent of FARC combatants are female.92 For both male and female 
combatants in Colombia, indicators such as the lack of legal employment, 
underemployment and ultimately economic grievances would shed further 
light on this area and provide useful details on the conditions that have lead to 
young men and women in rural areas to join the ranks of various insurgencies 
and paramilitary organisations in Colombia. 
 
Certain dynamics of the Colombian conflict have changed perceptibility in 
recent decades. Increased levels of globalisation, economic recession, and 
expanded access to international flows of funds and weapons in the post-Cold 
War era have all accumulated to the diversification of violence. This time 
period has seen the growth of the number of armed combatants and the 
spread of the violence to previously unaffected areas of the country. However, 
following over almost seven decades of violence, the dysfunctional 
relationship between the government and its people has not been addressed. 
Theories of civil conflict do not account for the role of the state and disregard 
economic and security grievances. Colombia’s paradoxical democracy has 
allowed the government to follow highly militarised policy prescriptions, with 
little checks on the country’s military and intelligence services. The fumigation 
of crops, mass human rights abuses at the hands of the authorities, the 
political genocide of the Colombian left and the military-paramilitary links has 
deepened the mistrust of the traditional political elite and in particular the 
police and armed forces. 
 
How natural resources play a pivotal role in civil war in the post-Cold War era 
is a matter of considerable controversy.93 Examining the Colombian conflict !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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through the lens of the “greed” school highlights the economic factors, which 
have contributed to the intensity and duration of the war in Colombia. 
However, there is little discussion of the role of economic actors – from 
foreign companies involved in natural resource extraction, the financial and 
banking sector that launder unimaginable sums of money,94 insurance and 
private security firms, global arms manufacturers and brokers, local and 
international drug traffickers, to rural coca and poppy growers with few 
alternatives who derive benefit from the economy of war and contribution to 
the continuation of the conflict.95 Despite the enormous body of literature on 
the drugs trade, comparatively, there is comparatively little research on how 
licit trades, such as coffee, oil and the mining of gold, coal and emeralds have 
contributed to the political economy of war in Colombia.  
 
There one point of agreement amongst almost all scholars of the Colombian 
conflict: the coca boom abruptly changed the dynamics of the war. The 1980s 
marked the worldwide boom of the drugs trade, setting the scene for critical 
change in drug producing nations, such as Colombia. Accordingly much of the 
literature has explored the changing dynamics of violence, and in particular 
the political economy of war. The “greed” school provides insightful 
perspectives on civil wars and resource predation, however this is a gross 
simplification of any conflict. This thesis does not disregard the importance of 
the illicit trades in diversifying violence in Colombia. However, it does seek to 
clarify how continuing economic and security grievances that have 
characterised the dysfunctional relationship between the Colombian state and 
its people has fundamentally driven violence since 1946 to present day. 
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In Colombia, one of the most unequal and economically stratified Latin 
American countries, the ‘narrative of grievance’ resonates with reality. 
Peasant rebellions have existed since the privatisation of public lands during 
coffee boom of the nineteenth century. Historically, the Colombian political 
system has not afforded access to parties other than the Liberals and 
Conservatives.96 Sporadic attempts at opening up the political system led to 
the political genocide of the left from the mid-1980s.97 Members of peasant 
leagues and movements have been systemically tortured and murdered over 
decades by paramilitaries and the police and armed forces. The governmental 
incompetency stretches beyond its failure to protect the lives of its citizens. In 
economic terms, the problem of unemployment and underemployment was 
ignored despite stark warnings from the International Labour Organisation 
during the 1970s. 98  Workers’ strikes and protests have been brutally 
repressed over decades. Economic and security grievances are at the core of 
the Colombian armed conflict. Collier’s suggestion of a ‘narrative of grievance’ 
driving civil conflicts reflect a misrepresentation of the experiences of those 
living in destitute and violent conditions over decades. Importantly, like 
Kaldor’s thesis, it fails to address the role of the state in the perpetuation of 
conflict. 
 
 
Geography  
 
State failure in Colombia is a historical problem and not necessarily linked to 
‘global interconnectedness’. According to the Latin Americanist Harvey F. 
Kline, ‘a strong Colombian state has never existed for the majority of its 
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people’, a view that is widely held amongst Colombianists.99 The lack of state 
power is largely a result of the country’s economic geography and 
topography, which divides the nation into three racially, culturally and 
economically distinct regions.100 State failure can therefore be result of local 
conditions and the history of state building, which in the case of Colombia 
have been an important factor in the lack of state presence and the 
perpetuation of conflict throughout the history of the country. Government 
programmes to improve the infrastructure of rural areas have been hindered 
as many rural parts of the country have seen little or no improvement in their 
living conditions due to lack of resources and difficulties in transportation to 
implement schemes. 
 
Local level archive data illustrates the problems posed by the topography of 
the country for the security services. Much of the mountainous terrain, which 
was a breeding ground for insurgency, was historically difficult for security 
services to reach for investigating massacres. Indeed, this is persistent 
problem today. Much of the insurgency and the home of the two leading 
insurgent groups, the FARC and the ELN are in the southern jungle areas. 
This has had an important impact of the dynamics of the conflict and the role 
of civilians as intelligence sources for security officials who are keen for 
information. Local residents have provided authorities with intelligence, local 
knowledge and logistical support for decades particularly in rural areas 
throughout Colombia’s violent history, however they have also suffered 
greatly at the hands of the security services and insurgent groups for their 
role. Through the analysis of the challenges posed by the country’s physical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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geography we are able to examine localised dynamics that include both the 
problems faced by security officials as well as the role of non-combatants.  
 
Colombian Security in an International Context 
 
For Kaldor, globalisation is the key driver of conflict. It is conceived of as the 
‘intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and 
cultural’.101 This process is presented as contradictory; involving integration 
and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and 
localisation, and is framed as the primary cause of contemporary conflicts. 
The ideology of Cold War politics provided a common vocabulary on which to 
build trans-national civil society. During this period, military cooperation 
increased; state armies were tied into inseparable cooperative international 
frameworks through military alliances, international arms production and 
trade, forms of military cooperation, and arms control agreements.102 Cold 
War rivals provided economic and diplomatic assistance to Third World states 
in the competition for control and assistance, deepening their reliance on the 
outside war and ultimately leading to the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate 
organised violence.  
 
How important was great power assistance to Colombia? It is generally 
accepted that there was ideological backing from the USSR to Colombian 
insurgents from the 1960s. To some degree this is true. Written material such 
as leaflets and pamphlets and meetings led by left-wing youth movements, 
some sectors of the clergy and the dissident middle-class in Colombia would 
make reference to their ‘counterparts’ across the world. However, the 
Colombian peasantry hardly needed ideological backing from the USSR. By 
the mid-twentieth century they acquired decades of experience in organising 
rural protests and disturbing the economic processes of the agricultural 
entrepreneurs. Cuban assistance to Colombia is also largely driven by the 
suspicions of the policymakers in Bogotá and Washington. Whilst Havana 
certainly provided training to a relatively small number of would be insurgents, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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primarily from the ELN, the economic assistance was limited. Kaldor’s theory 
is built on the assumption that Cold War assistance to Third World countries 
was great enough to drive conflict. In rural Colombia, the seeds were already 
sown well before the onset of the Cold War due to the land policies 
implemented in Bogotá. 
 
The new focus on the economics of civil conflicts was prompted by the 
observable increase in the self-financing nature of combatant activities. Some 
scholars have interpreted this shift as deeply connected to changes within the 
global political and economic order.103 The end of the Cold War marked the 
decline in foreign state patronage for state and non-state combatants 
throughout the globe. Whilst in some countries, such as Mozambique, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, the withdrawal of external support helped induce 
rebel movements into peace agreements, in other cases, such as Colombia, it 
is seen to have impelled rebels to seek out alternative modes of financing 
their campaigns. 
 
For both Kaldor and Collier external support was central to the emergence 
and growth of armed groups during the Cold War. In the case of Colombia, 
declassified material and memoirs from defectors of armed groups raise 
serious doubts about the level of international assistance to insurgent 
groups.104 Whilst the “greed” school raises important questions of economic 
motives, it fails to recognise the lack of legal economic opportunities in 
conflict-ridden countries. In Colombia, the rise of the cultivation and 
production of narcotics and the increase of popular support for insurgent 
groups is not coincidently linked to the end of the Cold War, but the fall of the 
peasant movement in the 1970s and repressive conditions in rural areas.105 
 
The “greed vs. grievance” theory has led to a new conceptualisation of civil 
war. Conventionally, civil wars are seen as engendering complete economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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breakdown and anarchy, however this new body of literature understands this 
situation as having the potential of creating ‘alternate system of profit, power 
and protection.’106 There is an element of truth in this assertion, however it 
must be understood in terms of country-specific factors relating to the political, 
economic and security conditions. Colombia’s ‘war-system’ is tied to the 
institutional failure of the Colombian government in arbitrating rural conflict.107 
Collier’s suggestion that ‘economically rational’ individuals drive all armed 
conflicts misinterprets violent conflict in the global South. Importantly, like 
Kaldor’s theory it does not give enough weight to the role of the state in 
perpetuating the ‘war system’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In parallel to the Colombia conflict, a veritable war of words has been 
conducted over how we might frame it. International armed conflict 
classifications and war studies developments have shaped analyses of the 
Colombian situation in diverse ways. In the post-Cold War era, civil conflicts in 
the Balkans and the horn of Africa diverted the attention of scholars to the 
nature of these conflicts, which challenge the traditional understanding of war. 
The theories of “new wars” and “greed vs. grievance” have shaped scholarly 
debates of the Colombian conflict through their analyses of the causal factors 
of state conflicts and the social transformations within societies in a global 
perspective. Indeed, globalisation creates conditions that facilitate the growth 
of transnational criminal organisations, such as drug cartels, however, it also 
generates a paradox for a country which struggles to keep control of its 
territory – whilst the state is asked to withdraw from the social and economic 
sphere, it is also simultaneously forced to combat the growing violence more 
effectively to secure regional stability. 
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Notably, recent classifications of armed conflicts argue that the changing 
nature of conflicts illustrate their non-political character despite calls by the 
international community to recognise the political struggle of the conflict in 
order to reach a peaceful end. All of these classifications owe their origins to 
political or academic agendas that originate - in part at least – outside 
Colombia. Importantly, none of these discussions pay significant attention to 
the relationship between the Colombian state and its people and localised 
dynamics. This chapter has provided an insight into a more nuanced way of 
understanding conflict that takes into account the larger classifications of 
conflict and the shortcomings of such analyses. It is one of ambitions of this 
thesis to examine Colombian security through Colombian eyes, grounding it in 
local concerns and hopefully bringing the conception of the conflict a little 
closer to home. 
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Chapter Two 
 
New Wars Research: Globalisation and Civil Conflict 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
The recent tranche of civil wars research has emphasised international 
dynamics to further our understanding of conflict in the global South. The 
previous chapter discussed how the theories of “new wars” and “greed vs. 
grievance” have shaped analyses and representations of civil conflict and 
offered an area studies approach grounded in local dynamics to highlight the 
shortcomings in contemporary approaches. This chapter furthers this 
contribution through an analysis on interaction the relationship between local, 
regional and global dynamics in driving violent conflict. In both academic and 
policy circles, the forces of globalisation and “greed” are hailed as the most 
important causal factors for civil conflict in the global South. Whilst these 
classifications have shed light on the dynamics of intra-state conflict, civil 
conflicts are not a homogenous phenomenon. The origins, motivations and 
objectives of violence in every conflict vary considerably, to the extent that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to comprehensively theorise this phenomenon on a 
global scale. However, in order for social scientists to provide more accurate 
generalisations on global trends, it is important to take into consideration more 
localised, area specific knowledge. 
 
Increased levels of globalisation have undoubtedly had an impact on civil 
conflict. The “new wars” literature provides an effective critique on 
globalisation, however much of the literature in this area does not take give 
sufficient emphasis to local or even regional dynamics in insecure and violent 
countries. In particular, it fails to sufficiently recognise the historical processes 
of violent conflict in the global South as there is an excessive emphasis on 
recent ‘global trends’ or Western foreign policy, particularly that of the United 
States. The “new wars” literature is bound through a critique of globalisation 
and in doing so has perhaps unintentionally stripped the governments of 
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conflict zones of a role in the perpetuation of violence. Globalisation is the 
seen as the key driver of conflict and accordingly, the solutions proposed by 
“new wars” scholars are problematically global initiatives and again do not 
consider the action that governments in conflict states can take in order to 
help overcome insecurity and violence.  
 
The concept of globalisation has emerged as a point of departure for 
numerous academic debates. From questions of global political economy, 
global development agenda, global humanitarian crises to global terror and 
global criminality, the emphasis on global solutions to global problems are the 
talking pointing of numerous international organisations, governments, 
academics and third sector groups. Much can be gained from understanding 
global trends. Globalisation has resulted in increasing interdependency and 
between states and the impact of this must be subjected to critical analysis. 
However, there is also a danger in the focus on global trends. Paradoxically, it 
can limit our knowledge by leading to a neglect of more local and even 
regional trends. Although global changes and pressures have undoubtedly 
had an impact on the security of Colombia, most prominently through the 
explosion of the drugs trade, we must also consider the structural problems 
rooted in the domestic political, social and economic spheres of the country 
and the relationship between these dynamics on a historical basis. 
 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the “new wars” school by 
focussing on the work of three leading scholars in contemporary academic 
literature, Mary Kaldor, Mark Duffield and Paul Rogers. It follows with an 
exploration of the external and internal, global and local dichotomies and how 
this relates to the phenomena of violent conflict. It is anticipated that this will 
tease out the relationship between these scholars as well as the divergences 
amongst them which will provide a conceptual framework from which to 
explore the case of the Colombia – a local conflict in a globalised world. 
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Mary Kaldor: “New Wars” 
 
The end of the Cold War ushered a new era in international politics. The 
largely peaceful wave of democratisation and the end of a number of 
longstanding civil conflicts that were fuelled by superpower rivalry created a 
consensus that a reduction in armed conflict would occur. The concept of 
humanitarian intervention became widely accepted by the international 
community as a means to prevent and resolve conflicts. However, parallel to 
these positive developments, the end of the Cold War was also followed by a 
spate of civil conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Africa marking a shift 
in scholarly attention from superpower rivalry to “new” civil conflicts. Over the 
last decade, a number of scholars have argued that qualitative changes have 
occurred in the nature of contemporary conflicts.108 The argument holds that it 
is now possible to view the ‘modern’ conflict, particularly civil war, as a 
departure from ‘earlier’ forms of conflict. 
 
Mary Kaldor’s study, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 
conceptualises the spate of contemporary, civil wars in these regions, using 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a model. The main thrust of this theory is that the 
objectives, actors, impact, and organisation of these ‘new’ wars seem to differ 
markedly from the Clausewitzean notion of war as battle between opposing 
forces. In contrast to ‘old’ wars, Kaldor argues that the dynamics of 
globalisation are a key causal factor behind “new wars”. “New wars”, 
according to this study, are characterised by the following: state failure and a 
social transformation driven by the intensification of global interconnectedness 
and liberal economic forces; the breakdown of public authority leading to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘irregular’ armies; an increase in ethnic conflicts rather than ideology and 
territory; a phenomenal rise in civilian casualties; the targeting of civilians as 
objects of war; a dependence on internal sources of finance, and massive 
international involvement in the form of foreign media, aid organisations, 
military advisers, and volunteer forces.109 
 
For Kaldor, globalisation is conceived of as the ‘intensification of global 
interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural’. 110  This 
process is presented as contradictory; involving integration and fragmentation, 
homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and localisation, and is 
framed as the primary cause of contemporary conflicts. The ideology of Cold 
War politics provided a common vocabulary on which to build trans-national 
civil society. During this period, military cooperation increased; state armies 
were tied into inseparable cooperative international frameworks through 
military alliances, international arms production and trade, forms of military 
cooperation, and arms control agreements. 111  Cold War rivals provided 
economic and diplomatic assistance to Third World states in the competition 
for control and assistance, deepening their reliance on the outside war and 
ultimately leading to the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organised 
violence. According to Kaldor, the decline of state legitimacy gives rise to 
rivalry among non-state actors, and the distinction between public and private 
authority is blurred as the state’s control and monopoly over violence 
declines, spreading criminality, corruption and inefficiency. In short, 
globalisation presents two processes in the “new wars” thesis. Firstly, it brings 
about changes in the state, particularly the erosion of state authority; 
secondly, it generates increased opportunities for economic gain in civil war 
as a result of both legal and illegal trans-border trade. 
 
Violent civil conflict since of the end of the Cold War is generally linked with 
an environment that implicates a range of non-state and state actors. Central 
to this environment is the erosion of state power, which Kaldor sees in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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context of neo-liberal economic forces and globalisation that undermine state 
authority and power and form a new political economy of war. Within this 
vacuum of state authority, a range of new militaries and privatised violence 
made up of decaying remnants of state armies, paramilitary groups, self-
defence units, mercenaries and international troops, engage in new forms of 
violence, often associated with ethnic allegiances and competition over the 
control of natural resources or criminal opportunities.112 It has been argued 
that the use of light weapons such as rifles, machine-guns, hand-grenades 
and landmines amongst these groups is the product of a long and 
sophisticated technological evolution since World War II, which was further 
encouraged by the biggest military build up during the Cold War. 
 
For Kaldor, “new wars” mobilise citizens around identity politics rather than 
ideology. Identity-based conflicts are unanticipated side effects of the 
globalisation process that have been nurtured under the loss of legitimacy of 
post-colonial states. Global integration not only eroded the autonomy of states 
and their monopoly on the legitimate use of force but also allowed non-state 
actors, such as organised criminal networks and paramilitary groups, to 
pursue their own selfish goals through exclusionist and nationalist policies. 
“New wars” are therefore political conflicts, involving state power as well as 
various private, non-state actors, in which ‘identity politics’ is a means by 
which political elites reproduce their power. Hence in “new wars” ethnic 
cleansing has been used to achieve political control. Territories are purged of 
their minorities through the use of population displacement techniques and 
hearts and minds are now won through fear and hate. “New wars” are 
therefore not directed at opposing sides, but against civilian populations.113 
Whereas in “old” wars these were considered to be undesirable and illegal 
side-effects conflicts, identity politics and systematic violence are ‘central to 
the mode of fighting in the new wars‛.114 
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“New wars” take place in the context of ‘an extreme version of 
globalisation’. 115  Liberalisation and state support leads to a collapse of 
territorially based production and armed forces are sustained via remittances, 
diaspora fundraising, external governmental assistance and the diversion of 
international humanitarian aid. However, in a number of cases valuable 
commodities continue to be produced, for example drugs in Afghanistan and 
Colombia. Various forms of illegal trading are key sources of income, which 
provide alternative sources of funding for non-state actors to sustain violence 
activities over a prolonged period of time.116 The new globalised political 
economy of war, therefore not only damages the region of conflict itself, but 
also damages the economies of neighbouring regions through the spread of 
refugees, identity-based politics and illegal trade. It creates regional clusters 
of fragility and war economies that can be observed in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, Central Asia and 
the Middle East, that are characterised by internationalised western global 
interventions. 
 
Foreign assistance in the new political economy of war is integral to “new 
wars”. In the context of the collapse of domestic production, Kaldor puts forth 
a number of ways that foreign assistance is crucial as part of the new 
economy: remittances from abroad to individual families, direct assistance 
from diaspora living abroad, assistance from foreign governments and 
humanitarian assistance. The latter two arguably form the most influential 
forms of foreign assistance and have received much scholarly attention. 
Governmental assistance, according to Kaldor, has largely dried up following 
the end of the Cold War as both regular forces and guerrillas relied on their 
superpower patrons.117 However, since the end of the Cold War neighbouring 
states have often provided assistance for various political and economic 
reasons. For example, in Zaire the opposition was supported by Rwanda in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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attempt to prevent Hutu militiamen from operating from refugee camps. 
Humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War has increased 
dramatically; however Kaldor concludes that such initiatives have ultimately 
failed as “new wars” are still interpreted in traditional terms and have served 
the purpose of sustaining conflict rather than avoiding it. This has been 
achieved through the provision of humanitarian aid, which provides a source 
of income for warring parties, the legitimisation of war criminals by negotiating 
and through the attempts to find political compromises based of exclusivist 
assumptions.118 
 
Kaldor calls for cosmopolitan law enforcement rather than a peacekeeping 
force. The suggestion here is that the international community should 
abandon its current policy of pushing for negotiated solutions as peace 
negotiations work conversely by raising the profile of warring parties and 
extend public legitimacy to war criminals.119  Kaldor advocates a form of 
‘global overwatch’ whereby states and international organisations monitor and 
enforce human rights and humanitarian law, which would allow for outsiders 
to intervene in domestic affairs to stop civilian violence. This is framed in the 
context of globalisation where cosmopolitan governance would fill the void left 
by the erosion of the state and its inability to govern its territory and avoid civil 
conflict. 
 
Kaldor’s “new wars” thesis raises some important theoretical questions 
contemporary violence. Proxy Cold War conflicts, state collapse, globalisation, 
the end of the Cold War and the emergence of identity politics have all 
arguably had an impact of the changing mode of warfare. However, it is 
incredibly problematic to assert a general departure. Kaldor’s articulation of 
the historical understanding of war in general and the changes in war and 
politics in the current period arguably overstate the features that are identified; 
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spatial context, human impact, political economy, and social structure of 
conflict can also be observed in earlier conflicts to varying degrees.120 
 
The orthodox definition of international security is premised on the military 
defence of territory. This has to some degree sidelined human security and 
social factors. However, international security can no longer be solely 
conceived of as the defence of national territory against ‘external’ military 
threats. The security agenda now incorporates political, economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions, and increasingly the greatest threats to security for 
many people in the world come from disease, hunger, environmental 
contamination, crime, and unorganised violence, or even from the state itself, 
rather than from an ‘external’ force. This evolving security agenda explores 
the links between violence and factors such as socio-economic inequality, 
divided societies, human rights abuse, poverty, migration, economic 
disruptions, diaspora communities, and international economy and security 
discourse, which is essential to our understanding of contemporary conflicts. 
 
 
Mark Duffield: The Conflict-Development Nexus 
 
The nature of security has changed from state security to human insecurity 
creating multiple threats to global stability. Whereas Kaldor’s focus is on the 
implications of globalisation in internationalising threats, which creates the 
need for international solutions to the problem of human insecurity, Mark 
Duffield argues that the West’s war on insecurity is the product of a neo-
colonial division of the world between the rich and the poor. Development, 
Security and Unending War provides an alternative to the mainstream 
perspective of “new wars”, humanitarian interventions, and the merging of the 
fields of development and security by international actors to counter “new 
wars”. 
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According to Duffield the end of the Cold War brought significant changes for 
conflicts. Not only has there been a shift from inter-state to civil wars, but also 
an international denial of legitimacy to warring parties within ‘ineffective’ states 
has emerged as result of the end of the Cold War.121 The “new wars” label of 
cruelty and barbarity and their threat to global security was used as a moral 
justification for the increased interventionism of the 1990s. Duffield argues 
that the concept of human security should not be understood by its common 
definition as ‘prioritising people rather than states’ but as a form of long-
distance bio-politics, that is, ‘effective states prioritising the well-being of 
populations living within ineffective ones’.122 A rather cynical, however novel 
way of looking at the wave of western humanitarian and peace 
interventionism in the post-Cold War period is presented which interprets 
‘human security’ and ‘state fragility’ as a form of bio-politics or technologies of 
power aimed at controlling people living on the margins of global society. 
Whilst those who live in the West are ‘insured’ and therefore self-reliant 
through welfare systems, development policy is aimed at encouraging the 
Third World to be self-reliant and remain ‘uninsured’. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a conceptual debate about the 
nature of security. Governments, NGOs and the UN have insisted that 
development requires security as globalisation, with all its benefits, has also 
brought into existence a radically interconnected world that presents a more 
dangerous situation of a multitude of threats and uncertainties. The 
underdevelopment of the Third World and the non-insured life is presented as 
a dangerous threat to international security, which foments armed conflicts, 
criminal activities, massive displacements and terrorism. According to 
Duffield, the permanent emergency posed by these threats demands that 
states play a central role in the protection and security of the non-insured or 
self-reliant life and has defined the moral grounds for Western interventions 
through the responsibly of the West to ‘protect’. The struggle to achieve global 
human security has therefore been prioritised by the West as a 
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‘governmentalising technology’.123 Although the concept of human security 
within policy and the merging of development and security is often portrayed 
as positive and progressive, Duffield argues that these shifts are highly 
problematic and un-progressive as globalisation has led to an international 
environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in 
the governance of Third World states drawing on the example of Mozambique 
and Afghanistan. 
 
For Duffield, the contemporary security-development nexus is novel. New 
security concerns focus on ‘underdevelopment as a source of conflict, 
criminalised activity and international instability’ rather than ‘the threat of 
traditional interstate wars’.124 However, one might legitimately question how 
novel this development is. For example, the Marshall Plan also recognised the 
links between underdevelopment, political instability and violence. 
Furthermore, ‘security’ in political terms has always placed importance upon 
economic concerns. According to Duffield, development discourse is shaped 
by the remaking of fragile states. Technologies of security – humanitarian 
intervention, sustainable development and human security – are used to 
examine the fragile states as a relation of international governance.125 Duffield 
takes this argument further by assessing the implications of 9/11 on the 
human security agenda. Throughout the 1990s failed states, especially those 
of limited strategic importance to the West, ranked low on the security 
agenda. However, 9/11 and the perceived advent on an unending war against 
terror has made the need to rebuild ‘ineffective’ states a priority in extending 
the West’s external sovereign frontier.126  State failure in this context has 
gained a new significance as an enduring technology of governance 
associated with occupation. Wars are therefore seen as a consequence of 
human insecurity and underdevelopment; hence development is increasingly 
seen as a form of conflict prevention. 
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Duffield describes “new wars” in terms of trans-border networks of state and 
non-state actors. Both are inextricably tied to the global shadow economy. As 
Kaldor also advocates, in these networks the distinctions between people, 
armies and generals are blurred. However, Duffield adds to this argument in 
Global Governance and New Wars by asserting that the governance of fragile 
states is achieved through the reintegration of the global South into the 
economies of the North – based on illegal or extra-legal forms of exchange. 
The concept of the global shadow economy is a part of globalisation and the 
new formal system of interconnections of trade and money. These networks 
involve violence; however the difference between war and violent peace is 
one of amplification or increased intensity of these relationships.127 
 
Duffield presents a pessimistic analysis of the relationship between global 
governance and contemporary forms of warfare. Although both Duffield and 
Kaldor agree that post Cold War conflicts are characterised to some degree 
by state failure, intensification of globalisation, liberal economic forces, 
‘irregular’ armies; a rise in civilian as compared to military casualties; a 
dependence on internal sources of finance, and massive international 
involvement; the focus on human security has created divergences in the 
“new wars” debate. Kaldor advocates that the solution to global insecurity is 
human security. The alternative to military force is therefore the containment 
of global instability within fragile states, which would require global 
engagement from international community around human security and 
development – cosmopolitan law enforcement. Duffield effectively critiques 
Kaldor’s idealised view of the progressive nature of new forms of global 
governance and human development. In his view, the human security 
approach is problematic as it globalises the problems of instability by making 
the West responsible for world security. This creates a racist bio-political 
division between the ‘insured’ and the ‘uninsured’, which threatens Western 
security. According to Duffield, interventionist development techniques are 
continually reinvented through the process of human securitisation. The focus 
of the west to make the Third World self-reliant and remain uninsured fails to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001) 
p. 191. 
 57 
bridge the development gap; it divides regions, favours policies of 
containment and encourages militarisation and thus allows the west to 
engage in an unending war.128 
 
 
Paul Rogers: Global Security  
 
Paul Rogers furthers this argument in Losing Control: Global Security in the 
Twenty-First Century. His study demonstrates how current attempts by the US 
to tackle global insecurity through a reliance on military power projection are 
not only likely to fail but will lead to an increasingly militarised and insecure 
global environment. Rogers argues that the post-Cold War security paradigm 
is fundamentally misguided. Countering contemporary security threats, such 
as crime, disease, poverty, violence, and terrorism through military force is 
fundamentally unsustainable. 129  The security paradigm of the twenty-first 
century is described with the US as the world’s pre-eminent military power, 
which is faced with threats to its own security and wider economic and 
political interests, despite no other states being able to match its military 
power. According to Rogers, this security paradigm is a result of the Cold War 
legacy, which saw the development of a remarkable range of military 
technologies and nuclear confrontation, which allowed for a process of 
maintaining large military forces. In this view, the Cold War gave way to the 
development of a range of military technologies that could ensure future 
conflicts. Military security therefore remains the ultimate guarantee of Western 
well-being. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War military advances have been primarily geared 
towards counterinsurgency. There has been a greater emphasis on acquiring 
weapons for long-range strike and special operations forces, both of which as 
form crucial elements for military posture. In this context, special operations 
forces act principally in low intensity conflicts and engage diverse conflicts 
and security interests in the global South. The increase in training available to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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friendly regimes in Latin America provides an indication for these shifts. For 
example, during the Cold War US forces were involved in many internal 
conflicts, most commonly aiding conservative governments fighting left-wing 
insurgency. However, during the 1990s the training of foreign armies, 
especially those involving US Special Forces operations forces, had 
expanded considerably and involved counter-insurgency training in support of 
local elites. In 1998 alone, around 2,700 special operations troops were 
involved with training the armed forces of every one of the 19 Latin American 
states and nine Caribbean states, including armies in Guatemala, Colombia 
and Suriname – all of which have been widely condemned for human rights 
abuses.130 
 
The underdevelopment of the South is increasingly portrayed as a threat to 
global insecurity. Although the liberal market system has delivered significant 
economic growth, it has persistently failed at delivering social justice, 
therefore widening the rich-poor gap and breeding insecurity. The main 
driving force in this inequality, according to Rogers, has been the post-colonial 
trading system and its endemic imbalances, which have been further 
exacerbated by globalisation and the exploitation of labour markets. Rogers 
argues that the impact of globalisation and its socioeconomic elements is 
particularly marked in the field of education and literacy where there are an 
increasing number of marginalised people in the global South that are aware 
of their marginalisation and of the rich-poor gap. This leads to an increasingly 
knowledgeable poor and a ‘revolution of unfulfilled expectations’ that forms a 
prominent feature of many of the insurgencies and instability in Latin America, 
North Africa and the Middle East.131 
 
Furthermore, the industrialised North has become progressively more 
dependent on physical resources from the South fuelling global insecurity. 
The costs to extract deposits of key minerals, such as ores, coal, oil and gas 
in many industrialised states have increased significantly in recent years, 
marking a resource shift that has resulted in many physical resources !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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acquiring strategic significance. This has increasingly resulted in conflicts in 
the global South and presents the potential for many more. For example, the 
civil conflict in Zaire and much of its politics in the past 40 years since 
independence has been dominated by the competition for the control of 
Shaba province – a rich mining region for radium, uranium as well as 
diamonds. 132  For Rogers, the current economic system fails to deliver 
economic justice and there are now firm indicators that it is not 
environmentally sustainable. The combination of the rich-poor divide and 
limits to current forms of economic growth is likely to lead to a crisis of 
unsatisfied expectations within an increasingly informed global majority of the 
disempowered. 
 
Rogers forecasts the future of global security. This is explored through a 
contemporary assessment of the impact of growing military technologies, the 
global wealth disparity and environmental constraints. The conclusion 
reached presents a disturbing picture of global security where these issues 
will influence the spread and development of conflict in the coming decades. 
In this context, the increasingly informed global majority of the disempowered 
is likely to involve itself in conflicts, such as anti-elite action; migrants will 
become more radicalised; conflicts over physical resources will intensify 
leading to globalised insurgency.!133 The common response to the range of 
contemporary conflicts will be one of regaining and maintaining control, rather 
than addressing root causes – the impact of the liberal market system, which 
will be achieved through Western states, especially the US, depending upon 
security and intelligence capabilities as well as development aid for local and 
regional elites. For Rogers, September 11 is interpreted as reinforcing all the 
core elements of the security paradigm and is demonstrative how the major 
effort is concentrated on maintaining control of an unstable and evidently 
violent world.134 In this context, defence budgets will continue to increase, 
counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism will form the primary focus of warfare, 
bases will be maintained in ‘regions of potential threat’ and long-range force !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 ibid., p. 93. 
133 ibid., p. 91. 
134 ibid., p. 149. 
 60 
projection will be enhanced - the efforts to maintain control therefore lead to a 
war with no decisive end. 
 
Rogers’ holds a radical view of militarism led by the US. He asserts that that 
the rich global core of capitalism cannot remain secure if the majority of the 
world remains impoverished and excluded. His alternative approach to global 
insecurity encompasses arms control and disarmament, fair trade, massive 
debt cancellation, quadrupling of development aid, implementation of a green 
economy and the creation of an internationals standing force of 20,000 
observers for conflict preventing interventions. As these threats cannot be 
overcome by traditional military control, he argues that an approach based 
upon sustainable security is required which attempts to address the roots 
causes of global instability. For example, socio-economic divisions would 
require changes to international trade. Threats from climate change would 
require rapid transition away from carbon emissions to energy conservation 
and renewable sources of energy provision. 
 
The “new wars” debate is now more than a decade old. This discussion of the 
leading commentators in this area of research has demonstrated the 
convergences and divergences in the literature. For Kaldor, the perils of 
globalisation have led to internationalising threats and calls for international 
solutions to the problem of human insecurity. Duffield and Rogers take a 
much more critical view of global governance and international solutions. For 
Duffield, internationalised solutions deepen the reliance of the global South on 
the West and have effectively created neo-colonial division of the world 
between the rich and the poor. Rogers add to the debate with his argues that 
the impact of globalisation and its socioeconomic elements is particularly 
marked in the field of education and literacy where there are an increasing 
number of marginalised people in the global South that are aware of their 
marginalisation and of the rich-poor gap. 
 
“New wars” scholars share a consensus on the negative impact of 
globalisation for the security of the global South. Whilst detractors have 
focussed their concerns on whether “new wars” are distinct from earlier forms 
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of conflicts, particularly in the post-Cold War era, the debate within the “new 
wars” literature is firmly grounded on a critical view of globalisation.135 Indeed, 
global processes such as free or increased levels of trade, movement of 
capital, expansion of extractive industries have impacted local dynamics. The 
success of the international drugs trade has been undoubtedly facilitated by 
these global trends, and the money extracted from this industry has been one 
of key ways in which paramilitaries, armed criminal groups and insurgents 
have waged war.136 This thesis uses interdisciplinary insights from violence in 
Colombia on a historical basis that broadens the current characterisation of 
violent conflict through the deployment of regional and local perspectives to 
complement the global ones. 
 
 
The Relationship between the Global, Regional and Local 
 
One of the main challenges that this thesis presents to the “new wars” school 
is that it largely representative of broader scholarly shifts. Arguably, the 
discovery of “new wars”, rather like the discovery of “new terrorism”, tells us 
more about the sociology of knowledge within academia in developed states 
than it does about conflict in the global South.137 In their rush to claim new 
paradigms that critique the impact of globalisation, academics have arguably 
been drawn into a process that parallels globalisation itself. General 
assertions about “new wars” have reduced a range of diverse conflicts across 
the global South to a series of stereotypes that arguably neglect crucial 
regional and local factors that have driven violence in Colombia long before 
the contemporary wave of globalisation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The relationship between the global, regional and local currently constitutes 
as the missing dimension in the “new wars” literature. External grand 
narratives and broader international dynamics such as the Cold War, War on 
Drugs and most recently, the Global War on Terror have formed the basis of 
understanding violence in the global South and, in particular Colombia. For 
Kaldor, superpower rivalry and Cold War politics resulted in economic and 
diplomatic assistance to states in the global South, including Colombia. This 
resulted in the phenomena of proxy-Cold Wars. Duffield explores the state of 
emergency posed by external threats demands that Western states play a 
central role in the protection and security of the ‘non-insured’ of the global 
South and has defined the moral grounds for Western interventions through 
the responsibly of the West to ‘protect’. Rogers adds that countering threats 
with military force is fundamentally unsustainable and deeply problematic. 
 
The United States sees itself as the primary economic, cultural and political 
power in the Americas. Bilateral relations between the US and Colombia are 
the strongest in the hemisphere. Military cooperation between the two states 
dates back to the Korean War and Colombia has frequently relied on its 
northern ally for political support as well as military aid to counter its internal 
security threats. During the Cold War, US and USSR rivalry led to the two 
states to consider Colombia as one of the key stages of the numerous proxy 
Cold Wars. However, in this regard it is also important to consider the Cold 
War dynamics within Latin America to provide a regional perspective to 
broader international dynamics. Latin America was home to a number of 
ideological brands of Communism and Marxism that encompassed a wide 
range of civil society. Rural campesinos, students, revolutionary Roman 
Catholic clergymen, and trade unionists, together with members of the middle 
class joined various social movements including insurgent groups during the 
1960s and 1970s. 
 
Cold War politics were intertwined with regional and local dilemmas. The 
power of the Catholic Church, deep levels of inequality, elitist and often brutal 
political systems and Falangist political exports from Spain created social 
unrest across Latin America. The success of the Cuban Revolution signified 
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an important turning point. Arguably, the Cuban Revolution was not just 
Cuban, it was a Latin American revolution that involved people from the far 
flung corners of the region. In Colombia, these factors thrown in with a 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis following La Violencia in which 200,000 
civilians were killed and millions displaced as well as the establishment of a 
power sharing pact between the two political parties provided the ripe 
conditions for insecurity and the emergence of insurgent groups.  
 
The roles of actors and conflict dynamics must be evaluated at the global, 
regional and local level. At the global level, the world’s most powerful states 
compete for military, diplomatic, economic and cultural superiority. Latin 
America was at the forefront of superpower rivalry for both the United States 
and USSR. However, on a regional level these wider international dynamics 
have interacted with the region’s political systems. Whilst these factors are 
certainly important, this thesis places the state at the centre of the analysis 
with an emphasis on the role of the national government in meeting local 
demands in the context of social unrest and insurgency. 
 
The critical view of globalisation presented by “new wars” scholars provides 
an insight into the negative aspects of globalisation. This thesis presents local 
perspectives that lend credence to a number of these analyses. Rogers’ 
claims of the socioeconomic impact of globalisation are particularly important 
in this regard. The marginalisation of rural poor in Colombia and increasing 
economic divide between the rich and poor have been a central element of 
the narrative of various insurgent groups. In 2013, the country’s largest 
insurgent group called for free and universal education to be included in the 
current peace talks as a meaning of tackling the development deficit between 
the rural and urban communities of Colombia.138 Rogers’ conceptualisation of 
insurgencies in the global South includes characteristics such as anti-elite 
action, radicalisation and physical resource conflicts. In Colombia, the mining 
of gold, emeralds and oil in rural areas have featured as the central point of 
contention, not only between insurgents, paramilitaries and the state but also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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involving local communities who see environmental degradation and little 
difference in their menial incomes. 
 
The global demand and rising price of gold and emeralds and mining of coal 
are particularly salient. According to the Oficina Internacional de Derechos 
Humanos – Acción Colombia, the Colombian mining boom has led to the 
emergence and increase of social conflicts with hundreds of struggles taking 
place in rural areas between civilians, armed groups, state security forces and 
international corporations.139 Social indicators show that large-scale mining 
activity in the four principle departments for these industries – Antioquia, 
Bolívar, Quindío and Tolima – have seen no substantial improvement in levels 
of poverty and extreme poverty. Moreover, open cast mining has led to the 
loss of agricultural lands, access to water and the quality of water has 
deteriorated and rural populations have experienced a loss of work. 140 
According to the Contraloría General de la República (Colombian Comptroller 
General), an independent authority within the Colombian government for fiscal 
control, the economic benefit of the global demand for Colombia’s raw 
products in also questionable with problematic local effects.141  
 
The extractive sector does not necessary equal economic development for 
Colombia. A report from the Colombian Comptroller shows that there are 
significant tax losses to the state. A lack of transparency, a wide range of 
deductions, rebates and exemptions to income tax resulted in the Colombian 
state until a ‘mini-tax reform’ in 2011. Also tax losses have decreased to 
around 57 per cent, the Colombian government today still fails to generate 
income through taxation of extractive industries.142 Mining and oil extraction 
areas also overlap with human rights abuses. An estimated 80 per cent of 
human rights violations, 87 per cent of forced displacement, 78 per cent of 
crimes against trade unionists, 89 per cent of crimes against indigenous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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communities and 90 per cent of crimes against Afro-Colombian communities 
in the country occur in mining and oil municipalities.143 This not also highlights 
the relationship between globalisation and local dynamics, but also illustrates 
that the drugs trade is far from the only industry that is contributing to the 
complexities of the Colombian conflict.  
 
In order to combat the problems presented by globalisation, a global response 
is certainly needed. This is a solution advocated by Kaldor who sees 
cosmopolitan law enforcement as an alternative to military force. This would 
involve global engagement from international community around human 
security and development. However, global governance structures are also 
problematic. Economic development as a means to achieving security, as 
shown by the case of extractive industries in Colombia, illustrates the negative 
impact of this. Duffield effectively critiques Kaldor’s idealised view of the 
progressive nature of new forms of global governance and human 
development. In his view, the human security approach is problematic as it 
globalises the problems of instability by making the West responsible for world 
security and economic development. By placing the state at the centre of the 
analysis of the Colombian conflict, this thesis argues for the structural 
changes within the country as a starting point for implementing strategies for 
peace. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Kaldor, Duffield and Rogers are bound together by a common understanding 
of globalisation as a key causal mechanism of “new wars”. Globalisation has 
not only transformed the cultural, economic and political matrix of global 
society, it is remaking ‘relations of violence’. Scholars writing in this vein 
present accounts that attempt to explain changing forms of organised violence 
in relationship to broader and deeper changes at the level of the world order. 
Whereas Kaldor asserts that globalisation has played a key role in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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merging of war, organised crime and the widespread violations of human 
rights and that a cosmopolitan approach is required as a response to these 
wars, Duffield argues that the merging of development and security leads to 
the governance of Third World states that pose a threat to global security. 
Rogers’ study adds to this conceptual debate by analysing global security 
through the legacy of the Cold War - proliferation of weapons, global 
ecosystem and liberal market. Within this literature a general consensus has 
emerged which argues that the current methods for dealing with global 
insecurity have created an environment of unending war, whereby current 
conflicts have no decisive end. However, the ways in which to approach 
global security remains contested; whilst Kaldor and Rogers call for the 
implementation of a global over-watch, Duffield argues that such measures 
have already led to so-called ‘governance states’ in the Third World. 
 
The “new wars” literature has broadened the definition of ‘security’. It offers a 
comprehensive critique of the impact of globalisation. However, rather than 
explaining the dynamics of conflict, this literature raises serious questions for 
scholars of violent conflict. The questions here are – has the objective nature 
of warfare changed? What are the links between global, regional and local 
dynamics? My research will further this argument through an analysis of the 
Colombian conflict from 1946 to present day. It combines the global 
approaches highlighted here with a localised, national-level perspective of the 
development of violent conflict through a comprehensive assessment of the 
relationship between the Colombian state and its people.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Civil War Debate and the Colombian Conflict 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The Colombian conflict has lasted for almost seven decades and has 
attracted diverse explanations. These can be broadly divided into two 
categories. One category sees perpetrators as acting rationally for gain within 
their own preference system in ways that can be measured numerically. The 
other category sees perpetrators as being motivated by a range of more 
elusive drivers embedded within religion, culture or collective memory that are 
broadly less amenable to statistical analysis or comparison. Numbers and 
rational choice – what we might call the political economy of violence – is a 
growing trend in international security. Moreover, the increasing use of formal 
models has made the field of conflict analysis highly respected. Yet Area 
Specialists, and in this case “Colombianists”, often feel that the increasing 
emphasis on numbers and rational choice has obscured the need to utilize a 
variety of other important modes of analysis.144 This chapter explores Collier’s 
numerically driven “greed” thesis in greater depth and in particular the riposte 
offered by area studies scholars working on Colombia. It illustrates the 
shortcomings of the “greed” thesis by exploring the different facets of violence 
in Colombia and taking into account a local perspective. Particular 
considerations are given to historical factors, illuminating continuities, 
permutations and synergies of violence over space and time and the inner 
workings of Colombia’s political, economic and social problems, which form 
the main thrust of this thesis. 
   
Recent research on civil conflicts on a global level places a strong emphasis 
on the material motives of combatants. As we have already seen in chapter 
one, this spate of research led by economist Paul Collier argues that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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distinction between “greed” and “grievance” is important in understanding the 
motivation for civil war.145 Drawing on an impressive range of statistical data 
on civil wars since 1945, the stark and unequivocal conclusion of Collier’s 
work suggested that ‘grievance-based explanations of civil war’ were 
‘seriously wrong’.146 Indeed, the conclusions of his study had a major impact 
upon policy prescriptions to deal with civil wars as well as academic debates. 
The long-standing view that civil strife related to rising expectations and 
relative deprivation,147 the disruption of traditional social structures through 
modernisation, 148  ethnic cleavages and nationalism, 149  and inequality, 150 
which are perceived as grievances, cause civil conflict was fundamentally 
called into question. 
 
The debate over the motivation for civil war dates back to the 1960s. The 
Correlates of War Project (COW), led by political scientists at the University of 
Michigan, laid the foundation for the quantitative analysis of civil war. In recent 
times, economists, namely Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, have used data 
from the COW project to apply rational choice theory and econometric 
analyses to macro-statistics on 140 civil conflicts that have occurred 
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worldwide since 1945.151 Similar studies, led by James Fearon and David 
Laitin, also interpret large data sets and conclude that economic inequality 
and identity cleavages are ubiquitous and therefore not reliable predictors of 
civil war.152 Importantly, the findings of the “greed” school are valid for many 
conflict-ridden countries, including Colombia. Firstly, civil conflicts are more 
likely to occur in countries with low national income. A dependence on primary 
export goods and abundant natural resources are associated with a higher 
risk for civil war. Secondly, non-or partial democracies are more prone to civil 
war than those ruled by authoritarian dictatorships. Thirdly, countries with 
fewer resources are less able to effectively deal with rebellions. Finally, 
access to lootable resources prolongs the longevity of a rebellion.   
 
Broadly speaking, the greed school is correct in these assertions. However, 
as an explanatory framework for the motivations of violence, the “greed” 
school does not illuminate the complexity of the internal dynamics of 
protracted civil conflicts. Specifically, in the case of the Colombian conflict, 
Collier’s theory depoliticises the conflict and delegitimises rebellion, therefore 
disregarding internal drivers of violence – political, economic and security 
grievances in the form of poverty, political exclusion and human rights abuses 
in a cycle of violence and insecurity that has persisted for almost seven 
decades. It is not only important to take into the political, economic and social 
conditions in which violence develops but also the relationship between 
armed conflict and multiple forms of violence and criminality. 
 
This chapter highlights the various dimensions of the violence in Colombia. 
These consist of three main features: political violence, insurgent activity and 
the criminal activity. The intractability of this conflict is largely a result of the 
complex linkages between these different types of violence and the failure of 
the Colombian state to arbitrate these conflicts over decades. Lamentably, the 
range and intertwining of these factors is often misconstrued through cross-
national analyses and simplified creating a tendency to support policies that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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do not enhance the prospects for peace. Despite recent successes against 
the FARC and the highly militarised policies of Uribe’s administration, which 
continue under the current presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, peace still 
eludes Colombia. The predatory activities of armed groups are an established 
reality. However, the excessive focus on the criminal nature of insurgencies 
has driven a reductionist approach that impairs the identification of a robust 
and sustainable peace strategy. The use of macro-level data sets to test 
hypotheses about civil war do not take into consideration micro-level 
behaviour of irregular combatants, civilians and state actors is problematic. In 
this regard, the arguments presented by Collier with relation to state 
weakness and the political economy of war are subjected to critique and are 
more nuanced manner of understanding the complexities of the Colombian 
conflict are presented. 
 
 
The Debate over ‘Greed’ and ‘Grievance’ 
 
The greed school has been the subject of a robust critique by a number of 
civil conflict experts. Much of this criticism has focussed upon the methods 
used by Collier. Leading scholar of violent civil conflict, Nicolas Sambanis, 
argues that Collier’s model is flawed by its failure to incorporate different types 
of political violence, external influences and the role of state capacity.153 
Sambanis’ research model draws on twenty-one case studies and combines 
case study work with the a formal quantitative approach of analysing civil war 
onset and war avoidance. By combining statistical and case study work, he 
argues that we can be in a better position to understand the political 
processes that lead societies into civil war. In particular, this method enables 
the exploration of the causal mechanisms through which independent 
variables in the Collier-Hoeffler and Fearon-Laitan models influence the 
dependent variable, which indicates the distinction between ‘greed’ and 
‘grievance’ illusionary.154  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 71 
 
The central question of what constitutes as ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ looms 
large. In the case of Colombia, Collier’s model assumes that young men with 
low levels of education with lack of opportunities will engage in rebellion. This 
is problematic in two regards. Firstly, it ignores the fact that current female 
membership of the FARC is estimated between 30 to 40 per cent. 155 
Secondly, it is unclear why economic grievances in areas of low education 
and opportunities should be considered as ‘greed’ and not a grievance. In 
short, if economic opportunities are scarce and can drive rebellion, as it has 
done in Colombia, low income should not be considered to be ‘greed’. The 
argument for economic opportunity presented by Collier provides an indication 
to what influential factors in determining the duration of violent conflict, 
however it is not a useful indicator when determining the causality of violence 
in Colombia. Micro-level and macro-level determinants of civil war do not 
always directly correspond do to local conditions. In Colombia, the political 
system has bred elitism, inequality and political exclusion for decades. The 
geography of the country effectively splits the country into three racially, 
culturally and economically distinct regions. The wide array of violence in the 
country is associated with riots – la Violencia; crime – banditry during and 
following la Violencia, drugs trade, illegal mining trade; genocide of the 
political left; insurgency, paramilitarism as well as state-sponsored forms of 
violence.  
 
 
State Weakness 
 
For Collier, war occurs because of three interacting determinants – 
preferences, opportunities and perceptions. Preferences for private gain, or 
‘greed’ lead to political violence if there are opportunities to rebel. Whereas, 
grievance is simply rhetoric used to legitimise a person’s decision to engage 
in appropriation. In short, the primary cause of civil war is the opportunity to 
loot combined with the opportunity to organise to organise an insurgency or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Anne Phillips, ‘Fighting Mad: Why Women Turn to the FARC – and How the 
FARC Turns on Them, Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2012. 
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rebellion. Rebellion in therefore sustained through the looting of natural 
resources, extortion of local populations and local support, and is less likely to 
occur in the case of a strong state. State strength is in Collier’s model is not 
well theorised and is particularly problematic as it is measured by the 
country’s economic strength in terms of the gross domestic product on a per 
capita basis (GDP).156 
 
The question of state strength or weakness is a central part of the theorisation 
of violent conflict and country analyses of the Colombian conflict. The reason 
for this is twofold: for country-level analysts or Colombianists the country is 
characterised by the paradox of democratic governance and stable economic 
development. However for rational choice theorists, who examine conflict on a 
macro-scale, state strength or weakness is a useful indicator for transnational 
analyses. Civil war is most certainly a problem for the poor in the world. It is a 
phenomenon that is present in less economically developed countries, 
however GDP per capita in itself do are not a useful indicator of state strength 
or weakness. Bruce Bagley, a Latin American security expert, theorises the 
role of the state and explores it in its ability to ‘penetrate society, extract 
resources from it and regulate conflicts within it’. This includes the ‘ability of 
state authorities to govern legitimately, to enforce the law systematically, and 
to administer justice effectively throughout the national territory’.157  
 
State weakness in this regard plays a significant role in the development of 
violence in Colombia. However, the country is not a failed nation state. 
Colombia boasts the position as Latin America’s oldest and most stable 
functioning democracy. Throughout the country’s history as a republic a 
civilian president has governed Colombia with regular elections taking place 
every four years.158 Both presidential and congressional elections are held on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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schedule and political power has periodically transferred between the 
country’s two main political parties, the Liberals and Conservatives. 
Economically, Colombia is Latin America’s forth-largest economy and is 
characterised by slow but steady economic progress. Since the mid-1940s the 
economy has seen almost interrupted positive growth. The country is well 
endowed with rich soils and favourable climates, making Colombia self-
sufficient in the production of food, coal and oil. Colombia has successfully 
diversified its exports, which today include coffee, oil, coal, emeralds, 
bananas, textiles, cut flowers as well a range of agricultural and industrial 
products. The country escaped the well-documented debt crisis of the 1980s 
that consumed the economies of other Latin American states. Colombia’s 
history of democratic governance and stable economic growth in a region with 
a history characterised by military dictatorships and boom and bust 
economies’.159 The country’s policymakers have managed national accounts 
far better than their Latin American counterparts. 
 
However, despite positive political and economic indicators, Colombia’s 
history is littered with violence. Since the creation of the republic, the country 
has almost always battled with this phenomenon. Persistent bloodshed 
throughout the country’s history is the most obvious failure of the political 
system. Since the onset of the civil war La Violencia (1946-1958), Colombia 
has consolidated its position as one of the most violent nations in the world 
and spent the majority of the last 68 years under a state of siege. Since 2002, 
the country has seen a reduction in levels of violence, however the human 
cost in Colombia remains intolerably high. A report by the Geneva Declaration 
of Armed Violence shows that between 2004 and 2009, Colombia was one of 
only five countries in the world that saw more than 1000 violent deaths per 
year, along with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Sri Lanka and 
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Sudan.160 Colombia has been historically characterised by a peculiar mix of 
democracy, steady economic growth and chronic levels of violence. 
Democratic governance has existed alongside an undeclared civil war for 
almost seven decades, a claim very few, if any, countries in the world could 
attest to. Indeed, Colombia’s democracy could be described as almost 
mythical during some periods of its history – a range of irregular armed actors 
from insurgents, paramilitaries, criminal bands have emerged to challenge the 
state as well as competing groups vying for control of territory and resources.  
 
Colombian state weakness must be examined in terms of the poor choices of 
the political elite and intra-elite divisions. The government in the nation’s 
capital, Bogotá, has never successfully established itself throughout the 
country’s territory. Indeed, the state has also never held a monopoly on the 
use of force, basic infrastructure is lacking outside the country’s three main 
cities and it has failed to protect property and the habitants of these 
regions.161 The failure of the Colombian state to fulfil its role has resulted in 
the emergence of various armed groups that have adopted state-like functions 
in areas of control. The tradition of self-defence as a means of resolving rural 
disputes has existed throughout the republic’s history. Rural communities 
have organised and themselves in response to threats and the landowning 
elite have built private forces to protect their properties. The failure of the state 
to arbitrate conflict is part of one of its greatest structural weaknesses.  
 
 
Political Economy of Violence 
 
The most important scholarly text to emerge in recent years on the political 
economy of Colombian violence is Systems of Violence: The Political 
Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Nizah Richani’s book, as the title 
suggests, argues that the systemic interlacing relationship among actors in 
the Colombian conflict, their respective political economy and the overall !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political economy of the system has led to a ‘war system’ in the country. In 
this context the following conditions, which are all present in Colombia, have 
led to the creation of a ‘war system’: firstly ‘failure of the institutions, the 
channels, and the prevailing political mechanisms to mediate, adjudicate, or 
arbitrate conflicts among antagonistic social and political groups’. Secondly, 
‘the antagonists’ success in adapting themselves to conflict by establishing a 
“positive political economy” through accumulating political and economic 
assets that make the condition of war the best available option given the 
balance of power and the higher costs of peace’. Finally, ‘a balance of forces 
among the conflicting groups or actors that results in a comfortable 
impasse’.162 In this context, the interdependence between organised crime, 
the state and opposition is particularly important in highlighting the 
complexities of violence. 
 
The problems associated with application of the “greed” thesis to Colombia 
have been recognised by the country’s leading experts on the conflict.  
Colombian political scientist, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, has offered the 
strongest challenge to the “greed” school from within in the country. For 
Gutiérrez Sanín, the ‘Colombian war seems to offer very nearly the ideal 
conditions’ for the Collier’s evaluation of ‘rebellion as a form of criminality’. 
However, empirically the ‘criminal rebels thesis fails even in the Colombian 
case’. Economic incentives for FARC and ELN insurgents are practically non-
existent. Combatants are subjects to harsh living conditions and a lifetime 
service in which ‘death looms large over warriors.’!163 Moreover, if economic 
motivations were to drive young men and women to join armed groups, then it 
would be expected that more join paramilitary groups, such as the AUC, who 
pay salaries. This is simply not the case in Colombia. The number of armed 
combatants associated with insurgent groups outnumbers those that have 
joined paramilitary organisations. 
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Colombian insurgent groups see their revenues from illegal trades as serving 
purposes that are clearly strategic and political. Strategic activities include 
maintaining armies capable of fighting paramilitaries, launching attacks on the 
armed forces, linking urban cells, buying sophisticated weaponry, producing 
munitions, and expanding territory.164 Collier and like-minded scholars argue 
that the material motives of insurgent groups are illustrated by their predatory 
actions that maximise revenue. Engagement in the drug trade is cited as clear 
example of predatory behaviour. However, research led by analysts at the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) counters this assertion. It is 
argued here that that activity, such as political kidnappings (not for ransom) 
and blowing up oil pipelines, depletes rather than augments the insurgents’ 
material resources.165  In areas under FARC control, the insurgent group 
assumes state-like functions. These range from adjudicating local and familial 
disputes, regulating economic transactions, enforcing ‘laws’, and organising 
public projects. 166  The creation of a broad-based political party further 
illustrates the efforts of the FARC to influence municipal decision-making. 
Furthermore, the consistent agenda of the FARC on agrarian and social 
issues, their relentless efforts to gain political power (through violence, votes, 
or a negotiated settlement) are evidence of that agenda cannot be reduced to 
“greed” alone. 
 
“Greedy” wars are ‘doomed to failure’.167 Gutiérrez Sanín is not the first to 
argue this case. Military strategists from Napoleon to von Clausewitz have 
contended that armies require ideology, as those which run on the premise of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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looting are more easily defeated in combat. Combatants that are primarily 
motivated by self-interest are more likely to desert under threat.168 Gutiérrez 
Sanín’s assessment of the FARC’s almost five decade long war against the 
Colombian state illustrates the clear distinction between rebel movements and 
criminal syndicates. In criminal groups, successions are often decided by 
violent means and death. They are rife with mistrust and internal feuds that 
lead to fragmentation.169  The FARC is the world’s most successful rebel 
movement. It is a cohesive organisation that demands collective action and 
the sacrifice of life from its members. Material gain is not a rational choice for 
an insurgent group if material incentives are the ultimate goal, as waging war 
is costly. Combatants require a range of goods in a state of war, including 
arms, ammunition, food, medical equipment and medicines. Colombian 
insurgent groups have found themselves on the negotiating tables with the 
government on numerous occasions since the 1980s. This is indicative of a 
desire for peace. Although the success of these negotiations is questionable, 
if insurgents were solely motivated by material incentives it would be highly 
unlikely that negotiations would have ever taken place. 
 
Conflict conditions may also accelerate resource development in Colombia. 
Kalyvas’s model of civil war violence highlights the absence of ‘a clear, 
unequivocal, and fixing dividing line between combatants and non-
combatants’, which is of particular importance for exploring the link between 
conflict conditions and resource development. 170  Kalyvas critiques the 
scholarly tendency to focus only on perpetrators of violence and their 
motivations, and demonstrates that when non-combatants are excluded from 
analysis, it is quite possible to ‘completely miss the fact that the information 
used to make violence happen may come from civilians, usually closely linked 
to the victims.171 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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By placing emphasis on “greed”, many of the contributing factors that lead to 
a situation of civil war are disregarded. For Nicholas Sambanis, previous 
episodes of collective violence significantly increase risk of the onset, 
protraction and reoccurrence of civil war. Civil war, according to his study is 
therefore best understood as a ‘phase in a cycle of violence’.172 This enables 
a broader understanding of civil conflict that takes into consideration a wide 
range of organised violence from foreign occupations, politicides, mass riots, 
gang violence, organised crime, to wars of self-determination as well as state 
sponsored violence. It enables an analysis that looks beyond events to mark 
the onset of civil war and examine processes of violence. This argument holds 
tremendous value for the study of the Colombian conflict. 
 
 
Colombia’s Cycle of Violence: 1946 to Present Day 
 
Today, violence is Colombia is largely interpreted as associated with the 
drugs trade. However, area studies scholars, and particularly Colombianists, 
have long drawn attention to the violent state-making process in the 
country.173 Colombia has been characterised by high levels since colonial 
times and has lamentably staggered from one type of collective violence to 
another ever since. The focus of this thesis is the most recent phase of 
chronic violence from 1946 to present day – the ‘longest spell of internal 
political violence anywhere in the modern world’.174 It seeks to examine the 
conflict as a process of increasing radicalisation of the Colombian political 
system and society. The question of what constitutes the onset of a civil war is 
central to the ‘greed’ school of thought. This section presents the Colombian 
conflict as one continuous cycle of violence with a particular emphasis on the 
political system, economic and security grievances and the emergence of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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myriad of armed actors. It aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the ‘greed’ school through the incorporation of country-level analysis. 
 
For much of the beginning of the twentieth century, Colombia was at peace. 
The War of Thousand Days, which saw an estimated 100,000 killed, ended in 
1902 with the signing of peace treaties between the Liberal and Conservative 
political parties. Following 44 years of relative peace, violence erupted in 1946 
and has never ended. Violence during the 1940s and 1950s is largely framed 
in terms of partisan loyalties.175  Whilst Liberal and Conservative political 
parties existed elsewhere in Latin America, the depth of party affiliation is 
unique to Colombia. It is the only country in which the political parties that 
dominated politics in the nineteenth century continue to wield power today. 
Indeed, party affiliation was so strong in Colombia that loyalties were almost 
hereditary. In La Mala Hora (In Evil Hour) Colombia’s most successful 
novelist, Gabriel García Marquez, vividly describes the generation of armed 
conflict due to entrenched partisan loyalties, which stretched across all 
sectors of Colombian society.176  Partisan violence was a key element of 
violence in the mid-1940s. In the elections of 1946, power switched from the 
hands of the Liberals to the Conservatives sparking violence across the 
country. However, partisan affiliations do not wholly explain the pervasiveness 
of violence from 1946 to present day. 
 
The question of agrarian reform has been at the core of Colombia’s violence 
and political agenda for many decades. During the presidency of Alfonso 
López Pumarejo (1934-1938) a series of social reforms, known as La 
Revolución en Marcha (The Marching Revolution) were introduced.177 These 
included agrarian reform, the implementation of public education, universal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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male suffrage and trade union reform, which greatly alarmed the Colombian 
political parties. Not only did the reforms deepen the divides between the two 
leading parties, but they also sowed factionalism within the political system. In 
the election of 1942, the Conservatives were so deeply divided that the party 
lent its support to a dissident Liberal candidate.  
Popular unrest over socioeconomic grievances reflected the growing 
pressures. Rural areas saw disputes over land titles, tenant struggles and 
land invasions by peasant squatters to use large swaths of unused or 
underused parts of large estates. Urban centres were growing at an 
accelerated pace. Growth in the country’s capital Bogotá and other cities, 
such as, Medellín and Barranquilla was largely a result of the increased levels 
of industrial output, which between 1929 and 1945, doubled its share of total 
domestic output.178 For López, the neglect of the poor was not only wrong, but 
also dangerous for the development of the country. Unfortunately, the majority 
of neither his own party nor the opposition shared his sentiments. Hounded by 
allegations of corruption and under pressure from the opposition, López 
resigned from office in 1945. Although La Revolución en Marcha was largely a 
failure in terms of policy outcomes, López had awoken the hopes of the 
masses quicker than any political party could satisfy. 
 
In contrast to the nostrums of political scientists, Colombianist historians and 
Area Studies specialists have emphasised the problems of the Colombian 
state. The role of Colombian elites and the choices made by them in almost 
seven decades of violence have shaped the dynamics of the conflict from 
issues of land tenures, the decision to implement a two-party power sharing 
pact, military-paramilitary collusion and the displacement of millions in the 
process of economic development. Whilst attempts at reform by some 
members of the Colombian elite illustrate their acknowledgement of the issue 
of land well into the 20th century; successive failures to deal with these deep-
rooted problems led to the continuation and escalation of rural and urban 
violence. In line with the “greed” thesis, which undermines the role of the 
disruption of traditional social structures through modernisation, class-based !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!178 Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, p. 186.  
 81 
explanations for insurgency and violence have also been largely overlooked in 
political science literature in recent years. 
 
Colombian politics and society at the eve of the 1948 election was deeply 
fragmented. One of the rising stars of the political scene was Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitán, a young Liberal lawyer who had abandoned his party to form his own 
radical movement. 179  Gaitán’s humble origins, his denouncement of the 
oligarchy and the traditional political parties certainly struck a chord with the 
Colombian masses, however was not enough to secure an electoral victory. 
The Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez, won the election in the 
midst of bitter infighting and spreading rural violence. The failure of the 
government to control violent factions of their parties resulted in systematic 
violence against Liberals in a bid to take control of local municipalities and 
departments. Gaitán’s stand against the system of ‘tolerated violence’ took 
the form of huge popular demonstrations. 180  Although he was ‘cordially 
disliked by most of the party’s establishment’, Gaitán was the Liberal party’s 
‘most magnetic personally’.181 
 
On 9 April 1948, Gaitán was shot dead assassinated in downtown Bogotá as 
he left his office for lunch. This constituted a cataclysmic event in Colombian 
history. The violence that followed, misnamed as ‘el Bogotazo’182 was one of 
the largest insurrections in the history of Latin America. The reaction following 
his death illustrated that despite the elimination of the charismatic and popular 
leader, social turmoil was set to strengthen. In the wake of this event, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fortitude of the social and political structures came to light; once the revolt was 
quelled in the nation’s key urban centre, politics returned to the nineteenth 
century routine, shedding any signs of social mobilisation that had been 
constructed. Although the death of Gaitán signalled the onset of La Violencia, 
this catalytic event was the culmination of violence that had broken out since 
1946. A tense situation, which had been brewing under the surface since the 
election of 1946, finally came to a head and took the country into an abyss of 
violence. 
 
La Violencia lasted until 1958, killing an estimated 200,000. A further 600,000 
Colombian were injured and thousands fled their homes in what was not even 
an openly acknowledged war. It can be concluded from these figures that at 
least twenty per cent of the Colombian population was directly affected by La 
Violencia and its aftermath between 1946 and 1966.183 Although La Violencia, 
as often seen in partisan terms, and therefore disregarded as a nodal point of 
reference for the what is referred to as the ‘contemporary Colombian conflict’, 
economic and security grievances were the fundamental drivers of violence. 
This is illustrated by the various elements of violence, which include state 
repression, politicides, rural rebellion, local feuding and banditry. Although the 
number and variety of non-state actors involved have increased since La 
Violencia, the fundamental elements of violence continue to shape nature and 
texture of the Colombian conflict until today.  
 
In terms of the “greed vs. grievance” theory, La Violencia illustrates the 
problems associated with Collier’s narrow definition of civil war. At what point 
does malign violence and an urban uprising such as el Bogotazo transform 
into a civil war? If one were to define civil war in terms of the death count, La 
Violencia would certainly constitute as one. Although criminality and banditry 
were widespread during this period, it would be grossly misleading to suggest 
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that these factors drove the Colombian uprising.184 For the campesinos of 
rural Colombia ‘guerrillas were made by La Violencia’.185 The reality of an 
entire generation of Colombian children and adolescents from 1948 that were 
socialised in the guerrilla unit is not a facetious claim. Self-defence groups 
that emerged during La Violencia were not only a political force but also held 
a significant place in the social hierarchy of conflict regions; for many people 
who had been part of this socialisation process choosing their path in life as a 
guerrilla was as normal as choosing any other career. This is a persistent 
problem. The use of child soldiers is a case in point. In 2010, a report by the 
Medellín-based NGO, Humanitarian Diplomatic Mission concluded that 
Colombia has the forth-highest number of child soldiers in the world behind 
Burma, Sudan and Congo, with estimates of up to 14,000 children under the 
age of 18 active in insurgent, paramilitary and militia groups.186 In 2003, 
Human Rights Watch documented case histories of child combatants, which 
showed that children in rural Colombia have often observed, become victims 
of domestic violence or violent crimes long before they join an armed 
group.187 World Bank interviews with hundreds of low-income Colombians 
also reveal intergenerational causal links among different forms of violence.188 
 
The importance of La Violencia has been severely neglected by scholars of 
civil conflict. The ‘end’ of this phase of violence is marked by the 
implementation of a power-sharing agreement by the leaders of the 
Conservative and Liberal parties in 1958 known as el Frente Nacional (The 
National Front). This ‘peace’ pact brought with it more problems and failed to 
resolve old tensions. Colombian elites set aside their differences in order to 
end a short period of military rule and forged a new power-sharing pact that 
successfully ended inter-party killings; however it failed to establish peace in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the territory. The government used military repression to ‘pacify’ bandits as 
well as communities of Liberal and communist peasants – known as 
‘independent republics’ – that organised to resist persecution and then fought 
to retain their autonomy. The Frente Nacional institutionalised the control of 
the two parties over political offices and formal political participation well into 
the 1970s. This had the effect of trivialising the democratic process by dividing 
up government posts evenly between Liberals and Conservatives, regardless 
of electoral results. According to Jonathan Hartlyn, the result was that 
alternative political movements were excluded from the mainstream political 
process. In other words meaningful opposition became anti-systemic, fuelling 
leftist insurgencies.189 
 
The beginning of the Colombian conflict is contested across disciplines. For 
Area Studies scholars and historians, Colombia has suffered a series of civil 
wars throughout its history.190 Theorists of civil conflict cite the ‘coca boom’ of 
the late 1970s as an indicator for the onset of war. For security analysts, 
American-backed counter-insurgency operations in guerrilla strongholds in the 
early 1960s mark the beginning of the contemporary conflict. The conflation of 
Colombia’s insurgent groups with drug traffickers is wholly inaccurate and 
conceals a much more complicated reality. Drug traffickers and insurgents are 
fundamentally distinct; if global demand for illicit drugs was to miraculously 
disappear, whilst drug traffickers may cease to exist, the insurgents may well 
persevere. The goals of these two groups may overlap in some situations, 
however their primary objectives are diametrically opposed: insurgents traffic 
drugs in order to finance rebellions, however the cartels have not deliberately 
financed rebels. The insurgents do not protect traffickers from the state or 
other armed actors, however they may protect farmers from state actors. 
Insurgents have also acted as middlemen between farmers and traffickers, 
sometimes strengthening the leverage of small producers. Moreover, the land 
reform policies sought by insurgent groups are anathema to drug lords, who 
are themselves recent landowners. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!189  Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalitional Rule in Colombia, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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The unresolved agrarian question has had a lasting impact on the relationship 
between the peasantry and the Colombian state. The 1970s saw the 
radicalisation of the peasantry under the Asociación Nacional de Usarios 
Campesinos (ANUC, the National Association of Peasant Users). Land 
invasions sponsored by the ANUC spread across the departments of Boyacá, 
Huila and Tolima in October 1971. Between 1971 and 1975 around 2000 
haciendas (large estates) were invaded. 191  This increasingly open 
confrontation between the peasantry and the political elite became one of the 
most prominent axes of the Colombian conflict. The failure of the ANUC to 
thwart the government’s counter-reformist policies contributed to the later 
success of armed guerrilla groups. Whilst the drugs trade is often cited in the 
orthodox literature as the key factor leading to the growth of Colombia’s 
armed groups, three factors were central to the increasing support for 
insurgency in rural areas: economic and security grievances, and the demise 
of the ANUC by the end of the 1970s The Colombian state’s abandonment of 
agrarian reform during the 1970s therefore directly correlates with an increase 
of armed conflict, which is a key element of the violence ignored by 
contemporary theorists of civil conflict.192  
 
The neglect of the internal drivers of conflict in Colombia is largely ignored in 
recent accounts of the conflict. The origin of the conflict is often associated 
with either the beginnings of the insurgent groups in the early 1960s for US 
foreign policy analysis, or else the ‘cocaine boom’ of the 1980s for civil war 
theorists.193 As the internal antagonisms of the Colombian conflict have been 
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generally side-lined, with the drugs trade forming as one of the main focal 
points of violent conflict in the country, the history of the peasantry features 
little in literature where “greed” and US actions and drugs are seen as the 
most fundamental driving factors for violence. The focus on insurgents and 
the drug trade is problematic as it diminishes the role played by other armed 
forces in drug trafficking and perpetrating violence. Contrary to popular belief, 
the paramilitaries and national armed forces have actually played a larger role 
in the drug trade than the insurgent groups. Although, during the 1990s right-
wing paramilitary groups dramatically expanded their ranks and improved 
their public image, according to sources from the US State Department, the 
paramilitaries were responsible for more murders and massacres than any 
other armed group in Colombia. Furthermore, Colombian government sources 
attribute three-quarters of all extrajudicial killings during the 1990s to the 
paramilitaries.194 
 
The 1980s saw the initiation of a long process of negotiations between the 
guerrilla organisations and the Colombian government. Both the “new wars” 
and the “greed vs. grievance” theories would suggest that the drugs trade and 
the criminal activity associated with it drove the high levels of violence and 
increased paramilitarism in Colombia. However, the ideological collusion 
between the state and paramilitary forces is undeniable and this element is 
central to explaining the sustained attacks on various elements of Colombian 
society, including human rights activists, journalists, union leaders and 
peasants. The political genocide of the left in Colombia during the 1980s 
could not have been possible if it was not for the collusion of the state and 
paramilitary forces that were bound by their common goal of countering the 
guerrilla forces as part of a subterranean struggle that had little to do with 
narcotics. 
 
The paramilitary phenomenon is a direct result of policies implemented by the 
Colombian government. From 1964, a counterinsurgency decree authorised !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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self-defence units until state-sponsored militias were declared unconstitutional 
in 1989, following public outrage over the atrocities committed by such 
groups. However, despite the change of law, atrocities by the paramilitaries 
saw a marked increase during the 1990s. International human rights 
organisations documented the continued collusion between the paramilitaries 
and specific military brigades. 195  Paramilitaries have carried out civilian 
massacres and high-profile assassinations with impunity, whilst some 
government agencies have attempted to prevent and prosecute such crimes, 
illustrating the weakness of such agencies relative to the power of military and 
civilian elites that support paramilitary actions. Furthermore, these 
discrepancies reveal the fragmentation of the state apparatus and the 
insufficient power of civilian elites that oppose paramilitary goals and 
methods.  
 
Since 1948 a state of siege has been renewed periodically making it an 
almost permanent feature of political life in Colombia. The state of siege is a 
juridical institution, which is ‘put into effect to deal with irregular situations in 
the public life of the country’.196 Under state of siege, the Executive is able to 
implement decrees that ‘abrogate rights by transferring broad judicial and 
political powers to the military, with no or little civilian oversight’.197 Decree 
1290 passed in 1965 cleared the way for civilians accused of ‘subversive 
activities’ or supporting guerrilla groups to be sent to military courts where 
proceedings were secret and legal rights for the defendants were suspended. 
President Turbay’s Decree 1923 of 1978, aptly named the Security Statute, 
gave the police judicial powers to deal with the ‘disturbance of public order’ 
covering a broad range of social protest. For the leading Colombian historian 
Francisco Leal Buitrago, these conditions allowed the Armed Forces ‘to 
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expand its autonomy in matters of public order to unprecedented levels’.198 
Courts martial for civilians continued until 1987 and were reintroduced in 
1996. This is most troubling as the term ‘subversive activities’ came to 
encompass a wide range of actions by civilians. ‘Government critics, trade 
unionists, community organisers, opposition politicians, civic leaders, and 
human rights activists’ along with ‘non-violent protestors for land, education, 
human rights, better wages, health care, public services’ were labelled as 
subversives. 199  For the former Colombian Defence Minister, General 
Camacho Leyva, social protest was referred to as the ‘unarmed branch of 
subversion’.200 
 
The Colombian political system has allowed groups of Colombian elites to 
advance their political and economic interests with relative autonomy. In the 
search of explanations for long-lasting conflict, the poor choices of the 
Colombian elites have been emphasised by Colombianists. Leading historian 
of Colombia, David Bushnell argues that the leaders of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties established a ‘fratricidal’ pattern in the nineteenth 
century when the masses were used as cannon fodder in a series of highly 
violent civil conflicts.201 Philip Mauceri argues that because party elites viewed 
the state in instrumental terms, party competition was prone to result in armed 
conflict.202  
 
Colombia’s elites have been aware of the importance of the issue of land for 
many decades. On several occasions, Colombia’s elites have attempted to 
tackle the problem by attempting to increase the legitimacy of the state and 
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address the forces undermining it.203 However, these have largely failed due 
to the fissiparous nature of Colombian political parties. The failure of the 
implementation of well-needed land reform in the 1930s and 1960s illustrates 
the difficulties faced. A further example of this would be the sabotage of the 
peace efforts of the government of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) by regional 
elites and the armed forces command.204 Negotiations with the FARC resulted 
in the demobilisation of combatants and the founding of a popular, non-violent 
political party, Unión Patriótica (UP). The murder of thousands of UP 
members that followed was carried out by paramilitaries affiliated with regional 
and military elites. Intra-elite divisions were also evident when the military 
stormed the Palace of Justice in 1985, which had been seized by the urban 
guerrilla group, the M-19. Allegedly, the military destroyed the government 
building without Betancur’s orders, killing all the members of the Supreme 
Court and dozens of employees.205  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The increasing emphasis on numbers and rational choice has obscured the 
reality of violent conflict in Colombia. This chapter has illustrated the pressing 
need to utilize a variety of important modes of analysis for the study of violent 
conflict. If the Colombian government were to defeat the insurgent forces and 
continue with their recent successes, the demise of insurgency would not 
necessarily mark the end of organised violence. Whilst the desire for material 
gain is a major factor in the case of Colombia, analysts whose examination 
only includes rebels and illegal armed actors overlook key ideological and 
sociological dimensions of the violence and in particular the role of the state in 
the perpetuation of violence and the problems associated with the political 
system. Earlier cycles of violence and unresolved issues of land tenure have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fed subsequent cycles of conflict in Colombia. The most recent cycle of 
violence, from 1946 to present day, requires an in depth analysis of the 
economic and security grievances that have fuelled violence in Colombia.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Colombia’s Forgotten Conflict: La Violencia, 1946-1957 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
La Violencia is the forgotten period of modern Colombian history. The 
undeclared war killed an estimated 200,000 Colombians, marking one of the 
bloodiest periods of Colombian history. Remarkably, the ferocity of violence 
during this period is largely unaddressed in scholarly literature. This thesis 
brings La Violencia out of the shadows of history by restoring its position as 
the beginning of the contemporary conflict and illustrates how this period of 
violence consolidated Colombia’s dysfunctional democracy, which is 
characterised by the political exclusion of the left and political factionalism 
amongst the elite. These are the central elements of the structural 
weaknesses of the Colombian state that have driven political and social 
instability. In order to understand the complexity of violence in Colombia 
today, we must examine the historical nature of violence in the country and 
look to the problems associated with the political system as a fundamental 
element in driving violence.  
 
The framing of this event underlines its importance. Within Colombia, the term 
‘La Violencia’ functions to signify a wide range of meanings. For the oligarchs 
and Colombian elite, La Violencia was a ‘partisan conflict’; for those 
campesinos who mobilised in an organised manner, La Violencia is 
characterised as ‘la revolución’. By contrast, those people in the interior, 
coffee-making regions saw La Violencia as a ‘great historical process’. It is 
important to note the fissiparous nature the definitions of La Violencia within 
different sections of Colombian society, since they are indicative of the very 
different conception of anarchy that undoubtedly overtook Colombia for a 
decade despite its ‘great democratic tradition’. At the heart of academic and 
political inquiries which have baffled historians and political scientists alike is 
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the driver of an increasingly bitter division in Colombian society, which has in 
turn led to various interpretations of what type of conflict La Violencia was. 
 
The neglect of La Violencia in academic literature is part of a larger problem. 
Despite the status of being one the most violent nations in the western 
hemisphere, Colombia is the least studied of the major Latin American 
countries. 206  Scholarly neglect of the country is due to the trend of 
comparative analysis of countries within the discipline of Social Sciences. The 
economic and political development of Colombia has historically differed from 
its Latin American counterparts; it is been historically framed as the region’s 
‘anomaly’.207 As a result, the country has not featured highly within academic 
literature. Indeed, La Violencia is largely seen as an anomaly in itself.208 
Accordingly, much of the scholarly literature on this period of Colombian 
history has sought to define La Violencia.  
 
Area studies scholars have dominated the discourse on La Violencia. Over 
the decades several competing hypotheses have emerged on the origin of La 
Violencia. These divergent accounts have led to the characterisation of this 
conflict either as a partisan struggle, a delayed nineteenth century civil war or 
as a popular uprising.209 During the 1960s, a number of rather generalised 
theories were developed to explain La Violencia, which attributed the violence 
in Colombia to the transition of society from ‘pre-modern’ to ‘modern’ or to 
partisan rivalries in which the masses blindly followed the dictates of 
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competing political elites.210 Whilst these early studies offered some insights 
into the scope of the violence, the literature raises the question of how political 
tensions among the political elites in Bogotá drove the more distant citizens in 
rural areas to take up arms. Did partisan affiliation take precedence over all 
other types of identity in Colombia? 
 
La Violenca engulfed almost the entirety of Colombia. Partisan affiliation may 
have provided the initial catalyst for the emergence of violence; at least in 
some areas of Colombia, however this explanation is limited in accounting for 
the heterogeneous nature of the conflict. All sectors of Colombian society 
were responsible for the perpetration of violence: Conservatives, Liberals, 
Communists, Catholics, Protestants, wealthy elites, campesinos, farmers and 
bandits.211 The motivation for carrying out violence also varied amongst these 
groups. Conservatives carried out attacks against Liberals in order to seek 
reparations for previous sixteen years of ‘Liberal oppression’. The Partido 
Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party, PCC) provided support 
to Liberal guerrillas and rural self-defence groups. Catholics fought 
Protestants in order to gain influence over the population. Violent 
confrontations took place between wealthy elites and campesinos. Bandits, or 
criminals, took part in general lawlessness and were ‘an obvious result of a 
volatile political and economic history’.212 
 
Theories of civil conflict have not been applied to this period of Colombian 
violence. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, La Violencia has been largely 
framed as an anomaly of violence or a partisan war and therefore unrelated to 
later episodes of violence. For the historian and intelligence expert, James L. 
Zackrison, La Violencia was a ‘unique phenomenon’:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘it was partisan, but not organised; it was rural, seldom urban; it was 
seldom anti-establishment, but was sometimes encouraged by the 
establishment; it was not against a dictatorship, but it created a 
dictatorship; it was not religiously orientated; it was not among the 
poor, but rather predominantly among the prosperous small farmers; it 
was not against the armed forces, but was finally controlled by the 
armed forces’.213 
 
Zackrison’s description highlights the complexities of La Violencia and more 
generally cases of mass violence. Importantly, it also illustrates the difficulties 
of defining a civil war. The emphasis on partisan rivalries in the literature as 
the driving force for violence does not take into consideration the element of 
revolt or rebellion. The framing of La Violencia as an anomaly or exceptional 
case of violence does not fit academic notions of civil war. As a result, 
theorists of civil conflict and US foreign policy specialists have largely 
overlooked the importance La Violencia for understanding the current problem 
of violence in Colombia. 
 
Secondly, theories of civil conflict are largely based on external grand 
narratives. Both the “new wars” and “greed vs. grievance” literature assumes 
that external support was central to the emergence and growth of armed 
groups in the global South as a result of Cold War super rivalry. This raises 
serious questions about the conceptualisation of violence in the global South, 
and particularly Colombia, prior to external assistance and the Cuban 
revolution. 
 
La Violencia reflects in many ways what Mary Kaldor defines as a “new war”. 
Arguably, state failure, social transformation driven by the intensification of 
global interconnectedness and liberal economic forces; the breakdown of 
public authority leading to ‘irregular’ armies; a phenomenal rise in civilian 
casualties; the targeting of civilians as objects of war are all characteristics !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that can be observed in La Violencia. In terms of the “greed vs. grievance” 
theory, La Violencia illustrates the problems associated with Collier’s narrow 
definition of civil war. At what point does malign violence and an urban 
uprising, such as el Bogotazo transform into a civil war?214 If one were to 
define civil war in terms of the death count, La Violencia would certainly 
constitute as one. Although criminality and banditry were widespread during 
this period, it would be grossly misleading to suggest that these factors drove 
the Colombian uprising.215 For the campesinos of rural Colombia ‘guerrillas 
were made by La Violencia’.216 Scholars outside of Colombia have ignored La 
Violencia’s as a significant point of reference for the contemporary conflict in 
favour of a focus on the emergence of armed groups during the 1960s and 
the ‘cocaine boom’ of the 1980s. Moreover, the link between La Violencia and 
the current conflict is often reduced to descriptive accounts that merely trace 
the biographical paths of those guerrillas that emerged during the 1940s and 
1950s and went on to be leading figures of the FARC.217 
 
The element of criminality is not new to Colombia. An examination of the 
dynamics of La Violencia reveals the diversity of violence, which has 
continued to shape the nature of conflict in the country: state sponsored 
terror, guerrilla activity, privatised paramilitary forces and criminality. The 
relationship between rebellion and criminality has been at the centre of a 
heated debate amongst scholars and has serious implications for the way the 
Colombian conflict is perceived. Kidnapping was one of the most common 
elements of bandit activity and subsequent armed Colombian groups have 
practised this to an aberrant extent. The conflation of activities between 
guerrillas and bandits is a real component of the conflict and demonstrates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that the unstable boundaries between armed groups exists but must be seen 
in the context of the state’s security apparatus. Partisan violence is one key 
element of La Violencia, however this was largely related to the increasing 
factionalism within Colombia’s Liberal and Conservative parties, which by 
1946 had extremist wings on both sides that perpetrated violence against the 
masses in order to gain control of local municipalities. 
 
 
Partisan Violence 
 
Colombian history consists of series of bloody civil wars. The first civil war 
known as the Guerra de los Supremos – War of the Supremes – began in 
1839 and has defined the shape of Colombian politics until the twenty-first 
century. The war was principally fought between the supporters of Simón 
Bolívar, el Libertador, and the supporters of Francisco de Paula Santander, 
one of the leaders of Colombian independence. The Guerra de los Supremos 
ended in 1841 and led to the formation of the Liberal and Conservative 
political parties that have largely dominated Colombian politics to the present 
day. 218   The historical roots of the Colombian political system sharply 
differentiate the texture of Colombia’s politics from those of other Latin 
American states as the two traditional parties retained their monopoly of 
power and were also the sources of violent contention throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. Numerous conflicts throughout the 
republic’s history were waged in the name of the two leading political parties.  
 
One of the most fascinating episodes of Colombia’s violent history is the 
decade long conflict known as simply La Violencia – the violence. Little is 
known of La Violencia beyond Colombian borders. However, it forms an 
extraordinary episode within Colombian history and indeed twentieth-century !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
218 Fernán E. González, Partidos, Guerras e Iglesia en la Construcción del Estado-
Nación en Colombia, 1830-1900 (Medellín: Carreta, 2006); Fernán González 
González, ‘La Guerra de los Supremos (1839-1841) y los Orígenes del Bipartidismo,’ 
Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades, Vol. 97, No. 848 (2010) pp. 5-64; Gonzalo 
Sánchez, Guerra y Política en la Sociedad Colombiana (Bogotá: Áncora Editores, 
1991) pp. 15-16. 
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political violence. Although this century saw more social revolutions and 
upheavals than any other across the globe, nevertheless La Violencia was an 
exceptional case of mass violence for its time. As one prominent writer 
observed ‘no other country in Latin America – and few nations of the world – 
have in mid-twentieth century experienced internal violence and guerrilla 
violence as has Colombia’.219  It was an unexpected orgy of violence that 
marked the largest armed conflict in the Western hemisphere since the 
Mexican revolution. However, whilst one may have expected that the intense 
levels of conflict that have ravaged Colombia would lead to an increased 
study of La Violencia, conversely the horrors of this episode seem to have led 
many scholars to neglect this extraordinary episode in contemporary 
Colombian history. 
 
Traditionally, La Violencia is framed as a partisan struggle. To some degree 
this is assertion holds an element of truth. The Colombian oligarchy, 
consisting of Liberal and Conservative political parties, used rural campesinos 
as cannon fodder in order to gain control of local areas and municipalities. 
However, La Violencia broke out during a permanent state of crisis in which 
there was an increasingly open confrontation between the ruling elite and the 
masses following the Conservative victory in 1946 by Mariano Ospina Pérez. 
The question of agrarian reform has been at the core of Colombia’s violence 
and political agenda for many decades. During the presidency of Alfonso 
López Pumarejo (1934-1938) a series of social reforms, known as La 
Revolución en Marcha (The Marching Revolution) were introduced.220 These 
included agrarian reform, the implementation of public education, universal 
male suffrage and trade union reform, which greatly alarmed the Colombian 
political parties. Not only did the reforms deepen the divides between the two 
leading parties, but they also sowed factionalism within the political system. In 
the election of 1942, the Conservatives were so deeply divided that the party 
lent its support to a dissident Liberal candidate.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969) p. 360. 
220 Alvaro Tirado Mejía, La Revolución en Marcha y la Reforma Constitutional de 
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Popular unrest over socioeconomic grievances reflected the growing 
pressures. Rural areas saw disputes over land titles, tenant struggles and 
land invasions by peasant squatters to use large swaths of unused or 
underused parts of large estates. Urban centres were growing at an 
accelerated pace. Growth in the country’s capital Bogotá and other cities, 
such as, Medellín and Barranquilla was largely a result of the increased levels 
of industrial output, which between 1929 and 1945, doubled its share of total 
domestic output.221 For López, the neglect of the poor was not only wrong, but 
also dangerous for the development of the country. Unfortunately, the majority 
of neither his own party nor the opposition shared his sentiments. Hounded by 
allegations of corruption and under pressure from the opposition, López 
resigned from office in 1945. Although La Revolución en Marcha was largely a 
failure in terms of policy outcomes, López had awoken the hopes of the 
masses quicker than any political party could satisfy. 
 
Colombian politics and society at the eve of the 1948 election was deeply 
fragmented. One of the rising stars of the political scene was Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitán, a young Liberal lawyer who had abandoned his party to form his own 
radical movement. 222  Gaitán’s humble origins, his denouncement of the 
oligarchy and the traditional political parties certainly struck a chord with the 
Colombian masses, however was not enough to secure an electoral victory. 
The Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez, won the election in the 
midst of bitter in fighting and spreading rural violence. The failure of the 
government to control violent factions of their parties resulted in systematic 
violence against Liberals in a bid to take control of local municipalities and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
221 Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, p. 186.  
222 Gonzalo Sánchez, Los Días de la Revolución: Gaitanismo y Nueve de Abril en 
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and Popular Mobilization in Colombia (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
2003); Richard R. Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 1978); Arturo Álape, El Bogotazo: Memorias del  Olvido 
(Bogotá: Casa de las Americas, 1983); W. John Green, '"Vibrations of the 
Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia’s Atlantic Coast, 1944-
1948,' Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1996) pp. 283-311.  
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departments. Gaitán’s stand against the system of ‘tolerated violence’ took 
the form of huge popular demonstrations. 223  Although he was ‘cordially 
disliked by most of the party’s establishment’, Gaitán was the Liberal party’s 
‘most magnetic personally’.224 
 
On 9 April 1948, Gaitán was shot dead assassinated in downtown Bogotá as 
he left his office for lunch. This constituted a cataclysmic event in Colombian 
history. The violence that followed, misnamed as ‘el Bogotazo’225 was one of 
the largest insurrections in the history of Latin America. The reaction following 
his death illustrated that despite the elimination of the charismatic and popular 
leader, social turmoil was set to strengthen. In the wake of this event, the 
fortitude of the social and political structures came to light; once the revolt was 
quelled in the nation’s key urban centre, politics returned to the nineteenth 
century routine, shedding any signs of social mobilisation that had been 
constructed. Although the death of Gaitán signalled the onset of La Violencia, 
this catalytic event was the culmination of violence that had broken out since 
1946. A tense situation, which had been brewing under the surface since the 
election of 1946, finally came to a head and took the country into an abyss of 
violence. 
 
La Violencia stands in need of significant reinterpretation. Whilst La Violencia 
may present itself as being characterised by earlier forms of violence in 
Colombia where the ideological management of the masses was driven 
through the elitist political parties, this explanation neglects agency of the 
masses in rural and urban Colombia. In stark contrast to past confrontation, in 
the case of La Violencia, the conduct of military activity was assumed by the 
people, in particular the peasantry. It is this context of mass violence that we 
see the emergence of organised guerrilla groups, criminal bands and 
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paramilitary forces deployed on the part of owners of large estates to protect 
their assets. 
 
This chapter proposes that the conflict was indeed the result of a power 
struggle between the political elites of the country. However, this was 
exacerbated by complex socio-economic and social tensions in the country 
that made for an explosive conflation of violence that lasted over a decade. 
The archival material deployed here gives an insight into the internal divisions 
within the Colombian political elite and shows that fear of the possibility of an 
extreme Communist or Nazi/Falangist movement taking hold was at the heart 
of the political tensions. Catholic religious identity, socioeconomic strife and 
the popularity of Gaitán further complicated the already existing fears of the 
political elite leading to widespread state sponsored terrorism and the 
emergence of rebel forces in the key industrial and agricultural areas such as 
Llanos, Tolima and Antioquia. 
 
La Violencia was not a simple dual between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties. Nor were these political parties the sort of conventional political 
grouping that we associate with the term and we might be better to think of 
them as social factions. The monopoly of power held by these factions is of 
particular significance. The country’s historical political parties formed a key 
feature of partisan political activity and preceded the development of 
citizenship. Whilst in traditional terms, the emergence of political parties is 
seen as an important step toward democratic and societal development, in 
Colombia they appeared before the development of the nationhood, therefore 
representing an archaic or pre-political phenomenon. 226  The peculiarity of the 
make-up of the political parties is the key to understanding why the partisan 
struggle served to create supporters of political parties, rather than political 
actors. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gonzalo Sánchez and Ricardo Peñaranda, (eds.) Pasado y Presente de la Violencia 
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The Colombian Liberal and Conservative parties had developed deep-seated 
fears of the each other well before the onset of La Violencia. Arguably each 
nurtured a conspiratorial mindset that suspected the other of preparing to 
move into the terrain of extra-parliamentary politics. The former feared the 
anti-communists and their ‘Nazi, Fascist and Falangist’ agenda, which 
according to Liberal officials had the ‘undeniable support of the clergy’. 
Conversely, the Conservative party emphasised the ‘failure of the Liberal 
party to take a stand in conflicts between Communists and so-called anti-
Communists’.227 Editorials written by the former President Santos for the daily 
newspaper El Tiempo before the onset of La Violencia reveal a wider 
narrative, which extends the debate on the partisan politics that were for many 
years seen to have driven the country to civil war. The source of contention 
between the two political parties during the 1940s was based around the fear 
of a Spanish influenced Falangist government or a social revolution. In short, 
the extreme factionalism of the Colombian system was at core of the political 
problem. 
 
Indeed, these fears were not unfounded. Well-placed British and American 
officials serving in Colombia picked up substantial evidence of this and 
concluded that in March 1945 a revolutionary movement was in motion that 
included a number of pivotal army officers and members of the clergy, 
together with support from the Cartagena Naval Base. During the same month 
1600 bombs and hand grenades were discovered hidden in a Bogotá 
cathedral.228 Inquiries following this episode revealed that the revolutionary 
movement consisted of mainly inactive servicemen and members of the 
Conservative party, despite no official sponsorship from the wider political 
faction. The FBI was watching Colombia closely because of fears of 
undercover German activity. J. Edgar Hoover worked especially closely with 
Frederick B. Lyon from the State Department’s Division of Foreign Activity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
227American Embassy, Bogotá and Secretary of State, Memorandum of conversation, 
Washington DC, July 31, 1945, No Document Number, 5239, RG 59, USNA. 
228American Embassy, Bogotá and Secretary of State, Memorandum of conversation, 
Washington DC, March 10, 1945, 821.00/3-1745, 5239A, RG59, USNA. 
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Correlation. Both were agreed that the potential for revolution in Colombia 
was considerable due to the extremely high cost of living, which caused great 
unrest among the population who were very critical of the ruling 
government.229 This is a repeated observation made by officials working in 
Colombia during this period and also gives some indication as to why the 
urban riots of el Bogotazo quickly spread to other cities in Colombia. 
 
The labelling of the insurrection is of particular significance. In official 
memorandums, newspaper reports and later scholarly work, words such as, 
‘mob’, ‘riot’, ‘rising’ of April 9 have served to obscure the true reality and 
diversity of the violence and participants, giving rise to the non-analysis of the 
crisis.230 However, a number of scholarly works, such as that of Herbert 
Braun,231 Arturo Álape,232 and Gonzalo Sánchez233 have been instrumental in 
bringing in new dimensions to the events across urban centres in Colombia as 
well in the most remote provisional regions and rural areas. These studies 
have done much to restore the historical significance of April 9 to 
contemporary Colombian history and have laid the foundations for the further 
study of the following period. Following the assassination of the Liberal party 
leader Gaitán, the logic of suppressing social and political activity was 
ruthlessly enforced through the dismantling the April 9 rebellion; repression of 
all vestiges of civic and social protest, including union or workers’ 
organisations; and the widespread terror against Gaitanistas and other 
expressions of the left across the nation, including the Liberal party. This 
structured form of repression and terror instilled the notion of deviants in 
society, who had transgressed the ‘official’ order.  
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The situation between the two political parties compounded to form a vicious 
circle of violence. The Liberals continued to proclaim that the ‘Conservative 
Government has the power under the state of siege to put an end to violence; 
that they (the Liberals) were not responsible for starting the violence and that 
their interest lies in the reestablishment of peace in the country.’ In retaliation, 
the Conservative government argued that the only effective means to end it 
and bring about the end of martial law was ‘for the Liberals to cease their 
subversive attitude and recognise the victory of Laureano Gomez’.234  
 
The Liberal and Conservative parties’ peculiarity is rooted in their status as 
belonging to the same social order and needing each other to survive. 
Nevertheless they possess an inherent hatred toward one another through 
almost mythical differences. The element of the partisan struggle during La 
Violencia and fears that each political faction held was very real. The threat of 
a Falangist government or revolutionary movement felt imminent for many 
government officials. It is in the context of these fears and permanent state of 
warfare, the Conservative government implemented a series of measures to 
curb the violence, increase state control and censorship, which led to 
resistance to form and organise across Colombia. 
 
 
The Impact of La Violencia  
 
La Violencia had a profound impact on Colombian society. An estimated 
200,000 perished and a further 600,000 injured.235 Millions fled their homes. 
Incomplete records have hindered research on this period of Colombian 
history. In many parts of the country, records were simply not kept or were 
destroyed. Indeed, a great deal of the violence was perpetrated by those 
figures that were in charge of keeping records – the Colombian authorities.236 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234American Embassy, Bogotá and Secretary of State, Memorandum of conversation 
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235 Campos, Borda and Luna, La Violencia en Colombia, Tomo I; Guzmán, Borda, 
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Despite the lack of concrete figures for the majority of the country, for the 
relatively small department of Tolima the records are fairly complete: between 
1948 and 1958, 1,993 families left the province (around 8,000 people), 34,730 
farms were abandoned and property worth 970,000,000 pesos was destroyed 
(400-500 million dollars).237 The term ‘La Violencia’ is used in a number of 
contexts and serves various purposes. It described the barbarity of the conflict 
and the conflation of violence on different fronts that characterised the 
struggle – terror, anarchy and insurgency. Most importantly, in official terms, 
the terminology functions to conceal the social and political effects of the 
crisis, and also implies the violence is mysterious, unexplainable and without 
the possibility of calling individuals to account. 
 
Property, production and social relations were all deeply affected. Not only 
had the loss of human life been enormous, but also the losses in property, 
harvests and business profits were incalculable. Industrial hubs, such as 
Líbano in Tolima, and Sevilla in Valle were dislocated due to a sharp increase 
in violence and a subsequent decline in industry. Other areas such as 
Armenia, in the department of Quindío, conversely experienced rapid 
economic growth. 238  Irregular mechanisms to conduct business became 
commonplace as trade channels for important agricultural products, such as 
coffee and livestock were altered. For some, La Violencia brought wealth and 
upward mobility, such as merchants. However, in areas under guerrilla control 
this could also bring obligatory taxes into practice for those working in 
agriculture, a technique adopted from local bandits in order to raise funds. In 
areas where the resistance was not successful, thousands of small 
landholdings were looted, affecting many vulnerable indigenous communities. 
Hence, La Violencia favoured the expansion of agriculturalists that were well !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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positioned before the conflict exploded and were able to reap the benefits to 
maintain their initial advantage. The Colombian economy seemed to fare well 
despite enduring chaos during future decades. This is particularly important 
for the development of violence in Colombia throughout the twentieth century 
– intense levels of violence have gone hand in hand with stable economic 
growth on a national level over decades. 
 
Rituals of violence were important during La Violencia in instilling repression. 
Killing followed a sinister logic in which the method of execution was symbolic 
where the stripping, mutilating, desecrating bodies sought to communicate the 
message of intimidation. Such ceremonial killings were important in 
constructing the ‘Other’ in Colombian society; cutting out the tongue signified 
silencing the opposition; eviscerating expectant mothers to eliminate the 
ability of the Other to reproduce; burning down of houses to banish the 
Other.239 The effect of these heinous crimes was the consolidation of a highly 
stratified society of politically homogenous regions. Economic activity, 
marriage, selection of godparents and friendships would take place on the 
basis of party affiliation, transforming the daily life of Colombians.  
 
Killings were carried out with incredible ferocity as crucifixions and hangings 
became a familiar way of death. Certain methods of killing and torture became 
commonplace and given specific names, for example: picar para tamal, 
cutting a living body into a number of small pieces, bocachiquiar, inducing a 
slow death through hundreds of small punchers on the body, and an elaborate 
classification system of the various different ways of beheading which were 
given different names: el corte de mica (monkey cut), el corte de franela (t-
shirt cut), el corte frances (french cut), el corte de corbata (neck-tie cut).240  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Children suffered enormously; infants were knifed, young children as young 
as eight were raped en masse. These peculiar manifestations of social 
dysfunctions indicate the pathological desire to assert the existence of the self 
and obliteration of the Other. The religious context in which these societal 
transformations were taking place is particularly important as Colombia at the 
time prided itself as a deeply Catholic nation. Indeed, religious rhetoric was 
used to legitimise actions on all sides of this multi-faceted conflict, from 
Conservatives who saw their support of the government’s cause as part of 
their path as Christians to bands of assassins leaving signs of religiosity at the 
scenes of their killings to superstitious practices among guerrilla groups.   
 
Historical hindsight shows the reproduction of La Violencia wherein each 
cycle as multiplied to reproduced several others. In the case of this cycle of 
violence, the political-partisan conflict produced revolutionary and bandolero 
or criminal violence. Armed groups from the police, armed forces, 
paramilitaries and guerrillas have all adopted similar methods of killing. The 
dynamics of La Violencia are very peculiar and perhaps here lies the 
explanation why it is not defined as a war. La Violencia did not take place in 
battlefields and the death toll did not consist of enemy casualties; massacres 
and genocide were commonplace and undertaken by rival groups to resolve 
antagonisms. The purpose of this war was not to defeat the enemy but to instil 
fear in a nation where regions were characterised by partisan affiliations. In 
line with this path, it was the masses that would become the targets of these 
smaller conflicts.  
 
La Violencia ushered in a number of key changes for the nature of conflict in 
Colombia. Firstly, structural changes moved the social and political struggle in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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new directions, showing new traits of class conflict, as there was an 
increasing hostility between campesinos and the Colombian elite. In short, La 
Violencia deepened factionalism with Colombian politics and society. 
Secondly, political repression became institutionalised, a feature that has 
characterised violence in Colombia until present day. Thirdly, La Violencia 
established the existence of organised criminal bands. Finally, this period of 
Colombian violence saw a marked increase of new social actors, such as an 
emerging independent workers movement and peasant struggles aligned with 
agrarian associations, which took hold in the coffee-producing regions.241  
 
However, the decisive factor that came to dominate the political outlook of 
Colombian society was Gaitanismo – the political movement named after and 
led by the 1946 Liberal party candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.242 Strikingly, 
Gaitianismo for a significant period of time was viewed as a variant of the 
Liberal party. However, Gaitanismo varied from the elitist Liberal party by 
representing the anti-oligarchical movement, opposing both the Liberal and 
Conservative oligarchies. In recent years, the political discourse of 
Gaitanismo has been explored and reinterpreted as a movement that is 
distinct of Colombian bipartisanism. The reinterpretation of Gaitanismo is 
particularly important is relocating the debate on La Violencia; if La Violencia 
erupted as an opposition to the Gaitanista movement, the origins of the 
conflict are placed on a different premise. The repression of the ‘third way’ is a 
continuing theme within Colombian politics. The work of the revolutionary 
priest, Camilo Torres Restrepo in his essay on the effects of La Violencia on 
the peasant mentality is imperative in gaining an understanding on the 
enduring impact of La Violencia on the people and the political conscience of 
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the peasantry.243 Camilo Torres found that the participation of the campesinos 
in the conflict and their process of resistance was key in breaking down the 
traditional structures, submissive mentality and their isolation. This key text 
highlights the importance of not only seeing La Violencia and domination from 
above, but also from below as a rebellion.  
 
The Gaitanista programme in modern terms was reformist. Whilst it would 
have cleared the Colombian system of its existing structures that limited social 
mobility and held power in the hands of the military and political elite, who 
were often fused, Gaitán sought popular and nationalist goals to broaden 
political participation of the masses. His inclusive mission set out to integrate 
campesinos, workers as well as various middle-sector groups as active 
agents into the social and political fabric of the nation. 244  The allure of 
Gaitán’s rhetoric for the masses led to a quasi-religious adoration for the 
Liberal politician, not only in his stronghold in Bogotá but across Colombia. 
The urban support for Gaitán came from the increasing urbanisation of the 
country during the 1940s that created ideological niches for alternative ideas 
of Colombia’s social and political make-up.  
 
La Violencia altered Colombia’s social, political and economic development. 
During the 1940s, the ‘seigniorial republic’ drawn together with the power of 
the hacienda, church and political parties continued to form the fundamental 
composition of social, political and economic life, however the emergence of 
new collective identities, and new networks of socialisation presented 
significant changes as campesinos began to take part in political socialisation 
in public squares.245  Whilst these social changes presented a potentially 
conflictive situation for the ruling elite, Gaitán’s presence made it truly 
explosive. His visibility in public squares to address the masses with an array 
of symbolic gestures, impassioned speeches opposing the forced silence of 
the campesinos resonated with the masses.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gaitán was particularly distinguishable from other Latin American leaders of 
the time as he represented a number of political incongruities. As noted by the 
leading Colombianist, Daniel Pecaut, Gaitán represented the political 
antagonism between the masses and the elite, which made him a populist 
leader.246 By setting the elite against the masses, Gaitán was raised to the 
status of social leader, however in the context of intense competition between 
the Liberal and Conservative parties, he represented the antagonism between 
the two parties, making him a traditional political leader. Whilst Gaitán 
inhibited the ability to gain popularity and mass support, he was at the point of 
intersection for these contradictions; therefore, although Gaitán is seen as the 
protagonist for collapse of the Colombian state during the 1940s, he was also 
part of its preservation.247   
 
The repressive nature of La Violencia was not homogenous. Nor did it 
monopolise the entire political stage of the conflict. Indeed, organised 
resistance was a key element of La Violencia, which shaped the evolution of 
the conflict in later decades as spontaneous and sporadic rebellions would 
emerge. The closures of regular channels of political expression through the 
repressive conditions of La Violencia lead to the formation of armed defence 
groups. In this context we see the emergence of Colombia’s rebel groups, as 
a form of self-defence to confront repression. The proposition here is that the 
beginnings of Colombia’s rebel movement are not linked to the politically 
minded insurrection project that went on to form the ideological backbone of 
future rebels, but were a reaction to the official line of terror sponsored by the 
government.  
 
Armed defence groups fulfilled a variety of functions in this context. In the 
wake of social movements that had been crushed, they played an important 
role as political actors leading agrarian unions, peasant leagues and 
indigenous organisations and as representatives of the Liberal and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 Daniel Pécaut, Orden y Violencia: Evolución Socio-Política de Colombia entre 
1930 y 1953 (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 2001). 
247  Braun, Assassination of Gaitán. 
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Communist political parties. A number of key agricultural locations formed the 
basis of these organisations that correlated with the agrarian struggle: 
Sumapaz, South Tolima, and the Eastern Plains. In Sumapaz the movement 
was led by Juan de la Cruz Verela, an admirer of Gaitán and migrant who 
came to the region during the troubling 1920s and was later recruited by the 
Communist Party. In southern Tolima, home to today’s guerrilla forces, the 
Liberal guerrilla groups lead by José María Ovieda248 and the Communist 
guerrilla groups of Isauro Yosa fled from government forces during 
competition between the two groups in recruiting campesinos.  
 
One of the first known interviews with a member of the guerrilla forces during 
La Violencia was published in June, 1950 in the Venezuelan newspaper, 
Últimas Noticias. The interviewee claimed to be the Secretary of the Chief of 
the Colombian guerrilla forces, named Luis Buitrago of Tunja.249 Buitrago 
stated that the Colombian guerrilla forces are in complete control of the 
Llanos of Casanare in Colombia. He went further to add that the rebel 
movement has organised a government named ‘República Libre de los Llanos 
de Casanare’, with its army, courts, and civil administration as well an army 
consisting of 60 commandos organised in groups of 40 men each or a total of 
2400 guerrillas. Buitrago claimed that the guerrilla forces could have had 
more men but they were obliged to turn away volunteers due to a lack of 
arms. However, some of the volunteers now form part of the civil 
administration and of the courts. According to Buitrago, guerrilla forces 
occupied the entrances and exits to the Llanos and some strategic mountain 
ranges. The reporter asked what towns the army held and Buitrago’s reply 
was that they did not wish to occupy towns as this would lead to massacres 
by ‘Falangist aviators’. When asked whether Falangists were Colombians, 
Buitrago replied that ‘Colombians were not capable of shooting their brothers 
and that the aviators are Spanish.’ He stated that the guerrillas have shot 
down three planes and found documents in the plane to prove that the pilot 
was a Spanish Falangist. He added, ‘Falangist Spain will never realise its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 José María Ovieda is also frequently referred to as ‘General Mariachi.’ Gonzalo 
Sánchez, ‘War and Politics in Colombian Society,’ p. 33. 
249 Últimas Noticias, June, 1950. 
 111 
colonial dream of the re-conquest of Spanish American Indies while the 
Llanos are fighting’. 250  Whilst the numbers of guerrillas operating in the 
guerrilla group could have been exaggerated by Buitrago, this interview is 
significant in illustrating the level of organisation and cooperation that existed 
within guerrilla groups in the early 1950s. 
 
The Colombian government was largely in denial about the level of guerrilla 
organisation. Official memorandums between Colombian and American 
embassy officials, including President Ospina, illustrate that by 1950 very little 
was known of the activities of guerrillas or bandits in the far reaching areas of 
the country. The reports of armed conflict in the Llanos were brushed off as 
involving ‘bands of robbers and marauders, not Liberals in rebellion’. It was 
noted that President Ospina stated that he ‘wished it really was a 
revolutionary force instead of gangs of bandits, for then he was sure he could 
use the Army to crush it.’251 
 
La Violencia saw the organisation of rural peasants. The Eastern Plains saw 
the greatest synthesis of military and civilian organisation under the 
leadership of Guadalupe Salcedo who was seen as a key figure in the 
Colombian guerrilla forces at that time. At the onset of the military government 
of General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957), an amnesty was issued to local 
guerrillas. Under this agreement known as la entrega, local guerrilla fighters 
voluntarily gave in weapons in exchange for legal amnesty. Salcedo was 
however assassinated during the transition to the National Front, a move that 
went on to further complicate the relationship between the government and 
the guerrillas, as they were reluctant to accept future amnesty offers.  
 
The reality of an entire generation of Colombian children and adolescents 
from 1948 that were socialised in the guerrilla unit is not a facetious claim. 
The FARC prides itself on including some of the oldest guerrillas in the world, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the most well-known being Manuel Marulanda Vélez who was part of the 
Liberal guerrilla forces during La Violencia in the 1950s. Guerrilla groups were 
not only a political force but also held a significant place in the social hierarchy 
of conflict regions; for many people who had been part of this socialisation 
process choosing their path in life as a guerrilla was as normal as choosing 
any other career.  
 
Early guerrillas were fundamentally rural in their leadership and areas of 
activity. However, the urban element to this movement was significant. Urban 
networks proved to be useful in allowing rural guerrillas to acquire munitions, 
arms, funds, food, medicine and other necessary commodities, the most 
important aspect of this assistance came in the form of intelligence and 
information of the plans and movements of the government forces. 252  
Guerrilla groups, despite the widespread polarisation in the society, were 
incredibly diverse causing precarious alliances to occasionally develop in 
which conflicts would emerge. Conflicts centred on a wide range of issues 
from territorial control and influence to diverging opinions on the relations 
between guerrilla groups and their peasant strongholds. Areas with both 
Communist and Liberal guerrilla presence were particularly problematic, such 
as South Tolima and Sumapaz. Here divergences such as the battle between 
agrarian reform and individual private rights caused significant problems 
between groups signalling the state of anarchy that had overcome in the 
regions.  
 
By 1953, the embryonic and disparate guerrilla networks that had been set up 
in earlier years began to take form into a national guerrilla project. Although 
this ambitious plan had little chance of materialising it served to deter the 
elites and government forces from exerting power in regions where guerrillas 
had established themselves. Within some guerrilla units calls for a new 
property regime, the regulation of production with available resources in 
accordance considering local needs, creating channels of power and justice 
and for redefining the relationship between the masses and guerrillas. These !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
252 Gonzalo Sánchez, ‘War and Politics in Colombian Society,’ p. 33. 
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types of demands illustrate a maturing democratic social project and intended 
to bring about a new state. 
 
Forms of resistance into the La Violencia can be categorised into two paths 
that were taken by participants. According to leading Colombian scholar, 
Gonzalo Sánchez, a revolutionary path was followed and led to the 
emergence of the FARC. Despite the official formation of this national guerrilla 
group took place in 1965, many of its cadres were scarred by the intensity of 
La Violencia and were part of the self-defence groups in the 1950s.253 Parallel 
to the revolutionary path was a regressive trail that branched out to variations 
of political banditry. 
 
On June 13, 1953 the Colombian army broke it long tradition of non-
intervention. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Commanding General of the Armed 
Forces assumed the Presidency of Colombia with the support of the two 
traditional parties in a bid to curb the excessive levels of violence that had 
engulfed the nation for five years. In a radio address to the nation, Rojas 
Pinilla promised free elections in Colombia and reiterated that the army would 
only be in charge until a new government was organised.  
 
During the Rojas Pinilla years there was a marked reduction in levels of 
violence. Although violence was not on the same scale as the earlier years of 
La Violencia, nightly attempts to murder political personalities and judges 
continued. Further unrest was fuelled by dissatisfaction with some of the 
military government’s policies. By 1958, the Liberal and Conservative parties 
ousted Rojas Pinilla from office to form the Frente Nacional. This power-
sharing pact did little to relieve the situation in Colombia. Over a decade the 
intensity of violence in Colombia reached unprecedented levels, fermenting 
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the formation of various self-defence groups and Liberal and Communist 
guerrillas. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the political elites in Bogotá, La Violencia represented the power of the 
masses and underlined the rise of the third way. There was a remarkable lack 
of attention paid to the impact of the intense levels of violence. In an attempt 
to regain control of the country Conservative and Liberal parties joined to form 
an unprecedented political alliance. It was hoped that the Frente Nacional 
would bring the warring parties together and cure the ills of Colombian 
society. However, the process of La Violencia brought about extraordinary 
economic, social and political changes. The displacement and killing of 
thousands, the practice of state sponsored terror, the organisation of 
guerrillas and the establishment of criminal bands led to deep insecurities 
from which the Colombian state has yet to recover from. Although the number 
and variety of non-state actors involved have increased since La Violencia, 
the fundamental elements of violence continue to shape nature and texture of 
the Colombian conflict until today. The Frente Nacional alliance as a solution 
to the violence emerged as the ‘sole party of the oligarchy’ and marked the 
formal exclusion of the third way.254  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Frente Nacional: Reform and Insurgency, 1958-1969 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
For scholars of Global Governance, Development Economics International 
Security super power rivalry fuelled violence in the global South. External 
support was therefore central to the emergence and growth of non-state 
armed groups during the Cold War. American-backed counter-insurgency 
operations in the early 1960s and Cuban and Soviet assistance to guerrillas 
are given salience as the driving factors in the organisation and growth of 
current insurgent groups in Colombia. Accordingly, foreign intervention and 
the formal organisation of guerrilla groups in the 1960s dominate conventional 
accounts of the beginning of the contemporary Colombian conflict. 
 
By contrast, this thesis focuses on the internal driving forces for Colombian 
insecurity. The proceeding chapter outlined the historical significance of La 
Violencia for the future of the Colombian conflict. It argued that La Violencia 
brought about structural changes which moved social and political struggles in 
new directions, characterised by increasing hostility between campesinos and 
the Colombian elite; it institutionalised political repression of the ‘third way’; 
established the existence of organised criminal bands and marked an 
increase of new social actors, such as an emerging independent workers’ 
movement and peasant struggles aligned with agrarian associations, which 
have shaped the nature of violence in Colombia.  
 
Colombian security is often framed by US foreign policy. For the detractors of 
US intervention, US activities in Colombia during the 1960s are the hallmark 
of a foreign policy, which resulted in severe “blowback”.255 For proponents of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed Books, 
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US intervention and assistance in Colombia, US activities during this period is 
representative of the special and longstanding relationship between the two 
states, which in terms of military cooperation dates back to the Korean War. 
US-Latin America security expert Dennis M. Rempe describes the ‘unique role 
played by the United States in facilitating the development of all aspects of 
Colombia’s internal security infrastructure’.256 Whilst this literature is useful in 
exploring bilateral assistance between the US and Colombia, there is a 
significant lack in social-scientific research on Colombian insurgents during 
the 1960s as both schools of thought have tended to view Colombian security 
as a blank canvas for descriptions of Cold War era assistance to the Global 
South. In short, the subject of Colombian security has been seen almost as a 
sub-set of American national security policy. In response, this chapter seeks 
to develop an essential new paradigm that situates Colombia more centrally, 
meanwhile addressing the disturbing absence of the domestic factors within 
prevailing regional security theories. 
 
The success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 dramatically increased popular 
interest in guerrilla warfare and insurgency during the 1960s. As a result there 
is a sizeable corpus of case-study accounts and journalistic material 
describing early guerrilla activities across Latin America.257  A world-wide 
public fascination with Latin American guerrilla leaders, in particular Ché 
Guevara, arguably led to a somewhat romanticised notion of insurgency. 258  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2003); Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland 
& Company, 2001). The classic statement of the “blowback” thesis, focusing mostly 
on US foreign policy in Asia is Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and 
Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Second 
Edition, 2004). 
256 Dennis M. Rempe, ‘Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter-
Insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959-1965,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 6, 
Issue 3 (2007) p. 304. See also: Dennis M. Rempe, The Past as Prologue: A History 
of US Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (Carlisle, PA: United States 
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, 
Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1971). 
257 Excellent examples include Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America 
(London: Thomas Nelson, 1970); Luis Mercier Vega, Guerrillas in Latin America: The 
Technique of the Counter-State (New York: Praeger, 1969). 
258 Jon Lee Anderson, Ché Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (London: Grove Press, 
2010); Ernesto Guevara and Aleida Guevara March, The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes 
on a Latin American Journey (Minneapolis, MN: Ocean Press, 2003); popular films 
 117 
Ché Guevara in particular enjoyed celebrity and engaged in a degree of self-
promotion. Indeed, this is reflected in the vast amount of biographical material 
in literature and film. 259  However, as Timothy P. Wickam Crowley in his 
seminal work on guerrillas and revolutions in Latin American argues ‘the 
romantic, journalistic, and military treatments of guerrillas do not constitute 
sociological analyses’ of Latin American guerrilla movements and 
revolutions.260  
 
Remarkably, we still know very little about the Colombia’s security as viewed 
from within the country. Whilst much ink has been expended on the role and 
impact of US assistance during the 1960s and wider Latin American guerrilla 
activities, little has been written on the unique internal political and security 
conditions that led to the formal organisation of people across the spectrum of 
Colombian society. Rural campesinos, students, revolutionary Roman 
Catholic clergymen, and trade unionists, together with members of the middle 
class joined various social movements during the 1960s. By the end of the 
decade Colombia’s situation was unique amongst its Latin American 
counterparts: the country was home to three active guerrilla groups, all of 
which had affiliations to different ideological brands of Communism and 
Marxism.261 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Plan LASO and Foreign Assistance 
 
Plan LASO was the centrepiece of US assistance to Latin America during the 
1960s.262 It is a frequent point of departure for the analysis of the Colombian 
conflict.263 Accordingly, the literature has focussed heavily on US assistance 
to Colombia under Plan LASO. Explicit US activities in Colombia began in 
October 1959. A US Special Survey Team with experience in the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Korea, other parts of Asia and Latin America was sent to investigate 
Colombia’s internal security problems and possible solutions. This was 
headed by a colourful CIA officer called Hans Tofte, who had been in charge 
of covert action during the early phase of the Korean War, before being re-
assigned to operations in Guatemala in 1953.264  
 
Tofte’s team in Colombia included Colonel Napoleon Valeriano (Philippine 
and US Army), Major Charles T.R. Bohannan, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. 
Koontz, Colonel Berkeley Lewis and Lieutenant Bruce Walker. During two 
months of travelling around the country and travelling over 23,000 kilometres, 
the team spent two months meeting with a range of Colombian actors: 
political and labour leaders, military commanders, incarcerated bandits and 
guerrilla fighters and guerrilla leaders. 265  The survey team in this initial 
assessment concluded that violence in Colombia was criminal rather than 
subversive and suggested that both ‘banditry and guerrilla warfare could be 
substantially reduced within a year by employing a special Lancero (Ranger) 
unit as a mobile counter-guerrilla force’.266 Further emphasis was placed on 
developing the domestic military intelligence service, implementation of 
psychological warfare and civic action programmes. Any assistance provided 
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to Colombia for internal security reasons was to be ‘sterile and covert in 
nature’ to avoid accusations of an interventionist policy.267 
 
By the summer of 1962, US activities in Colombia had expanded quite 
remarkably. A further assessment was carried out by the Yarbourgh team in 
1962, which led to the Colombian Internal Defence Plan. This plan integrated 
military, economic, social and political efforts in Colombia and included a wide 
range of measures to curb violence.268 However, it is the military element of 
this plan that has received most attention in the literature for this period of 
Colombian history. Under Plan LASO, military action targeted bandits and 
guerrilla forces with a particular emphasis on destroy and capture 
techniques.269 Key elements of Plan LASO included counter-guerrilla training 
to Colombian security forces and the reorganisation of the Ministry of War in 
December 1965.  
 
The US was not only source of foreign assistance given to Colombia in the 
early 1960s. British involvement in training the National Police force is a 
currently the missing dimension of this body of literature. Colombia’s National 
Police during this period was highly inefficient and had strong partisan 
affiliations. There are numerous accounts of police brutality from the period of 
La Violencia. As part of the shake-up of the Colombian security forces the 
British provided training for the National Police force that drew on their recent 
experiences in Malaya. British training paralleled similar advice proffered to 
South Vietnam by another training mission.270 In an attempt to curb violence, 
the British training forces recommended the close-cooperation between the 
Army, Police and Civil Administration through a Joint Intelligence Committee; 
formation of a psychological warfare section; integration of the criminal 
investigation of DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, 
Administrative Department of Security), the country’s premier intelligence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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agency, with the National Police Force; formation of camps for the 
rehabilitation of terrorists; re-orientation of bandit statistics and more foot 
patrols in towns and cities.271 Whilst US funding for such operations was three 
times that available to the British, this element of foreign assistance illustrates 
that the Frente Nacional went to some lengths to secure foreign assistance to 
address its internal security conditions. However, foreign intervention in 
Colombia during the 1960s and the counter-guerrilla operations that followed 
this foreign training, while important, are not sufficient enough to explain the 
establishment of dissident political movements involving a broad swathe of 
Colombian society and insurgent groups. Notably, the internal political 
dynamics have received little attention in the literature: the political impasse 
between the coalition parties, the social and economic conditions following La 
Violencia and the organisation and growth of social and guerrilla movements 
in both rural and urban Colombia amongst campesinos, students and the 
Catholic Church.  
 
 
The Frente Nacional  
 
The implementation of the Frente Nacional marked the end of one cycle of 
Colombian political history. The military government of Rojas Pinilla united the 
Liberal and Conservative parties through the shared fear of ‘third way’ – an 
extremist alternative to the status quo, which could have ranged from a social 
revolution or Falangist dictatorship. This led to the formation a long-term 
power-sharing pact, which was implemented through a constitutional 
amendment approved by a plebiscite. This system of government was 
implemented in such a way as to provide both with the guarantee of equal 
power distribution. The central features of this peculiar system were the 
alternation of presidencies every four years and the equal distribution of all 
public and legislative posts between the Liberal and Conservative parties. 
Consequently, this also marked the formal exclusion of any third parties from 
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any share of political power and the result was the marginalisation and 
alienation of political groups from the democratic process. 
 
The Frente Nacional aimed to usher in a new era of peace and reconciliation. 
Headed by the Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo and Conservative Laureano 
Gómez, it was hoped that a period of peace and unity would in turn lead to the 
social and economic development of the country. The first presidency of the 
Frente Nacional was undertaken by the Liberal leader, Alberto Lleras. 
President Lleras hoped that the Frente Nacional would reconcile the Liberal 
and Conservative centre ground around a great programme of economic 
progress and social justice as ‘the adequate solution to the Colombian 
problem’.272 This highly regarded politician had previously held the presidency 
for a brief period between 1945 and 1946 following the resignation of Alfonso 
López Pumarejo, and was also the Secretary General of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) from 1948 to 1954. Described as the ‘driving force’ 
behind the political pact of the Frente Nacional and a successful conciliator, 
he was seen as the natural leader for inaugurating the new bi-partisan 
coalition.273  
 
In April 1959, President Lleras offered a commentary on the domestic 
situation in a radio and television address to the nation. During this speech, 
he attempted to reassure Colombians by reiterating that the two major 
problems of political violence and economic difficulties facing the country had 
been ‘largely overcome’. The President severely castigated the ‘enemies of 
the National Front’ who used techniques such as ‘fomenting coups d’états, 
conspiracies and resorting to arms as a political instrument’, meanwhile 
painting a rather optimistic economic picture with reference to the improved 
situation of balance of payments as well as agricultural and industrial 
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production.274 Despite assurances from the President, the economic situation 
was in fact one of the ‘greatest difficulties’ Colombia faced during this period.  
 
From 1958, growing inflation drove the peso down and Colombia’s coffee 
prices fell by around 20 per cent. Moreover, increased spending under the 
previous administration of General Rojas Pinilla meant that the Frente 
Nacional inherited sizable debts from the previous regime.275 President Lleras’ 
positive rhetoric was largely geared towards building confidence in the 
coalition among the demoralised Colombian population. High levels of 
violence persisting since the onset of La Violencia, a growing distrust of the 
politicised national police force and a general alienation from all government, 
judicial and political institutions presented a grave challenge to the President.  
 
Against expectations, during the 1960s the development agenda of President 
Lleras was able to drive significant economic growth.276 Despite little change 
in the overall patterns of inequality in the country, there were advances in 
transportation and communications infrastructure and the development of 
mass media, which served to lessen the divide between the geographically 
divided regions of Colombia. However, the bi-partisan coalition was less 
successful in countering the growing phenomenon of guerrilla insurgency, 
which during this period was able to mobilise effectively under various 
umbrella organisations. The agrarian question of Colombia had reached a 
crossroads. Thus, while the Frente Nacional was presented to the public as a 
negotiated exit strategy out of La Violencia, in fact it inaugurated a new phase 
of violence. 
 
Colombian politics have always been fissiparous in nature. However, during 
the early years of the Frente Nacional the coalition was particularly weak. The 
political pact between the Liberals and Conservatives faced considerable 
opposition from within their own parties. Political factions that had formed prior !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to La Violencia continued to grow with politicians gravitating towards the far 
right and far left of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The increasing levels 
of ideological extremism created a political impasse in terms of policy-making 
and implementation. Moreover, the ousted former leader General Rojas Pinilla 
formed his own political movement, the Alianza Nacional Popular (National 
Popular Alliance, ANAPO), in opposition to the Frente Nacional presenting a 
further challenge to the fragile coalition. The difficult economic conditions 
across the country aggravated many sectors of Colombian society, who had 
suffered immensely during La Violencia. During the first decade of the 
coalition, there was a widespread mobilisation of the peasantry, youth and 
other groups that caused considerable problems for the political stability of the 
Frente Nacional. 
 
In social terms, the situation was particularly bleak. La Violencia had caused 
carnage in the Colombian countryside with some 1,500,000 displaced rural 
campesinos.277 Whilst in official terms the civil war had ended, the early 1960s 
nevertheless saw a steady increase in rural violence. Between January and 
May 1961 alone, over 1038 persons were killed, in comparison to 892 
persons for the same period in 1960.278 As discussed in chapter three, the 
conventional wisdom on civil war is to use death counts as an indication of the 
onset and ending of war. However, in the case of Colombia this methodology 
poses serious questions, as the number of deaths does not indicate the 
ending of any civil war period. In this context, perhaps we are better placed to 
see the Colombian conflict as one continuous cycle of conflict with periodic 
phases of increased violence.  
 
Increased levels of violence coincided with a growing lack of confidence in the 
courts, police and army. The National Police in particular was an inefficient 
and partisan force, and distrusted by the public. So-called ‘independent 
republics’, consisting of displaced campesinos and ‘self-defence’ groups, 
were able to establish a degree of autonomy from the central government and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the midst of a deep seated fear of communist infiltration following the 
success of the Cuban Revolution, these peasant enclaves were at the centre 
of government and Army efforts to rid the country of guerrillas. Independent 
republics that were controlled by Liberal or Communist guerrilla forces, 
included broad swathes of Colombian territory in southern Cundinamarca and 
eastern Tolima: Agriari, Viotá, Tequendama, Sumapaz, El Pato, Guayabero, 
Suroeste del Tolima, Río Chiquito, 26 de Septiembre and perhaps the most 
famous, the Independent Republic of Marquetalia.279  
 
The Colombian elite decided that they could no longer continue with the 
status quo. Government traction over the main political institutions had been 
at serious risk from 1946 and was judged to be slipping away. La Violencia 
had clearly illustrated the capabilities of rural masses. An abiding fear of the 
‘third way’ launched the two main political parties into a constitutionally bound 
and quite peculiar political pact. However, the agrarian question was 
inescapable and on the forefront of the country’s political agenda at the onset 
of the Frente Nacional. Generous estimates from 1961 suggest that 3.5 per 
cent of landowners owned 65 per cent of the arable land.280 Some records 
also suggest that that 62.5 per cent of Colombian farmers subsisted on less 
than 1 per cent of the arable land.281 In the midst of this social, political and 
economic turmoil, the Frente Nacional under the leadership of the President 
Lleras was geared towards a very ambitious reform agenda, which aimed not 
only to stabilize the country but also to maintain broad elite control of the main 
levers of the Colombian political economy. 
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Opposition to the Frente Nacional: Party Splits and ANAPO 
 
The Frente Nacional faced a twofold problem of legitimacy. Firstly, the bi-
partisan coalition was formed by the very political elites who were seen as the 
agitators of La Violencia. Therefore, from the outset, the Frente Nacional was 
embroiled in a battle of legitimacy against those who were excluded from the 
political alliance. The first test the coalition faced was the trial of the former 
military leader General Rojas Pinilla which was used by the Frente Nacional 
as a means of absolving the Liberal and Conservative parties of any 
responsibility for the horrors of La Violencia. In October 1958, to the 
displeasure of both of the political parties, Rojas Pinilla returned from exile 
and was brought before the Colombian Senate and was tried for a number of 
exaggerated misdeeds in office including accusations of corruption. The 
rather theatrical trial found Rojas guilty on two accounts, violation of the 
Constitution and conduct unbecoming a president. The sentence deprived of 
Rojas of his political rights, including his right to vote, hold office and engage 
in partisan activities, and although this was later overturned by the Colombian 
Supreme Court, the trial had grave consequences for the coalition. The fallen 
dictator proceeded to become a living symbol of those Colombians who were 
politically excluded from the bi-partisan pact and was a force to be reckoned 
with. Until his death in 1974, Rojas did all he could to make life difficult for 
those people who overthrew him. He organised a political movement, Alianza 
Nacional Popular (ANAPO) of a strongly populist flavour, which was able to 
capture the support of those who grew disillusioned with the Frente Nacional 
throughout the 1960s.282 
 
Secondly, the coalition faced opposition from factions within the Liberal and 
Conservative parties who actively distrusted each other. President Lleras 
warned the nation of the dangers ahead in a series of speeches in which he 
attempted to halt the deterioration of the newly created political consensus. 
Whilst there was no fighting involved, the President stressed that the 
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possibility of this was ‘latent and near’.283 Liberals on the left wing of the party, 
in particular the former followers of Gaitán, wanted to retain control of the 
government, given that the last congressional electoral results in 1958 
showed that the party had more popular support. Moreover, their dislike of 
their coalition partners, the Conservative party, was still deeply embedded. 
The fear here was that the Conservatives would perpetuate themselves once 
they gained power.284 As the co-founder of coalition, President Lleras could 
not concede to the demands of the left wing, as to do so would deny his own 
handiwork; therefore he issued a threat to resign office if the alternation 
provision did not work as a strategy to pacify the opposing Liberals.  
 
The coalition was precarious. Divisions within the Conservative party 
particularly endangered the Frente Nacional. The Conservatives were deeply 
divided between supporters of the former presidents of the party, Laureano 
Gómez and Mariano Ospina Pérez. This split was formalised in the 
congressional elections in March 1960 where abstentions reached 50 per cent 
and had paralysing effect on the operation of the coalition. Conservative 
divisions that were primarily battles for party predominance quickly 
transmitted themselves to the national political arena. Whilst the issues of the 
basic economic and social problems that faced the country were certainly not 
new, these matters were now driving the political agenda. Political and 
economic leaders increasingly addressed these issues in terms of immediate 
action or proposed ameliorative legislation.285 Bitter feuding and divergent 
opinions on how to deal with issues such as agrarian reform, tax reform, 
education, transportation, labour and demonstrations against the rising cost of 
living therefore propelled internal party divisions into the national sphere. The 
general air of pessimism led many to the question of whether the coalition 
system commanded sufficient authority to avoid extremist upheaval, despite 
its constitutional status. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Opposition to the coalition also manifested itself in traditional elite circles. 
They worried that such a public display of political unity between the 
traditional parties was not desirable as it could lead to the mobilisation of the 
masses against both ruling parties. On April 10, 1959, a luncheon party of 
distinguished Colombians took place including a Conservative ex-president 
and a prominent Liberal who also served in a previous government as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meeting of Colombia’s gerontocracy came to 
the conclusion that the Frente Nacional coalition as a symbol of unity between 
the traditional parties could ferment a revolution in the absence of a ‘vertical 
cleavage’ in Colombian society. In the absence of real political competition 
amongst the mainstream parties, they concluded, rather cynically, that the 
division of the masses at the lower end according to political affiliation was 
necessary.286  
 
The ANAPO was able to make significant progress through the divisions in 
the Conservative party. Formed in 1961 by the former military leader Rojas 
Pinilla, the ANAPO (like the ruling coalition) was bi-partisan with both Liberal 
and Conservative wings. Taking advantage of the factionalism in the coalition, 
Rojas Pinilla was able to benefit from the divisions within the Conservative 
party by uniting his old collaborators from the party and the supporters of 
Ospina Pérez, who were also opposed to the alternation system. The 
ANAPO’s colours of red, white and blue were particularly significant as former 
and latter colours were the respective colours of the Liberal and Conservative 
parties. For ANAPO, this was representative of the peaceful, bi-partisan 
make-up of the movement, which Rojas Pinilla used to urge his supporters to 
‘rise above the old party hatreds’.287  
 
Rojas Pinilla adopted a both a nationalistic and vaguely leftist political stance. 
Mixing popular nationalism with a degree of socialism, he proposed an 
expanded programme of public works and infrastructure. His nationalist ideals !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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emphasised the traditional values of family, religion and community, as one 
would have expected from the former military leader. However, it was Rojas 
Pinilla’s condemnation of the traditional political parties and the disparity of 
wealth in Colombia that struck a chord with the urban masses, particularly the 
lower and lower middle classes. The fundamental political base of support for 
Rojas Pinilla was from non-unionised workers, many of who were victims to 
the Colombia’s chronic problem of unemployment and the poorest class of 
peasants who had not benefitted from the government’s agrarian reform.288 
For the former military leader, the Frente Nacional was an alliance between 
the oligarchs who were fighting to defend their position of power at the 
expense of the Colombian people, a tone that is reminiscent of Gaitán. The 
prominence of socio-economic issues on the political agenda, such as the 
rising cost of living, tremendous inequalities and inflation enabled the 
ANAPO’s populist agenda gain momentum as Gaitán did during the 1940s. 
The ANAPO was therefore able to effectively channel popular discontent with 
the socio-economic situation as well as provide an umbrella organisation for 
those Liberals and Conservatives who remained loyal to Rojas Pinilla and 
opposed to the Frente Nacional. 
 
On election days, ANAPO candidates represented their respective political 
parties, either Liberal or Conservative, like other mainstream factions of the 
traditional parties. Rojas Pinilla entered the electoral arena with ANAPO in 
1962 and despite a modest start of 104,829 votes by 1964 the movement had 
tripled its support drawing 309,678 votes. Two years later in the congressional 
elections, ANAPO received 523,000 votes and in the presidential election of 
1966, under the candidacy of the Liberal José Jaramillo Giraldo, the 
movement received 742,133 of the votes. 289 ANAPO peaked during the 
elections of April 19 1970 in which Rojas Pinilla presented himself as a 
presidential candidate. He ran under the Conservative party label for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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presidential term from 1970 to 1974, which under the Frente Nacional 
alternation agreement was reserved for a Conservative candidate. A notably 
close election result led to the case of being brought before the Electoral 
Court, which to the displeasure of many ANAPO supporters ruled in favour of 
his rival, Pastrana Borrero, on 15 July 1970. 
 
 
The Agrarian Question and Evolution of Violence  
 
For ordinary Colombians, violence continued to be a part of daily life under 
the Frente Nacional. The ruling coalition had only just begun to realise the 
true extent of the underlying social problems in Colombia and its role in the 
continuation of violence in some areas. Despite the identification of the direct 
link between the underlying agrarian problem and La Violencia in 1953, it was 
almost three years into the first administration of the Frente Nacional before 
political leaders suggested that political agitation at the local level over land 
distribution was the main causal factor in the continued outbreaks of 
violence.290  There was a gradual acceptance in both public and political 
spheres that a sustainable social equilibrium was not possible without 
addressing the agrarian issue. However, despite the growing consciousness 
of the true dimensions of the conflict, there were few indications that the 
Frente Nacional could implement redistributive measures to deal with the 
violence. In rural areas and small towns, peace was a distant promise and so 
the remnants of the previous phase of violence, La Violencia, contributed to 
the evolution of various armed bands. 
   
Agrarian issues remained at the core of the renewed phase of violence. 
Following the abortive attempts at agrarian reform during the first 
administration of Alfonso López Pumarejo, under the banner of la Revolución 
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en Marcha, there were few credible efforts at addressing the issue. 291 
However, social questions haunted government officials and the widespread 
turmoil during La Violencia served to keep the agrarian question on the 
political agenda, connecting conflict over land with other issues of state 
deprivation and poor educational provision. Social reform was increasingly 
viewed as a palliative measure to appease the needs of the masses, in effect 
a preventative measure against social disorder. Official acknowledgement of 
the issue of land redistribution in rural areas led to the implementation of a 
developmental programme under President Lleras. A series of social and 
economic programmes were designed to rehabilitate the areas that had 
suffered the worst effects of La Violencia. In 1968, constitutional change 
provided the executive branch of government with extended powers, such as 
the ability to declare a ‘state of national economic and social emergency’. This 
would allow the president to bypass Congress and approve social reforms in 
times of need, but it was not widely used.  
 
Demographic problems also kept social reform at the top of the political 
agenda. Colombia now boasted a comparatively high birth rate of 2.8 per 
cent. The rapidly growing population presented stark challenges to the 
provision of public services, especially in area of education. The deteriorating 
social and economic situation in the rural areas of the country was hard to 
ignore. Around 17.5 per cent of the population in urban areas were 
matriculating, whilst amongst the rural population only seven per cent were 
attending school in the early 1960s; the discrepancy was markedly wider in 
isolated areas. This was important given that approximately 44 per cent of the 
total population of Colombia was at the time under the age of 14.292  
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There was a growing awareness of the extremes of income distribution. Some 
4.6 per cent of the population subject to income tax enjoyed 40 per cent of the 
income. Population growth was driving an urban housing shortage and there 
was a deficit of 247,449 homes in the cities, which was increasing at an 
annual rate of around 23,000. Whilst the production of basic food staples used 
by the lower classes – yucca, panela, potatoes, corn, onions and rice had 
increased in absolute terms since the end of the 1940s, it declined in terms of 
the production on a per capita basis, as did the production of cattle and meat 
products. The agrarian question was the most difficult; estimates showed that 
3.5 per cent of landowners owned 65 per cent of the arable land.293 Despite 
the huge disparities, very few in Bogotá had the political stomach for 
measures that might entail significant redistribution. 
 
These figures illuminate the scale of the social and economic challenges 
faced by Colombia post-La Violencia. Indeed, they underpinned the problems 
associated with rampant violence and political insecurities during the early 
phases of the Frente Nacional. It is not so much that the situation had 
worsened dramatically in social and economic terms during the early 1960s, 
but more that these problems had moved into the political sphere following the 
horrors of La Violencia. During the 1960s, social issues came to dominate the 
Colombian political agenda and became the point of departure for political 
campaigns throughout the country. The illiterate, malnutritioned, homeless, 
medically unattended and the unemployed could no longer be ignored as they 
had been during past decades. However, the fissiparous political system 
lacked the capacity and drive to adequately address these problems. Indeed, 
Colombian politics in the 1960s could be aptly described as a peculiar 
combination of colonial paternalism, nineteenth century laissez faire combined 
with superficial and abstract commitments to greater social justice.    
 
An attempt at social reform under President Lleras was underway. In 1961, 
the Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria (INCORA) was authorised to 
expropriate privately owned estates and redistribute to those who had little or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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no land. Whilst this move by the coalition government may seem radical, the 
legislative barriers, protected court cases and opposition from the Sociedad 
de Agricultores de Colombia (Colombian Society of Agriculturalists, SAC) 
made expropriation difficult and politically impossible. In fact, the main 
emphasis of this initiative was to diffuse possible sources of rural unrest 
without disrupting the status quo in rural areas or impeding the production of 
agricultural goods.294 The comments of President Lleras on social reform are 
particularly important in explaining the official governmental position on the 
issue. In the inaugural edition of the Liberal weekly Política, the President 
stated that whilst the government is committed to social reform, the 
‘government cannot promote a revolution nor follow a policy not supported by 
the two traditional parties’.295 The interests of the political parties in rural areas 
could not therefore be subordinated to meet the wider societal needs. 
Accordingly, under the INCORA initiative campesinos were placed on land 
that was reclaimed for agricultural purposes, such as plantations for cotton, 
rice, sugar and coffee production. The INCORA initiative therefore served to 
protect those families who suffered from the repeated subdivision of land 
among family members and to give landless campesinos land without 
disturbing the existing system of production in rural areas.296 
In the late 1960s, the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo deliberately 
accelerated the pace of agrarian reform. This was signalled by the creation of 
Asociación Nacional de Usarios Campesinos (ANUC), a nationwide 
organisation of peasant farmers. ANUC branches were organised throughout 
the country and by 1970, over 75 per cent of Colombia’s one million !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
294 The formation of INCORA and its accomplishments have been at the centre of a 
scholarly debate amongst area specialists: Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys toward 
Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963); Álvaro Tirado Mejía, 
Introducción a la Historia Económica de Colombia, (Bogotá, Universidad Nacional, 
1971); Darío M. Fajardo, Haciendas, Campesinas y Políticas Agrarias en Colombia, 
1920-1980 (Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra, 1983); Herbet Felstehausen, ‘Agrarian 
Reform: Colombia,’ in Peter Dorner, (ed.) Land Reform in Latin America: Issues and 
Cases (Madison, Wisconsin: Land Economics, 1971) pp. 167-183; Salomón 
Kalmanovitz, Desarollo de la Agricultura en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial La Carreta, 
1978). 
295  American Embassy, Bogotá and Secretary of State, Memorandum of 
Conversation, Washington DC, February 16, 1961, 721.00/2-1661, 1543, RG 59, 
USNA. 
296 Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, p. 232. 
 133 
campesinos were listed as members. Following the administration’s renewed 
commitment to social reform, ANUC were empowered to deal with local 
issues and to implement meaningful land redistribution. However, this 
measure was met with considerable resistance from government officials and 
the resulting rise in public expectations had serious implications for rural 
violence. Land invasions became commonplace and official support for land 
distribution waned. The ANUC was promptly taken up by the left and used it 
as a mechanism to progress the revolutionary agenda. Ironically, this attempt 
to promote agrarian reform eventually led to harsh state repression during the 
1970s and the renewal of violence coincided with the decline of the Frente 
Nacional.  
Political competition under the fragile legitimacy of the Frente Nacional led to 
internal struggles for power in rural areas. A remarkable disconnect between 
urban politicians and their counterparts in distant rural provinces meant that 
the implications of rural actions were not always understood by those in 
Bogotá. Government officials eventually wrote to the leaders of the various 
political factions within the Liberal and Conservative parties requesting their 
cooperation in combating the violence.297 They explained that one of the 
unintended reasons for the renewal of violence was ‘partisan political agitation 
which has many manifestations and translates itself principally into the 
internal struggles of various groups for predominance in positions of authority 
and repression in the villages of the affected zones’. At times they envisaged 
a worrying return to the worst phase of violence, La Violencia, which was 
characterised by the patronage and protection of the perpetrators of violence 
by political organisations.298 
In fact the more remote areas of Colombia suffered continued violence 
throughout the 1960s. This reminds us that the epochs of the country’s 
evolution of violence reflect predominantly urban sensibilities. The end of La !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Violencia did not mean peace or the end of unrest. In 1961, a state of siege 
was declared in five departments of Colombia. This consisted of Caldas, 
Cauca, Huila, Tolima and Valle del Cauca together with heavy outbreaks of 
violence in the departments of Antioquia, Santander and Meta. The primary 
highways in the country from the cities of Cali to Medellín and from Cali to 
Bogotá ran through the worst affected areas, stunting transportation. During 
January 1961 alone, 114 violent rural deaths were reported, consisting of 
mainly peasants and some policemen and bandits, marking a significant 
increase since the end of La Violencia.299 Whilst eyewitness accounts of 
crimes or killings have long been difficult to obtain due to motivations of self-
preservation or fear of reprisals on the part of witnesses, this wave of violence 
undoubtedly saw an increase in politically motivated killings. With some 
murders, reports showed an implicit political motive related to Liberal-
Conservative competition. Mutilated, decapitated, beheaded bodies served as 
political warnings to those still alive in small towns and villages. Urban 
government officials appeared bewildered as to who perpetrated such crimes 
– criminals, bandits, leftist guerrillas or partisan civilian political factions, 
reflecting the lack of knowledge and intelligence of activities outside of the 
country’s main cities. 
The rural department of Valle experienced the worst of the violence in this 
renewed phase of trouble. Under a state of siege, Valle saw the majority of 
the nationwide death count. On January 21 1961, the worst single massacre 
in the year occurred in the mountainous rural area near the town of 
Ansermanuevo. According to official documents, a guerrilla band, dressed in 
official military clothing marched fourteen campesinos from their homes. The 
fourteen captives were questioned with regards to their political affiliation and 
two who stated that they were Conservatives were released. The remaining 
twelve, presumed to be Liberal supporters, were shot dead.300 This example 
of mass murders in one department of Colombia is exemplary of the renewal 
of violence in the name of political affiliation, which had defined the earlier !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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phase of the conflict, La Violencia. Whilst this example is illustrative of 
violence against Liberal supporters, the endemic level of violence was not 
directed at or carried out by any one particular political group. 
Urban politicians did not foresee how their actions would impact violence in 
rural areas. As one political leader explained, ‘two opposing politicians can 
make bitter speeches against each other’s party in the Congress and when it 
is all over they will congratulate each other. But, heard over the radio in the 
rural countryside, where bitterness is deep and historic, it will move opposing 
elements to violence’.301  In 1960, President Lleras gave an inflammatory 
speech in the troubled department of Cauca in which he ‘invited the country to 
crusade against the Colombian left’.302 Local leaders from the left wing faction 
of the Liberal party, the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL), later 
reported that their supporters had also been victim to the ensuing violence. 
The MRL explained that the source of the political agitation was centred on 
the fight for the presidency that was greatly complicated by the system of 
alternation of power. 
The neighbouring department of Caldas together with Valle constituted the 
area of intense rural violence. Guerrillas and bandits were able to trawl the 
mountainous terrain at will, passing through the common frontier between the 
two departments. Whilst the majority of the violent killings occurred in the rural 
regions, the victims of such attacks varied. In Caldas, the Quindio River area 
saw the killing of a six-year-old child, the burning of three homes as well as a 
school during the same period. In Antioquia, a department of endemic 
violence, reports claimed a guerrilla band decapitated eleven campesinos in 
the mining town of Segovia of both of Liberal and Conservative affiliation and 
stole their belongings.303 Whilst partisan politics can explain some cases of 
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violence, guerrilla activity, extrajudicial killings by local authorities, criminal 
activity and banditry were also commonplace. 
In late January 1960, the Governors of Valle, Caldas and Santander toured 
the areas afflicted with violence. The detailed reports generated by these 
tours give an insight into the reaction of Colombian officials and the changing 
nature of their understanding of rural violence during this period. On January 
20, 1960, following an eight day tour of the department of Valle, the Governor 
of Valle, Alonso Aragon Quintero, acknowledged both political and economic 
factors as causal elements in the increase of violence. In particular, ‘the 
divergences among groups, the anarchy of the parties, the struggle for 
directive positions and bureaucratic jobs, rekindled hate and sectarian 
intransigence in many people’.304 The lack of police forces to adequately 
patrol the rugged terrain in the mountainous regions was also highlighted as 
an obstacle to achieving local security. For many of those who had recently 
acquired land during the La Violencia years, there was a fear that a return to 
normality would lead to the return of the rightful owners to claim backs their 
property and land. In short, the peculiar political factionalism amongst urban 
politicians during the era of Frente Nacional served to exacerbate more 
fundamental tensions related to land in remote rural areas. 
Theories of civil conflict have largely failed to provide explanatory frameworks 
for the persistence of violent conflict in the global South. The focus on the 
“new” and “greedy” elements of violence have obscured the historical tensions 
that plague developing countries, with little reference to the role of states and 
governments in the perpetuation of violence. For decades, the Colombian 
political elite ignored the country’s social ills. Few in Bogotá made real 
attempts for change. Whilst La Violencia brought carnage to the countryside, 
the legacy of this phase of violence brought the rural and agrarian question at 
the forefront of the Colombian political agenda. The reform initiative of the 
1960s under the Frente Nacional was largely a failure. Politicians who 
recognised the country’s social and economic problems were confined to the 
margins of the main political parties under extremist wings. This political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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impasse was further compounded by the fear of communist infiltration, which 
often allowed domestic agitation for social justice to be misrepresented as 
external subversion.  
 
 
Revolutionary Movements: The Cuban Factor 
 
The Cuban Revolution, which made noisy promises to export insurgency, 
fuelled the fear of communist infiltration amongst the Colombian political elite. 
The declaration of a crusade against communism by the Frente Nacional is 
particularly indicative of the deep anxiety on the part of government officials in 
Bogotá. The boisterous claims by the Cuban Revolution that they were 
promoting insurgency campaigns across Latin America and inside Colombia 
were exaggerated. Ironically, it was paranoia that led to the heightening of 
counter-insurgency campaigns in rural areas and government-sponsored 
violence against peasant enclaves (particularly those who were already 
victims of violence during La Violencia) that led to the emergence of 
organised armed groups in rural areas.305  
 
The Colombian government had received repeated reports Cuban arms and 
propaganda was stimulating the violence in rural Colombia. However, despite 
some evidence of pro-Castro propaganda activity, by February 1961, reports 
of arms of Cuban origin having entered Colombia had still not been 
confirmed.306 Moreover, an investigation carried out by the Colombian civil 
and military officials in co-operation with the American consulate in Bogotá 
found that the shipments of arms into northwest Colombia came from Panama 
with the ‘open or tacit consent’ of Panamanian officials. All arms were found to 
be of U.S or western origin and did not come from Cuba or the Soviet bloc. 
The emergence of armed groups during the 1960s in Colombia must therefore 
be re-examined to take account of local perspectives rather than interpreted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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as a spillover effect of the Cuban revolution or Cold War rivalry.307 At the 
same time both Colombian officials and local American diplomats were very 
much the intellectual prisoners of their anti-communist fears.308 
 
In terms of ideas, the success of the Cuban revolution undoubtedly provided 
greater ideological credibility to the Colombian left. However, rather than 
stimulating violence in rural Colombia, the Cuban revolution incited the left 
wing of the Liberal party, who collectively organised under the later president 
López Michelsen forming the MRL. As open apologists for the Fidel Castro 
regime, the second anniversary of Fidel Castro’s succession to power was 
attended by MRL officials, including Jaime Velasquez Toro, an MRL 
Congressman from the province of Antioquia as well as Jaime Isaza Cadavid, 
President of the Party Directorate.309 In particular, the MRL were able to take 
advantage of the bitterness between the Liberal and Conservative parties to 
advance their positions in terms of a wider support base. Velasquez Toro 
achieved this by making frequent touring visits of rural Colombia in areas of 
endemic violence, such as the mining town of Segovia, in Antioquia. 
  
The case of violence in Segovia illustrates how the MRL and leftist political 
factions were able to mobilise local support. Importantly, it also typifies the 
impasse between the state, local officials and armed bandits. The lack of 
resources available to local law enforcement was a key impediment in 
containing violence. In February 1961 local officials detailed a ‘typical anti-
bandit chase’ and outlined the ensuing struggle between the state, local 
officials and armed bandits. On Monday, the Mayor of Segovia phoned the 
Governor stating that a survivor of a bandit massacre reached the town after 
an all-night walk to bring news of the killing of eleven people. The mayor 
planned to take six of the ten police officers that were assigned to his 
municipal area and travel by car and mule to the scene of the crime. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
307 ibid. 
308 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999) pp. 177-179. 
309  American Embassy, Bogotá and Secretary of State, Memorandum of 
Conversation, Washington DC, February 17, 1961, 721.00/2-1761,1543, RG 59, 
USNA. 
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mayor and police had no radio facilities to communicate whilst at the scene 
and the mayor’s request for troops was denied as all troops were assigned to 
other violent areas. Moreover, reports of massacres from non-official sources 
are treated as not based on facts.  
 
Late on Monday afternoon, the mayor and six policemen arrived at the scene 
of crime. Eleven decapitated bodies, including five small children were found. 
The mayor and policemen made the decision to spend the night in the vicinity 
unable to start a pursuit of the bandits as the group who committed the crime 
‘most probably outnumber the six policemen available’. Troops finally arrived 
in Segovia late Tuesday. On Wednesday, the mayor took the troops to the 
scene of the crime. They carried out interviews of the local peasants, all of 
who denied hearing or seeing anything unusual. The platoon commander 
continued his investigation in search of a bandit hide-out in the nearby 
mountainous area. Leaving, but with no access radio or communicative 
device, he advised that he would return to Segovia in a one week. The 
following Wednesday, the commander and his platoon did not arrive in 
Segovia as scheduled. The military commandant for the region speculated 
that the platoon could quite possibly have been massacred by bandits, or 
deserted and joined the bandits, or captured the bandits and is en route back 
to Segovia. Or perhaps, he added rather facetiously, the platoon commander 
‘is having a nice vacation in the hills’.310 
 
The departmental officials of Antioquia and the neighbouring Pacific coast 
department of Choco faced increasing levels of violence in the early 1960s. 
This largely represented an overflow from the neighbouring ‘state-of-siege’ 
department of Caldas, leading to a general upward shift in violence toward the 
northwest of the country. Despite the assurances of the Colombian 
government that measures were being taken to curb the violence, the number 
of killings in the three months prior to February 1961 ran higher than any other 
comparable period in the past three years.311  Although the departmental 
officials of Antioquia and Choco had two battalions of Colombian troops and a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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smaller number of national police at their disposal, this was inadequate to 
deal with the overflow of violence of from other areas. Accordingly, those who 
had substantial property interests to protect amidst violence resorted to 
maintaining their own private army in the form of paramilitaries. The growth of 
local paramilitaries reflected another problem. Neither the Colombian Army 
nor the national police force was adequately equipped to undertake small-
scale guerrilla campaigns to confront the perpetrators of the violence. The 
diverse terrain of these departments includes huge swathes of dense jungle 
with an annual rainfall of 400 inches further complicating the efforts to contain 
violence. 312 
 
Criminality rather than externally inspired communism was perhaps the 
biggest problem for rural Colombia during the 1960s. Criminal violence was 
political in many cases. It was used to both protect and reverse economic 
gains made in previous phases of violence; however the increase of politically 
motivated violence on a localised basis during this period is also of particular 
significance. This decade certainly marked the development of an organised 
revolutionary movement in Colombia. Whilst social and agrarian reform was at 
the forefront of the political agenda, this only served to raise expectations and 
it would seem that it was not enough to curb the growing levels of dissent in 
some regions of the country. 
 
Havana was certainly a source of ideas and inspiration for Colombia, although 
not an active supplier of material assistance or externally driven insurrection. 
The Cuban Revolution is often cited as one of the most crucial factors leading 
to the surge of guerrilla movements across Latin America.313 Indeed, the work 
of Ché Guevara and Régis Debray based on the revolutionary struggle for the 
control of political power through armed insurrection did impact Latin 
American states in the 1960s. In General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare, Ché 
outlined the three fundamental contributions that the Cuban Revolution made 
to revolutionary movements in Latin America: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1) Popular forces can win a war against an army; 2) it is not always 
necessary to wait until all conditions of revolution exist; the insurrectionary 
enclave can create them; 3) in underdeveloped America the field of armed 
struggle must be fundamentally in the countryside. Of these three 
contributions, the first two pit themselves against the quietest attitude of 
revolutionaries or pseudorevolutionaries who hide, and hide their inactivity, 
behind the pretext that nothing can be done against a professional army. 
They also contradict those others who want to wait until all the objective 
and subjective necessary conditions automatically appear, without doing 
anything to accelerate the process.314 
 
Ché’s call for armed struggle made a profound and lasting impact in Colombia 
and its Latin American neighbours. To some extent both Castro and Ché’s 
work served merely as a transmission belt for Mao and his agrarian mode of 
communism. Across Asia, Africa and Latin America, followers of Moscow-
orientated communist parties had been told to sit and patiently await 
industrialisation, with its all-important industrial proletariat. The ideas of Mao 
and Ho Chi Minh, simplified by Castro and Ché, offered a younger generation 
of leftist youth the prospect of “revolution now”, rather generations in the 
future after the pro-longed arrival of a European-style urban proletariat.  
 
Spokesmen for Ché’s proposed political structure emerged across the 
continent in the early 1960s: Peru, Héctor Bejar (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional, ELN) and Luis de la Puente (Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria, MIR); Guatemala, Luis Trejo (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, 
FAR); Argentina, Jorge Ricardo Masseti (Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo, 
EGP); Nicaragua, Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Noel Guerrero 
and Tomás Borge (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) Carlos 
Marighella (Acción de Liberación Nacional).315 In Colombia, similar political-
military enclaves appeared in the early 1960s: the Movimiento Obrero 
Estudiantil Campesino (Worker Student Peasant Movement, MOEC); the 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Army for National Liberation, ELN); !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
314 Ché Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (London: Souvenir Press, 2003) pp. 7-8. 
315 Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. 
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Partido Comunista Marxista-Leninista (Marxist Leninist Communist Party, 
PCML). This would later extend to include the most persistent, successful and 
well-known insurgency groups in the world, the FARC. 
 
The element of external influence on the Colombian movement during this 
period now appears somewhat exaggerated. Civil strife and the dire economic 
and social conditions compounded by an intense decade of violence during 
La Violencia mobilised thousands in the Colombian countryside. The revival of 
the popular struggle under Rojas Pinilla is an internal dimension that is largely 
ignored. For Colombians and their Latin American counterparts, the overthrow 
of the dictator of Venezuela, Pérez Jiménez, and the Cuban leader, Fulgencio 
Batista were important symbolic changes. However, the external influence of 
the Cuban Revolution must not be overstated. It served to give some political 
legitimacy to the left-wing of the Liberal party (MRL) and kindled the 
enthusiasm for social change. Indeed, Colombia’s history of insurgency would 
have been markedly different had not been for the internal conditions that led 
to the emergence and persistence of what is today the world’s longest 
insurgent struggle. Unlike any other Latin American country, by the end of the 
1960s Colombia was home to three guerrilla groups, all belonging to different 
strands of communism.  
 
 
Revolutionary Movements: Internal Factors 
 
The Partido Communista Colombiana – Colombian Communist Party or PCC 
had long been influential in rural areas of Colombia. Unlike other communist 
parties in Latin America, perhaps as a direct consequence of the rural 
violence during La Violencia, the PCC had developed significant links in 
troubled rural areas such as in the department of Tolima and the 
southwestern area of Cundinamarca.316  By the mid-1960s, the PCC was 
estimated to have 13,000 members.317 The role of the PCC in organising the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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317 Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, ‘Communism and Economic 
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peasant enclaves or independent republics is particularly significant; a 
number of key figures went on to become influential figures in armed 
insurgent groups, such as Manuel Marulanda Vélez of the FARC, who was 
later the Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent group. However, the role of the 
PCC was not only limited to giving ideological legitimation to the peasants in 
their struggle. FARC’s Historical Outline, published by the insurgent group, 
illustrates the organisational and structural support provided through the PCC: 
 
(The PCC) ‘encouraged the peasant communities to share the land 
among the residents and created mechanisms for collective work and 
assistance to the individual exploitation of parcels of land and applied 
the movement’s justice by collective decision of assemblies of the 
populace. These became areas with a new mentality and social and 
political proposals different from those offered by the regime.’318  
 
It is questionable to what degree these groups were successful in their 
collective social, political and economic projects. However, the existence of 
such autonomous groups and their links to the PCC, an established political 
party that pre-dated the Cuban Revolution with strong links to the labour 
unions and confederations alone presented a threat to the Frente Nacional. Of 
particular significance is the fragmentation of the Communist party and its 
monopoly on revolutionary rhetoric. This split led to an extreme heterogeneity 
and dispersion of the armed movements and had a lasting impact on the 
future of the Colombian left. In 1956, a resolution was passed at the Twentieth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which called for all its 
affiliates around the world to seek a peaceful road to revolution. As a 
consequence of the resolution, the official stance of the PCC was a public 
denunciation of an armed struggle in Colombia. In 1958, at the onset of the 
Frente Nacional, the PCC called for a: 
 
‘peaceful revolutionary struggle through the progressive democratization of 
the country, the strengthening and unity of the workers’ movements and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
318 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), FARC-
EP: Historical Outline (Toronto: International Commission, 1999) p. 15. 
 144 
the worker-peasant alliance, and the development of the democratic 
Frente Nacional’.319  
 
The PCC’s adoption on a non-violent, peaceful revolution had a lasting impact 
on the leftist movements in Colombia. Firstly, the PCC splintered into over a 
dozen smaller groups and was largely divided by those who followed the 
party’s official stance and opponents who endorsed a violent means to social 
and political change. Secondly, the political, economic and social conditions of 
Colombia during this period and renunciation of an armed insurrection by the 
PCC marked the emergence of a broad range of radical political efforts. For 
radical urban groups and rural peasant movements, the adoption of the Soviet 
resolution did not serve their goals. One of the most important semi-
revolutionary movements in Bogotá was MOEC, which was founded in July 
1960 by a group of radical students. The group included Eduardo Aristizábal, 
Max Santos, Robinson Jiménez and Antonio Larotta. MOEC, as one of its 
leaders saw the group, ‘initiated a new stage in the Colombian revolution, a 
stage which is characterized by the repudiation of the old reformist, pacifist, 
and electoral political line and by the shift to an organized offensive by the 
masses’.320 This movement sprang from an event to demonstrate the rise in 
bus fares in Colombia’s capital in 1959, however, quickly emerged to 
represent a wider struggle. In the early months of 1959, there were a number 
of urban strikes and protests that took place across various sectors that 
mobilised students and workers in the capital, including the Unión Nacional de 
Empleados Bancarios de Colombia (Union of the National Bank Workers, 
UNEB) and workers of Icollantas. 321  The MOEC were therefore able to 
mobilise in a climate of protest during the early months of 1959. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It should be noted that MOEC was not a significant movement compared to 
other urban Latin American movements at the time. Bogotá during this period, 
and arguably today, is relatively Conservative in comparison to other Latin 
American capital cities. It would inconceivable for the ‘new left’ movements of 
the early 1960s to organise a wide scale leftist movement in Bogotá. 
However, MOEC does represent the opposition to the ‘pacifist’ PCC stand 
against armed revolutionary struggle and the growth of urban dissent. Other 
movements also emerged in Colombia that included students and 
intellectuals. The Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (The United Front of 
Revolutionary Action, FUAR) was led by Gloria Gaitán, the daughter of the 
slain Liberal politician, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, whose death sparked el 
Bogotazo. The MRL as the left wing of the Liberal party was also able to gain 
from this air of political change, securing 36 per cent of the Liberal vote in 
1962.322  
 
The formation of three separate and vibrant internal guerrilla movements 
during the 1960s was most troubling for the Frente Nacional. The ELN was 
started by a group of students led by Fabio Vásquez Castaño, a militant in the 
Juventud del Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (Youth of the Revolutionary 
Liberal, JMRL).323 Notably, Vásquez was neither a peasant nor a previous 
member of the PCC. The ELN was part of a ‘new revolutionary Colombian left’ 
that rejected the PCC. Whilst the situation of the peasantry was a key concern 
of the ELN, unlike the FARC, the ELN was not representative of the peasant 
land issue. The group was more aligned to the Latin American model of 
guerrilla movements, and similar to the revolutionary MOEC, led by a group of 
‘disaffected middle class youths’. 324  Vásquez was part of a group of 
Colombian students who went to Cuba on a scholarship in 1962 at the height 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis and on-request received military training. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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group included Víctor Medina Morón, former Secretary of Santander’s 
Communist Party and Heriberto Espitia who together with Vásquez founded 
the Brigada Pro Liberación Nacional de Colombia José Antonio Galán in 
November 1962.325  Although the Brigade soon dissolved, the group had 
established their goal for a revolutionary movement in their home country. 
 
Upon their return to Colombia, Vásquez and his cadres settled in the 
northeastern department of Santander, around the sparsely populated area of 
the middle Magdalena Valley. This region was specifically chosen by the 
founders of the Brigade for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Colombian 
revolution could not have the kick-start in the capital Bogotá due to the fact 
that despite labour unrest and deepening social strife there was simply not 
enough support in the conservative city. Secondly, the area was well known to 
the one of the original founders of the Brigade, Víctor Medina. Thirdly, the 
department was home to the Colombia’s largest oil refinery in 
Barrancabermeja, with a well-organised labour force. Finally, the department 
of Santander was already a politicised region of Colombia. The region had 
been dogged by violence during the civil war period of La Violencia and home 
to Liberal guerrilla forces. The most of notable of which is Rafael Rangel, the 
former Liberal mayor of Barrancabermeja and guerrilla, who famously 
accepted a government amnesty under General Rojas Pinilla’s in 1953.326 
During these early developments of the Brigade, the region of Santander 
continued to suffer from violence. Santander, along with other departments 
was declared a state-of-siege and in the early 1960s, there had been a 
marked increase in political agitation.327  
 
The decision of these cadres to set their movement in an already political 
fragile and violent department illustrates the ambitious nature of their 
revolutionary project. Forrest Hylton argues that apart from strategic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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differences, ‘the ELN was no less rooted in the history of popular liberalism, 
communism, and peasant-proletarian struggle than the FARC’.328 However, 
the ELN decisions to kick-start their revolutionary struggle in the department 
of Santander is representative of the broader split within the Colombian left. 
The ELN was representative of those students and intellectuals who rejected 
the pacifist stance and parliamentary ambitions of the PCC.  
 
Careful preliminary investigations had been carried out by Vásquez. In an 
interview with a Mexican editor in 1967, Vásquez explains how the group of 
students were able to gather the support of local peasants to set up their 
revolutionary guerrilla group, the ELN. The group ‘toured the area bringing 
together those with most determination’.329 A guerrilla nucleus of eighteen 
peasants was selected creating the ELN on July 4, 1964. The first public 
appearance of the ELN was at Simacota, near San Vicente in the southern 
region of Santander on January 7, 1965. According to El Tiempo, the heavily 
armed group, loaded with M-2 pistols, Madisen machine guns, 45 calibre point 
rifles and revolvers, entered the town dressed in a khaki-green uniform with 
‘ELN’ labelled arm bands. 330 Whilst it is undeniable that the cadres were 
armed, it is likely that the sensationalist nature of news report had overstated 
the sophistication of the weaponry. The ELN did however carefully execute 
their plan; telephone and electricity cables were severed and the group held 
the population of the small town for two hours, stealing from municipal 
buildings, the agrarian agency, local businesses and a private home. 331 
According to Vásquez, the ‘essential point of taking Simacota was to show the 
people a revolutionary line: armed struggle as the only effective way of taking 
power’.332  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The distribution of the ELN manifesto and programme certainly left a message 
with the people of Simacota and the local authorities. Signed by Vásquez and 
Medina the documents outlined the motivations of the ELN: seize power 
through the masses, agrarian revolution, economic and industrial 
development, housing and urban reform plan, creation of a people’s credit 
system, public health plan, road planning, educational reform, rights for the 
indigenous population, religious freedom, and an independent foreign 
policy.333 This broad, and rather ambitious agenda indicates that it was not 
only the agrarian issue that was driving revolutionary actions in Colombia 
during the 1960s. Social and economic issues, such as health, education, 
housing, industry and employment were all recognised as burgeoning 
problems for the country and high on the political and revolutionary agendas. 
 
One of the most well known recruits of the ELN during its beginnings was the 
revolutionary Catholic priest, Father Camilo Torres. Despite only serving five 
weeks in the ELN before his death during an armed confrontation with the 
Colombian army, Torres is widely regarded as a martyr of the revolutionary 
cause, along with Gaitán and Ché. Born to an upper-middle family and 
educated in Bogotá and Europe, Torres became the chaplain of the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia and was one of the founding members of 
the university’s faculty of sociology; his peers included the well-respected 
Colombian sociologist and analyst of the conflict, Orlando Fals Borda. During 
his tenure at the university, Torres travelled extensively throughout Colombia 
as a Catholic representative on the governing board of the agrarian law 
agency INCORA. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the agency faced 
severe limitations in diffusing the social tensions associated with land 
distribution. This experience sharpened Torres’ political conscious and left 
him with a deep-seated resentment of the government’s policy in the rural 
areas. For Torres, INCORA represented the continuation of a top-down 
societal structure in which the political elite dictated the needs of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
333 The Manifesto of Simacota and ELN programme are available through Uppsala 
University at 
http://www.kus.uu.se/pdf/publications/Colombia/Programa_simacota.pdf.  
 149 
peasantry.334 Remarkably, by the end of the 1960s INCORA officials issued 
statements that ‘there was no problem of unequal distribution of land 
ownership in Colombia’.335  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an alternative account of the Colombian conflict in 
the 1960s rooted in the internal dynamics of a unique social and political 
system that has perpetuated a Sargasso Sea of violent conflict. It has sought 
to illustrate Cold War dyanamics from the perspective of Latin America, in a 
regional centric account of violence through emphasising on the socio-
economic and political legacy of La Violencia into the 1960s. Whilst Cold War 
dynamics certainly provided rural movements with international ideological 
support, external support in terms of training and weaponry is grossly 
exaggerated. Detractors and supporters of US foreign policy and civil conflict 
theorists alike have placed emphasis on external support for driving conflict in 
the global South. Arguably, all these schools have ignored a crucial element 
of the Colombian conflict – the legacy of La Violencia in establishing guerrilla 
movements, resistance groups and criminal bands.  
 
For the political elite in Bogotá during the 1960s, their fears of communist 
infiltration ignited suspicion. However, little consideration was given to the 
internal social, political and economic conditions that drove the mobilisation of 
thousands into organised resistance groups. The Frente Nacional was weak 
and fragmented. During the 1960s the Colombian government operated under 
a political impasse in which real reform to alleviate the country’s social ills 
were impossible, despite open acknowledgement of the rural and agrarian 
problem. By the end of the 1960s, Colombia was in a unique situation 
amongst its Latin American counterparts – it boasted three active guerrilla !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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groups and thousands of mobilised citizens across the spectrum of society 
including rural campesinos, students, revolutionary Roman Catholic 
clergymen, and trade unionists and members of the middle class. In order to 
counter mass mobilisation, the Frente Nacional embarked on a programme of 
counter-reform and repressive measures during the 1970s that led to 
widespread rural support for insurgent groups. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Counter-Reform and the Campesino Movement, 1970-1979 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
The 1970s was an era of social unrest and rightist counter-reform in 
Colombia. During the previous decade, the legacy of La Violencia had brought 
social reform and the agrarian question to the forefront of the political agenda. 
Progressive members of the Frente Nacional coalition gravitated towards the 
ANAPO movement and leftist factions of the main parties; insurgent groups 
issued their manifestos calling for ‘an agrarian revolution’, and politicised 
members of the Catholic clergy openly criticised the half-hearted attempts of 
the Frente Nacional to confront the country’s social ills. However, the 1970s 
saw a marked shift towards a path of counter-reform supported by 
industrialists, agricultural business groups and large landowners. The 
dominant theme throughout the 1970s was of ‘economic growth not social 
justice’.336 This significant change in political rhetoric can be explained by two 
factors: the surprising success of General Rojas Pinilla’s ANAPO movement 
in the election of 1970 and the growth of the campesino movement under the 
ANUC.  
 
Once again, the Liberal and Conservative parties found themselves united by 
the perceived threat of radical social and economic transformation offered by 
the ‘third way’. The historical differences between the two traditional parties 
on laissez-faire economic policies and the Church-state relationship became 
less significant and instead their focus shifted toward their common concern 
of defending the political dominance of the traditional parties and the 
economic status quo.337 In the midst of losing support amongst the urban 
masses to the ANAPO movement, the Liberals and Conservatives pushed to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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retain their electoral base within the country’s upper classes by defending the 
interests of the economic elite. 
 
The counter-reformist policies of the Frente Nacional cast a long shadow. 
Agrarian questions had certainly not been resolved - but they had been now 
asked - and this had a lasting impact on the relationship between the 
peasantry and the Colombian state, together with the evolving trajectory of 
agrarian violence. Firstly, the 1970s saw the radicalisation of the peasantry 
under the ANUC. Land invasions sponsored by the ANUC spread across the 
departments of Boyacá, Huila and Tolima in October 1971. Between 1971 
and 1975 around 2000 haciendas were invaded.338 This increasingly open 
confrontation between the peasantry and the political elite became one of the 
most prominent axes of the Colombian conflict. Secondly, the failure of the 
ANUC to thwart the counter-reformist policies contributed to the later success 
of armed guerrilla groups. Whilst the drugs trade is often cited by theorists of 
civil conflict and US foreign policy specialists as the key factor leading to the 
growth of Colombia’s armed groups, arguably, it was the demise of the ANUC 
by the end of the 1970s that led to widespread support for insurgents in rural 
areas. The Colombian state’s abandonment of agrarian reform during the 
1970s therefore directly correlates with an increase of armed conflict.339 
 
Remarkably, this important decade of Colombian history is largely ignored in 
recent accounts of the conflict. The origin of the conflict is often associated 
with US interventionism, the formal organisation of insurgent groups in the 
early 1960s, or else the ‘cocaine boom’ of the 1980s.340 The reason for this is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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twofold. Firstly, the literature is dominated by American national security 
scholars and so periods of overt US involvement and military assistance in 
Colombia have received the most scholarly attention. Accordingly, much ink 
has been expended on the counterinsurgency operations in the independent 
republics in the mid-1960s initiated by JFK and or on measures implemented 
in the War on Drugs under various US initiatives post 1980.341 Similarly, 
human rights abuses during periods of US support have historically received 
more widespread global attention from writers, commentators and journalists 
as part of a meta-level debate about American core values versus national 
security imperatives. Secondly, the 1970s constitutes a period of peasant 
history in which the Colombian peasantry emerged under the AUNC as the 
‘agent and interpreter of the peasantry as a class’. 342  As the internal 
antagonisms of the Colombian conflict have been generally side-lined, with 
the drugs trade forming as one of the main focal points of violent conflict in the 
country, the history of the peasantry features little in literature where US 
actions or criminality and drugs are seen as the most fundamental driving 
factors for violence.   
 
It would be grossly naïve to suggest the drugs trade has not impacted the 
Colombian conflict. Indeed, the cultivation and production of illegal narcotics 
since the late 1970s has undoubtedly changed the face of the Colombian 
conflict.  Illegal narcotics and drug related violence are one of the most 
pervasive problems facing Colombia and its Latin American counterparts. The 
trade has brought armed actors to the forefront of the conflict. Insurgents, 
paramilitaries, cartels and organised criminal gangs have amassed huge 
swathes of arable land. However, the cultivation of coca must be explored in 
the context of the agrarian question. Coca, like other produce is cultivated and 
requires land acquisition. Importantly, the drugs trade is not the only trade 
associated with violence in Colombia. During the 1980s, the mining of oil, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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341 Plan LASO, 1962; The Andean Initiative, 1989; Plan Colombia, 1999 are the three 
aid packages between the US and Colombia in which counter-insurgency and 
counter-narcotics support has been provided. 
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coal, gold and emeralds also became embroiled in the complex interplay 
between state and non-state actors, in which various groups sought to expand 
their territory through violent means.343  
 
The counter-reform period during the 1970s is important because it 
represents the formal abandonment of rural areas by the Colombian 
government. Social protest as a result of the governmental abandonment was 
labelled as ‘subversive activity’. The inability of the Colombian state to 
arbitrate agrarian conflict, adjudicate the mining industry in rural areas and 
alleviate the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the country resulted in 
violence emerging as the alternative mechanism through which conflicts 
between groups were settled. The wider cultural impact of dysfunctional 
agrarian policies during the 1970s can be observed in the evolution of 
violence in the following decades in which insurgents, cartels, paramilitary 
groups, criminal gangs and armed political factions became embroiled in an 
increasingly violent conflict. The effective abandonment of the agrarian 
question and rural grievances enabled the emergence of new armed actors 
and radicalised the peasantry, many of whom by the end of the 1970s had 
opted to cooperate with rural guerrilla organisations. This concept of 
deliberate governmental retreat from what was the core question of land 
reform for much of Colombia’s population and state sponsored terror 
challenges the view espoused by numerous scholars and commentators of 
the Colombian conflict, which argues that the drugs trade has been the 
fundamental driver of violence in Colombia.344 
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ANAPO and the 1970 Election 
 
Government in Colombia is in the domain of the aristocracy. Illustrious names 
such as Lleras, López, Ospina and Gómez appear frequently in the roll of 
Colombian leaders from the two traditional political parties. The greatest 
electoral challenge to the Frente Nacional and the dominance of the Liberal 
and Conservative parties in the 1970s was Rojas Pinilla’s ANAPO movement. 
Rojas Pinilla’s near victory in the 1970 election, in which the former military 
leader was just 63,000 votes shy of an all-out victory, sent shockwaves 
through the Colombian political elite. 345  The ANAPO movement was an 
ominous force that reflected the manifestation of popular discontent with the 
Frente Nacional in the urban centres of the country. Rojas Pinilla’s campaign 
slogan ‘todos los pobres con Rojas’ – all the poor with Rojas – certainly struck 
a chord with the urban masses that were previously aligned with either the 
Liberal or Conservative parties. 346  Widespread unrest across the country 
during the early 1970s included labour strikes, land invasions by peasants, 
rural violence, urban terrorism and university disturbances. The narrow 
electoral result and widespread unrest reflected the dissatisfaction of the 
Colombian populace with the Frente Nacional coalition where ‘populism’ 
emerged as the main form of expression through the ballot box. 
 
The presidential election of 1970 was one of the most fiercely contested in 
republic’s history. The elections were expected to deliver a straightforward 
victory for the official Conservative candidate, in line with the Frente Nacional 
alternation agreement, however it quickly transformed into a four-man race for 
the presidential office. In the midst of widespread unrest, a state of siege and 
curfew was imposed. The ensuing events almost consigned the Frente 
Nacional to death and saw the emergence of the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-
19), a guerrilla group that went on to carry out some of the most high profile 
attacks against the Colombian state. The election of 1970 presented a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dilemma for the Frente Nacional as no Conservative candidate received an 
outright majority. The Conservative party put forward Misael Pastrana Borrero 
as an official candidate, however, two other Conservatives, Belisario Betancur 
and Evaristo Sourdis as well as Rojas Pinilla came forward to contest the 
presidency and run as candidates.  
 
How was an ousted former military dictator and architect of a coup d’état 
nevertheless able to challenge the Frente Nacional coalition? By Latin 
American standards, Rojas Pinilla’s ANAPO was a ‘populist’ movement. The 
ANAPOs success in 1970 was largely due to the growing rural and urban 
dissatisfaction with the Frente Nacional and divisions within the Conservative 
party. Rojas Pinilla provided a unifying symbol for the opposition of the Frente 
Nacional and importantly was able to gather support from both left and right 
wing political factions. His movement appealed to Conservatives who had 
always opposed the Frente Nacional and in order to gather support from this 
group, Rojas Pinilla emphasised the Christian nature of the ANAPO and 
social conservatism by questioning the use of birth control to counter the 
demographic problem in the country.347 Rojas Pinilla also had the support of 
retired military officers who had served under his regime and other military 
figures who wanted to follow the Latin American model of a strong military that 
plays a major role in government. Women formed another core group of 
support for Rojas Pinilla through his daughter, Senator María Eugenia Rojas 
de Moreno, who was his principal advisor and spokesperson. She became a 
symbol of female emancipation as political posters of María Eugenia and her 
two children were distributed in urban centres with repeated reminders of her 
father’s work in extending suffrage to women whilst in office.348 However, 
most important to Rojas Pinilla’s success was the continued and growing 
support from the urban lower and lower middle classes.  
 
Socio-economic issues were central to the complications of the elections of 
1970. Pastrana promised Colombians a complete overhaul of agrarian policy 
in which he would address the economic imbalance in towns and less-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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developed rural areas. Betancur, the former Minister of Labour, stressed the 
need to address the economic and social structures in the country and 
Sourdis who was openly opposed to the Frente Nacional alternation system 
argued for decentralisation. Rojas Pinilla ran under the slogan ‘president of 
the poor’ and used his populist and nationalist appeal to garner support. He 
was also known for commitment to prestige national development projects, 
including schools, hospital and airports. All four candidates strongly urged 
Colombians to cast their vote, arguing that the abstentions that were 
advocated by various armed guerrilla groups could prove to be fatal for the 
Colombian political system. 
 
Election day dawned on April 19, 1970. An initial electoral count gave an early 
lead to Rojas Pinilla, over the official Frente Nacional candidate Pastrana. 
However, as ANAPO loyalists took to the streets to celebrate a premature 
victory, the government announced a state of siege and interrupted the 
announcement of the election results. Rojas Pinilla levelled accusations of 
fraud against the Frente Nacional and threatened the government with a 
general strike and urban guerrilla warfare. Reporting of the results resumed 
the following day and Pastrana moved ahead and went on to win with an 
incredibly narrow victory of 1.6 per cent. The final count gave Rojas Pinilla 39 
per cent of the vote against Pastrana’s 40.6 per cent and as there were no 
rules in place for a runoff; Pastrana was able to win the election and become 
Colombia’s next president.349 The delay in reporting the electoral results lent 
credence to Rojas Pinilla’s claim of official fraud, however, the election results 
were in reality quite predictable – Rojas Pinilla enjoyed strong support in the 
cities, whereas in smaller towns and rural areas the traditional parties retained 
their power.350 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The outpouring of support of ANAPO in the 1970 election is largely symbolic 
of the shifting political sentiments of the electorate. Whilst the ANAPO never 
went on to win any major elections, the movement posed a visible threat to 
the Frente Nacional coalition.  The near-suicide of the coalition in the election 
of 1970 and the ability of the ANAPO to provide an umbrella for the disparate 
opposition groups certainly put the coalition under considerable pressure. In 
particular, Liberal and Conservative politicians were concerned about 
ANAPO’s popular support base and the increasing radicalisation of the 
peasantry and students. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest 
the implicit involvement of the Pastrana administration in the lack of press 
coverage given to the ANAPO, the movement was deeply affected by the lack 
of publicity.  
 
The country’s most popular and widely distributed newspapers are 
concentrated in the hands of influential and wealthy families and are aligned 
with one of the two main political parties.351 In the year leading to the 1974 
presidential election there was an ‘almost total absence of reporting on 
ANAPO, especially by the traditional party newspapers’.352 In October 1973, 
the Newspaper Association invited all presidential candidates for the 
upcoming election for dinner. Alfonso López Michelsen and Álvaro Gómez 
Hurtado duly attended, however the ANAPO candidate María Eugenia Rojas 
declined and issued a letter stating ‘she saw no point in attending a meeting 
of people who were determined not to report how the masses felt about the 
situation of the country, or what ANAPO was trying to do to remedy 
matters’.353 Although the ANAPO had no lasting impact on Colombian politics, 
the movement was most successful in the legislative branch of government !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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where the group was able to oppose all official policy measures in detail 
during Pastrana’s administration.354  
 
 
The Pastrana Administration 
 
During the volatile events of 1970 and 1971, it was widely believed that the 
Pastrana government would only last ‘a matter of months’.355  Despite the 
popularity of the ANAPO, the movement was not strong enough to break the 
Frente Nacional coalition. However, social unrest under the Pastrana 
government was a serious cause for concern. Unrest in Colombia during 1971 
included a series of strikes; the most important was the illegal general strike 
on 8 March called by the Union de Trabajadores Colombianos (Union of 
Colombian Workers, UTC) and the Confederación Sindicalist de Trabajadores 
de Colombia (Colombian Confederation of Workers, CSTC) with ANAPO 
backing. Student disturbances led to fatal altercations between protestors and 
police and a number of university dismissals and resignations across the 
country’s universities. There were two waves of land invasions by landless 
peasants in February and October 1971 as well as growing rural and urban 
violence and guerrilla activity.356  
 
The Armed Forces of Colombia made it clear that they were ready to 
intervene in the upheaval of 1970 if law and order deteriorated ‘more than 
temporarily’.357 However, the reluctance of the Army to step into a political role 
reveals much about the business of government in Colombia and its unique 
political culture amongst its Latin American counterparts. The strong tradition 
of military non-intervention in Colombia reflects a historic understanding 
between the ruling classes and army officers about civil-military relations; the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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military fulfils its role of combatting the problem of guerrillas, whilst the 
government deals with day-to-day political activity.  
 
 
The Michelsen Administration 
 
Election periods in Colombia have been historically marked by social unrest. 
The election of 1974 was no different. In 1974, for the first time in sixteen 
years, Colombians could elect a Liberal or Conservative president as well as 
voting for a separate party programmes. There was considerable opposition 
to the idea of a return to a truly democratic system, since the traditional 
parties had desired the continuation of the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ until the 
1978 presidential election. However, the wider call for a return to open 
democracy was too strong to resist. As expected Alfonso López Michelsen, 
the Liberal candidate won the election, with Gómez, the Conservative 
candidate coming in second, and María Eugenia’s ANAPO taking third place. 
More people voted than ever before in Colombia and many of those who 
defected to the ANAPO in the election of 1970 had returned to place their vote 
for the Liberal party attracted by a mixed platform of social justice combined 
with rapid economic development. Some five million out of the population of 
twenty-three million were expected to vote. However, many of those eligible to 
vote needed identity cards, of which less than ten million of the population 
actually had.358  
 
By the end of 1974, only eight months into the López administration, the 
Colombian electorate were expressing its increasing dissatisfaction with the 
government’s political and economic performance. These grievances were not 
new. A rapid increase in the basic cost of living was at the core of the 
widespread unrest that led to violent demonstrations in cities across 
Colombia, including Cali, Pasto, Popayan, Palmira and the south of Bogotá.359 
Inflation in the last months of 1974 varied from 3.75 to 2.5 per cent with wage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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increases remaining stagnant. Simmering discontent was visible not only 
amongst the poor, but also among farmers, who voiced concerns about the 
poor market for agricultural products as well as investors, particularly in 
Medellín, the centre of the textile industry.360 As with any other period of social 
unrest in Colombia “subversives” and “left-wing elements” were alleged to 
have helped exploit and co-ordinate the disturbances. However, the dire 
economic situation and the impact on the masses of Colombian workers and 
peasants were undeniable.  
 
The government declared an economic emergency. This was designed to 
give the administration additional powers to curb the financial downturn. 
However, a Supreme Court judgement declared some of the economic 
measures they had decreed to be unconstitutional. In particular, the Courts 
rejected proposed new measures for filing income tax returns. This was 
problematic in that it not only undermined the legitimacy of the new 
administration but it also marked a return to the old tax collection system, 
which allowed tax evasion to continue on a large scale.361 Increases in tax 
collection and a step-change in efficiency were essential to fulfil the promises 
set out by the López administration for improved education and social welfare.  
Although the general consensus within the government was that the López 
administration was keeping to its promises of retrenchment and reform, there 
was still considerable opposition within Congress on both the left and the 
right. For the left, the proposed reforms were simply not radical enough, which 
was typified by the jibe, ‘en que se parece el gobierno a un violín en que 
sostiene con la izquerida y se ejecuta con la derecha’ – the government is like 
a violin, which supports the left but runs with the right.362 For a leading 
member of the business community the government made promises it could 
not keep. In his opinion, the government seemed to believe that ‘all employers 
in industry could afford painlessly to double the wages they pay.’ He added, 
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‘investors expect to get their capital back in five years; the situation demands 
acceptance of a lower rate of profit’.363  
 
Whilst significant economic growth continued under López, social unrest 
nevertheless plagued the country. Violent crime mounted steadily, strikes, 
student demonstrations, occupation of the Universidad Nacional by the Army 
and the resignation of its Rector, unemployment, increases in the cost of 
living, ministerial resignations the re-imposition of a state of siege and the 
widespread unpopularity of the López administration all lent a bleak outlook of 
the future of the country by 1976. Wider international economic conditions in 
the wake of the 1974 oil shock also took their toll.  
 
The presidential election of 1978 saw the arrival of Julio Cesar Turbay. Known 
as an ‘astute politician’, he had a long history in the Liberal party.364 However, 
there remained a deep-seated mistrust of the politician, even amongst groups 
within his own political party because of his affiliation with unsavoury 
elements, such as drug smugglers looking for political protection. Upon his 
electoral victory, Turbay inherited a broad range of ills including ‘worsening 
social and economic problems, governmental corruption, student unrest, 
kidnappings, rampant crime as well as guerrilla activities’. 365  Inflation 
presented a further challenge to the new leader; whilst coffee export earnings, 
which accounted for 65 per cent of the Colombia’s foreign revenues, reached 
record highs, inflation reduced the average wage earner’s buying power to a 
record low.366  
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The ANUC and the Agrarian Question 
 
The rise and fall of the ANUC is notably absent from contemporary accounts 
of the Colombian conflict. This comes as no surprise; little attention is given to 
peasant movement in scholarly enquiries. Despite the condition of the rural 
peasants operating as the fundamental driver for much of the instability in 
Colombia and despite the fact that this sector of the population has endured 
the majority of human rights violations in the country, there are few serious 
analytical studies of the peasantry. The lack of scholarly attention in this area 
in part reflects the high illiteracy rates amongst the rural population; very few 
of them are able to write or contribute to the literature of their struggle and 
theirs is a ‘lost voice’ amongst Colombia’s diverse political constituencies. 
Many of those who were initially vocal figures in the peasant struggle either 
later took up arms with one of the country’s guerrilla groups or died during 
confrontations with the Armed Forces. Peasants also face unique difficulties 
regarding the organisation and representation of their interests. 367  Their 
struggle is often occluded by being framed as a regional or particularly local 
issue, whereas in reality in a country like Colombia, the rural class are at the 
core of an agricultural economy.  
 
Colombia’s political elite was certainly not oblivious to the rural problem. In 
1967 President Lleras Restrepo had created the ANUC in a bid to gain 
political support from the Colombian peasantry. The situation of the peasantry 
and the agrarian issue was highlighted as a national problem. This was 
particularly significant as it brought the issue of agrarian reform to the 
forefront of the nation’s political agenda and, momentarily at least, actively 
involved core engines of the state in the resolution of the problem. Arguably, 
the rise of the ANUC as a largely autonomous peasant organisation was a 
historical opportunity for the country. However, this opportunity passed and 
the subsequent demise of ANUC led to a revolutionised and fractioned 
peasantry, many of whom by the end of the 1970s opted to take up arms. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In the early 1970s around half the total population of Colombia lived in the 
rural areas of the country. The majority of these campesinos earned a poor 
income from the land, in conditions ‘leaving much to be desired’.368 Many of 
those who lived in towns also survived on menial incomes, however in general 
they enjoyed better standards of living; town dwellers had better prospects in 
terms of employment, education and health services. One of the many 
problems facing the government in the 1970s was the unmanageable influx of 
people from poverty-stricken rural areas to towns.  
 
Agriculture provided 30 per cent of the GNP and 70 per cent of Colombia’s 
export earnings. The internal social and economic importance of the 
agricultural sector demanded that the living situation of the peasantry should 
be addressed. A broad consensus had been reached by the Colombian 
government that this should be driven by increased output in the hope that 
this would result in improved wages for the peasantry, however there was little 
agreement about how to achieve this. The two factors that drove the lack of 
success in achieving agrarian reform were party politics and class warfare, 
which had created considerable obstacles. The internal security situation, 
growth of the guerrilla threat and party divisions created a political impasse. 
The Colombian government did however sponsor programmes that were 
intended to improve the social services available to the peasantry. These 
schemes were focussed in improving education, health, roads, 
communication, access to electricity and clean water supplies in rural areas. 
Despite the implementation of such programmes there were strict limits on 
finance and co-ordination between the ministries through which the schemes 
were administered and local bodies. Moreover, the topography of the country 
hindered the overall success of the scheme as many rural parts of the country 
saw little or no improvement in their living conditions through governmental 
programmes.369   
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The aim of agrarian reform was to improving the living conditions of the 
peasantry. However, and most importantly, agrarian reform was seen by the 
lower classes as a means to resolving the nexus of social, political and 
economic problems in rural areas by reforming land ownership. The salience 
of reforming land tenure as a means to eradicating poverty and improving the 
security conditions of the country was based on the widely-held belief that the 
existence that the distribution of land in Colombia structurally depressed the 
earnings of the peasantry and widened the already appalling gap between the 
rich and the poor. What many saw as the very ‘serious and genuine problem 
of the landless, unemployed and under-employed’ needed a solution rather 
than palliative measures and social work.370 
 
 
Internal Security: Land Invasions 
 
The dramatic land invasions of the 1970s posed a serious threat to 
Colombia’s internal security. The ANUC lent their moral support to invasions, 
which predictably were in rural areas. On November 14, 1971 some 500 
people ‘invaded’ a large farm near Palmira in the department of Valle. The 
land invasion led to a serious clash with the police who evicted the ‘invaders’ 
and arrested 44 of them to be tried by a military tribunal. The following day a 
total of 39 farms were reportedly invaded in the departments of Magdalena, 
Caldas and Huila. The ex-leader of the Socialist Party, Antonio García 
explained the rural land invasions in terms of a widespread feeling of betrayal 
on the part of the peasants. The peasants, according to García, ‘have a deep-
seated hunger for land, and were told during last year’s presidential election 
campaign that this hunger was to be satisfied through land distribution 
schemes organised by INCORA. This has not happened, and so they have 
decided to take the law into their own hands’.371 Land invasions not only 
caused local conflicts between invaders and landowners, but also increased !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tensions between the Liberal and Conservative parties; Conservatives 
accused Liberal Governors and Mayors of being ‘soft on invasions, or even 
encouraging them’.372 
 
By far the most dramatic land invasion took place at the end of November 
1971. An estimated number of 3,000 families moved onto 120 hectares of 
land in the urban district of Ibagué, capital of the Tolima department. Troops 
were called to evict the invaders and were eventually successful. In the 
aftermath, the Conservative press attacked the Liberal Governor of Tolima for 
‘permissiveness’.373  The Ibagué invasion led to government promises that 
housing would be provided for the evicted invaders. However, given the 
chronic shortage of housing in Colombia, urban land invasion were set to 
increase.  In 1974, a further wave of land invasions got under way leading to 
fatal confrontations. In Arjona, in the department of Cesar a skirmish between 
the police and invaders left two policemen and two peasants dead. Land 
invasions swept the country across the departments of Cauca, Antioquia, La 
Guajira and Córdoba. The department of Sucre was the worst affected where 
an estimated 30 to 40 land invasions took place in the period of a ‘few 
days’.374 
 
 
Unemployment and Labour 
 
The imposition of a state of ‘economic emergency’ was seen as a response to 
dire economic reality in the early 1970s.375 Despite record levels of coffee 
exports and a growth rate of six per cent in real terms during the 1970s, 
inflation levels drove the average purchasing power of Colombians to a record 
low.376 Made tangible by rapidly rising food costs, this conundrum added to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the wealth of social ills faced by the country during this period. The Colombian 
government during this period estimated its unemployment rate to be around 
8.4%; however estimation from the International Labour Organisation stated 
that ‘up to 25% would be more realistic’.377 
 
In a developing country such as Colombia, a healthy growth in GNP does not 
necessarily result in a reduction in unemployment. The ILO in 1971 reported 
that the best policy for Colombia, with its wealth of land resources would be to 
explore the possibility of job creation in the agricultural sector. This 
recommendation was made was for three reasons: it would reduce 
undernourishment, ease the upward pressure on food prices and result in the 
decline of poverty leading to stable conditions for the manufacturing 
market.378 Of particular significance was the recommendation to shift towards 
a more equitable income distribution in Colombia and to implement land 
reform. 
 
The reluctance of the Colombian government to follow this advice is not 
surprising. Colombian officials took a neo-liberal approach and saw ‘income 
growth as the main solution’ to the country’s economic woes. 379  The 
bourgeoning levels of population growth brought some 200,000 additional 
young Colombians into the work force every year.380 Yet, despite international 
advice to take measures to counter a future unemployment crisis, there was 
no ‘indication of a policy aimed at employment’ other than through the 
medium of GNP. Why did the Colombian political elite in Bogotá not following 
the recommendations of the ILO, despite recognising the seriousness of the 
country’s situation? Tax and land reforms were not only politically difficult to 
implement but also problematic from an administrative view. Moreover, the 
ILO was seen as an avowedly left-wing organisation and some viewed it with 
suspicion. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A general strike took hold of Colombia on March 8, 1971. Importantly, this 
strike saw the cooperation between the UTC of 400,000 to 450,000 workers 
and the CSTC of 120,000 to 150,000 workers.381 The joining of forces in strike 
action forged alliances between these unions was of particular significance in 
forming a political opposition to the growing problem of unemployment. 
Chronic unemployment in urban areas was around 9-16 per cent, and was 
estimated to be as high as 25 per cent in the country as a whole.382 In a 
booklet, entitled ‘Unemployment in Colombia’ produced by the UTC, the union 
launched an attack on the ILO report by accusing the mission of being ‘faint-
hearted and piecemeal in its recommendations’ and ‘failing to underline the 
need for a total redistribution of resources as a necessary predetermining 
factor in the flight to overcome unemployment’.383 Most interestingly, Belisario 
Betancur and Senator María Eugenia Rojas were reported to have been 
involved in the compiling of the report, showing growing opposition within the 
government to Pastrana’s counter-reformist policies. 
 
The role of workers’ unions was called into question in the 1970s. The 
average Colombian worker had little bargaining power; Colombia’s labour 
laws severely curbed workers’ freedom. Government employees and those 
working in public services were forbidden to strike by law. Public services 
employees were widely defined and included workers in public utilities, 
transport, health, municipal workers, oil workers and those in banking. The 
declaration of a state of siege was a constant and reoccurring element of 
Colombian life that made any modest challenge to the anti-striking laws 
difficult. Moreover, unions faced a weak financial position curbing their 
bargaining power. The total income for the UTC in 1968 was $1,200,000 US 
dollars of which 16 per cent came from the government. The financial 
dependence of unions on the government further eroded the militancy of the 
major unions.384 The alliances between the unions emphasised the political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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colour of the March 8 strikes. The labour laws incidentally underlined the 
illegality of the strike.  
 
Nevertheless, strikes were widespread across all sectors of the Colombian 
economy. The case of the bus drivers’ strike illustrates the tensions between 
the government and service providers. Buses were the most important form of 
transport in Colombia in the 1970s. Most bus companies were privately 
owned, with some municipal buses in larger cities, such as Bogotá, Medellín 
and Cali. For many years, the Colombian government was able to keep 
internal petroleum products at a very low rate by operating a special rate of 
exchange. However, when the Pastrana administration abolished the 
petroleum rate of exchange in 1971, the cost of petrol increased sharply by 
local standards. The government agreed to provide bus service operators with 
a subsidy in order to keep bus fares at their previous rates. Bus drivers in the 
private sector were paid a small percentage of their take, rather than wages 
leading to incredibly long working hours and an ‘appalling accident and injury 
rate’. The bus drivers’ union had long argued for a limited working day and 
weekly wage that included some sort of piecework bonus, however these 
requests were met with considerable resistance from company owners. The 
bus company owners from their end claimed that ‘rigid fare control, a static 
rate of subsidy, and increasing costs are squeezing profits’.385 In short, the 
owners called on the government to raise fares or subsidies. 
 
The Pastrana administration was reluctant to change its stance on the issue. 
Inflation was running at a rate of just under 30 per cent, per annum. Moreover, 
the upcoming Presidential elections were only seven months away. At 
midnight, October 1 1973, the bus drivers implemented an illegal strike. 
Joined by primary school teachers who were also striking, the authorities in 
Bogotá responded by calling in the Armed Forces to restore order. Estimates 
of arrests varied from 800-1200 people with 50-60 policemen and soldiers 
injured.386 Whilst the bus drivers’ strike may not seem significant, it reveals !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the tensions between the government and workers’ and how this situation 
could and did escalate very quickly into a strike that halted travel throughout 
the country’s capital city for 48 hours. Moreover, it reflects the heavy-handed 
response of the Colombian state to social unrest. 
 
The Colombian economy during Pastrana’s administration was precariously 
dependent upon export earnings. Agricultural production was a particular 
cause for concern due to ‘exceptionally bad weather over the past twelve 
months or more’. Official figures estimated of crop losses during 1970 at 
1,000 million pesos and in 1971 a further 1,400 million pesos.387 Damage also 
extended to buildings, roads, railways, power and telephone lines which 
coupled with the falling coffee prices led to reduced income at home. 
 
Official statistics offered an optimistic picture of the Colombian economy. 
During 1973, the Colombian GNP grew by 7.5 to 8 per cent in real terms, 
marking the best growth rate in many years. Industrial production also 
increased by approximately 9.5 per cent. In agricultural terms the volumes of 
rice, potatoes and barley all increased.388 However, despite these advances, 
‘there were still severe shortages in some cereal based and other basic 
foodstuffs’.389 Coffee prices also saw an increase and export diversification 
was achieved through ‘substantial increases’ in petroleum production. 
According to official statistics, there was a decline in unemployment from ’11.6 
per cent in 1970 to 6.3 per cent by the end of 1973’ and 210,000 extra jobs 
created in 1973 alone. 390  President Pastrana boasted that international 
agencies ‘had calculated that it would take fifteen years to achieve this result’. 
But these official figures were clearly at loggerheads with the reality of social 
conditions, strife and strikes that the country experienced during the same 
period, calling into question the reliability of such official statistics. 
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The Drugs Trade 
 
For many unemployed Colombians during the 1970s the drugs trade simply 
provided jobs for an expanding population. This was certainly the case in the 
late 1970s and is a problem that persists today. The drugs trade is often cited 
as one of the main driving forces in the continuation of the Colombian conflict. 
Countless policy reports, scholarly work and popular media accounts have 
reiterated the ‘narco-guerrilla’ nexus and the associated threats posed by this 
for global security. The question of how to combat the drugs trade has been at 
the forefront of the US foreign policy since Richard Nixon declared the “War 
on Drugs” in 1971.391 Although this initial declaration that drugs constituted a 
direct threat to US national security was largely with reference to the growing 
problem of addiction and criminal activity within the United States, successive 
US administrations have used the “War on Drugs” to justify a militarised 
foreign policy agenda in Latin America. Meanwhile, the issue of drug 
cultivation in Colombia is rarely viewed through the lens of the social 
conditions of the country during the 1970s. 
 
The correlation between the increase of drug cultivation and violence in 
Colombia has been well documented. However, the complex relationships 
between drugs trafficking, political violence, and the many actors involved in 
the social conflict in Colombia are often over-looked in the course of the 
discussion. In policy debates in Washington and Bogotá, the ‘narco-guerrilla’ 
term has been employed to suggest that the guerrillas are major drug 
traffickers and that counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations are 
one and the same. However, in reality the role of the guerrillas in illicit drug 
production and drug trafficking has evolved over time and remains primarily 
focused on taxation of illicit crops. In other words, the two are related but they 
are not the same thing.392 The problem of unemployment, growing levels of 
urbanisation coupled with a dire socio-economic situation for the majority of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Colombians and a growing dissatisfaction with the political system created a 
situation in which the drugs trade was able to emerge as a primary means of 
income for many of the poor. 
 
During the 1970s the Colombian political system attempted to grapple with the 
growing cultivation of drugs in the country. For example, in May 1977, the 
Ministry of Defence announced special protective services for Colombian 
judges. This measure was to counter attacks in which several magistrates 
were killed in relation to cases involving the trafficking of narcotics. The 
murder of a judge in city of Cali was well documented in the Colombian press. 
According to reports, the judge was killed after failed bribery attempts to 
reverse a ruling against a convicted drugs trafficker.393 During the 1970s, 
numerous drug traffickers were arrested and brought to trial, however 
members of the judiciary were subjected to physical intimidation and cash 
bribes from trafficking rings. Despite Colombia’s reputation for being the 
cocaine capital of the world since the 1970s, the majority of coca cultivation 
was in Peru and Bolivia. During this period, Colombia was the primary 
processing and transmitting location for cocaine, however it surpassed Mexico 
for marijuana production.394 Guerrilla groups such as FARC were not at the 
core of these early narcotics operations during the 1970s and instead, the 
main organisers were criminals. 
 
 
Crime and Kidnapping 
 
As the preceding two chapters have illustrated, crime is not a new 
phenomenon in Colombia. Criminal activity has as expected risen with social 
unrest and increasing levels of violence. By 1974, Bogotá was dubbed the 
‘one of the most dangerous cities in the world’. According to the country’s 
popular daily newspaper El Tiempo, in Bogotá alone there were 526 
assassinations in 1972 and 493 in 1973.395 The newly appointed head of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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civilian intelligence agency, DAS, General José Joaquin Matallana, described 
Bogotá as being in ‘a state of emergency’.396  In the wake of increased 
criminality, the Minster of Government, Cornelio Reyes announced a major 
offensive against the ‘crime phenomenon throughout Colombia that has 
manifested itself on and off for many years against a background of national 
indifference’.397 Whilst the Colombian authorities became increasing alarmed 
by the situation of crime and the local press reported of the ‘new wave of 
violence and lawlessness’, it was indeed an old and engrained problem in the 
country. One of the most fundamental problems faced by the country in terms 
of urban crime was the social condition in growing cities and towns as a result 
of millions displaced during La Violencia. 
 
The 1970s saw a marked increase in urban acts of terrorism. In August 1974, 
even the Minister of Defence, Abraham Varón Valencia, was subjected to 
personal attack. Varón’s official country home and his official Bogotá 
residence were both machine-gunned by unknown gunmen. In October, 
military bus bringing servicemen back from an excursion came under 
sustained gunfire outside Bogotá, meanwhile forty-five members of the 
Colombian Red Cross were held up by three armed men and robbed. A car 
bomb ‘of very substantial size’ was detonated close to the Industrial Exhibition 
grounds in the capital.398  Police records show that an anonymous caller 
telephoned the F-2 headquarters399 shortly before the explosion and stated 
that ‘a car had been parked in a suspicious manner in a (named) street near 
the Industrial Exhibition grounds and that the interior was covered in patches 
of blood’.400  A mobile patrol was sent to the car. According to the only 
eyewitness, one of the patrolmen opening the front door of the Volkswagen 
and got into the driver’s seat. When the ignition was turned on, the car blew !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
396  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 11 October 1974, ALL 1/4, FCO7/2659, TNA. 
397  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 6 September 1974, ALL 1/4, FCO7/2659, TNA. 
398  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 11 October 1974, ALL 1/4, FCO7/2659, TNA. 
399 The F-2 is the Colombian equivalent of a Security Branch. 
400  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 11 October 1974, ALL 1/4, FCO7/2659, TNA. 
 174 
up killing three patrolmen and causing ‘considerable damage in the immediate 
vicinity’.401 Although this specific act of urban terrorism and many others at the 
time were thought to have been the work of the ELN guerrillas, there was no 
specific evidence to suggest this. 
 
Urban kidnapping during the 1970s posed a serious security threat, with 
Colombia quickly becoming known internationally as the ‘kidnapping capital of 
the world’. However, prior to this acclaim, Colombia had long been the 
‘kidnapping capital of Latin America’. Despite the increase in kidnapping rates, 
‘widespread extortion along these lines’ had long been a fact of life in 
Colombia.402 There were a number of high profile kidnappings of politicians 
and members of wealthy families, however there were also a number of 
kidnappings that were not reported or unremarked due to ‘the prompt 
payment of ransom’.403 During the four years of the López administration 
there were 324 reported kidnapping in Colombia with ransom payments 
totalling $158 million US dollars. During the same period, the various 
insurgent groups organised bold urban operations and the country’s illegal 
drug trade expanded into a $1 billion US dollar industry.404 Kidnapping of 
foreign workers in particular proved very lucrative. In October 1973, two 
Americans working for La Frontina Gold Mines were kidnapped by the ELN 
and released on March 7, 1974. The mining company paid ransom of 2.5 
million pesos405 for the safe release of the hostages.406  
 
Kidnapping tactics were used by all three of Colombia’s guerrilla groups in the 
early 1970s. Contemporary urban guerrilla doctrine certainly advocated 
kidnapping as a source of revenue. In January 1973, over the space of ten !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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days, there were three kidnappings that were attributed to guerrilla groups. On 
January 5, Armando Mora de la Hoz with his son and son-in-law were 
kidnapped from a finca in Córdoba. Two days later Carlos Angel Villa and his 
son were kidnapped from a finca in Antioquia and on the same day, José 
Ignacio Rada Gonzales was kidnapped from a finca in Tolima.407 It is clear 
from these cases that relatively wealthy, landowning elites were targets by 
guerrilla groups. It was however, difficult to ascertain which one of the 
guerrilla was responsible for the kidnappings. The Córdoba incident, 
according to press reports was most certainly the work of the Ejército Popular 
de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army, EPL). This view is further reinforced 
by the close proximity between this incident and a further kidnapping in 
Antioquia. The police in Bogotá also favoured the EPL as the perpetrators as 
the incidents took place in their area of activity. However, the families of the 
kidnapped stated that the assailants identified themselves as ELN 
members.408 This case highlights one of the difficulties that confronted the 
authorities. Whilst guerrilla groups may not have been the perpetrators, they 
would also be just as happy to take the credit, enjoying the increased 
publicity. Unreliable evidence hampered the ability of the authorities to deal 
with kidnapping cases, which is perhaps one of the greatest factors in the 
prevalence of kidnapping in the country.  
 
In December 1975, the Office of the Presidency published official figures for 
nationwide kidnapping for the last half of 1974 and the first half of 1975. The 
department of Cundinamarca topped the list with the highest rate of 
kidnappings: 31 kidnappings over the twelve-month period. Whilst many 
kidnappings went unreported and other data collected by press offices 
suggest much higher levels, importantly the government statistics suggested 
that the kidnapping rate had indeed tripled.409 Moreover, ransom demands 
also increased sharply from 30,300,000 pesos in the last half of 1974 to 
101,540,000 from January to July 1975. Ransoms paid to kidnappers also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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doubled during the respective periods from 11,814,00 pesos to 22,218,00 
pesos.410 The most significant information from this data is the lack of activity 
from guerrillas in kidnapping and the indication that criminal gangs were 
largely the perpetrators of this type of criminal activity. Of the 23 positive 
identifications of kidnapping victims, only four were directly attributed to the 
FARC and one to the ELN.411  
 
At 7.45 on the morning of September 8 1975, Major General Rincón Quinones 
was shot dead in his official car on the way to work. The perpetrators of the 
killing were unknown with the only evidence available to the police constituted 
by a stolen Renault, which drew along the General’s car and ‘pumped eight 
bullets into Rincón’. The stolen car was later found abandoned. Immediate 
press reaction linked the killing to guerrilla groups, in particular the ELN.412 
However, much of this was based on speculation mainly centred on the 
General’s career in the army and anti-guerrilla operations, however no 
concrete evidence surfaced to suggest who killed the general and for what 
reason.  
 
In the mid-1970s, kidnapping fused with unrest that focused on university 
radicals to give Colombian violence an urban as well as rural flavour for the 
first time. On June 12 1975, the López administration declared the country 
under state of siege. In the midst of student demonstrations, social unrest, 
high levels of kidnappings in cities the President in a televised broadcast ‘took 
pains to deny that it would be used for political ends’.413 Initially the state of 
siege was declared in the departments of Atlántico, Valle and Antioquia 
following renewed student unrest. The Universidad Nacional in Bogotá was 
‘ground to a complete standstill’ with students and professors demanding a 
new university rector to be elected, rather be elected by the government.414 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Student unrest 
 
Kidnapping, student unrest and the increase of urban as well as rural guerrilla 
activity we all part of a general trend across Latin American in the early 
1970s. In part, this owed something to a wider climate of ideas inspired by 
Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian revolutionary. Renowned as the ‘father of 
urban guerrilla warfare’, he rejected the Maoist efforts of Castro and Ché to 
import ideas of rural struggle. Instead, Marighela attuned his ideas to the 
growing urbanization of the continent and argued that the city would be the 
revolutionary battleground in Latin America. Marighella emphasised the role of 
crime and kidnapping as a tool of escalation, goading the government into 
over-reaction. He also emphasised the importance of two other urban 
resources: the media and universities. Marighella died in a hail of gunfire in 
1969, having failed to promote an urban revolution in Brazil, but his ideas 
proved highly influential amongst the radical intelligentsia and students across 
Latin American and also in Europe.415 
 
Following the strongly contested Colombian election in 1970, universities 
across the country saw widespread unrest leading to the resignation of the 
Minister of Education. Some university lecturers lent their support to the 
student movement and became increasingly left wing in their own teaching. At 
the Universidad de los Andes and Javeriana, several professors were 
dismissed. Student links with guerrilla movements across the country 
reportedly reached as far as the Central University in Caracas, Venezuela.416 
Student unrest in Colombia during this period has been explained in terms of 
deliberate revolutionary infiltration into the universities. Indeed, student 
activism and support for guerrilla movements such as the ELN and M-19 is 
undeniable. Communist youth movements such as, the Juventudes 
Comunistas (the Communist Youth, JUCO) and the youth wing of the MRL 
movement had an active role to play in mobilising young Colombians. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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However, local and domestic grievances rather than external “subversion” 
were at the core of the student movement with educational reform playing a 
large role in mobilising staff and students in universities.  
 
Universities across Colombia were a breeding ground for protest. A major 
factor in the unrest was the neglect that Colombian education received from 
successive governments’ since the 1950s. Observers noted that both the 
Liberal and Conservative parties ‘lost real contact with the students and, to a 
large extent, with their teaching staff’.417 There was growing discontent with 
the increase of tuition fees and the ‘anti-democratic’ nature of the university 
education system. An increasing number of students felt that university 
teaching was ‘too dogmatic’. Students complained of ‘no participation 
whatsoever by professors and students in institutional decisions’, a sentiment 
that was shared by students at universities across the country.418 There was a 
growing fear amongst Church circles of the increasing links between 
revolutionary and liberation theologies. In 1971, the Catholic Pontifica 
Universidad Javeriana reacted to the protests by closing the Department of 
Sociology and Social Work. The Colombian government was ‘well-aware of 
the gravity of the university situation, and of the danger of allowing it to 
smoulder on’.419 Alarmed by the unprecedented mobilisation of students, the 
government issued a decree. This granted the secretary of education the 
power to close any and all institutions of secondary and higher education 
where strikes or activities that generally disturbed the “public order” 
occurred.420 Clashes between the demonstrators and army further escalated 
the protests. The army takeover of El Valle University, Cali reportedly led to 
death of 50 people.!421 Protests against the killing of the students quickly 
spread to other cities and generated increasing militancy. In Medellín, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 6 May 1971, ALL 1/1, FCO 7/2001, TNA. 
418 Santiago Castro-Gómez, ‘Colombia: ‘“The Cataluña Movement”, 1968: Memories 
and Legacies of a Global Revolt,’ German Historical Institute Bulletin, Bulletin 
Supplement 6 (2009) p. 48. 
419  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 6 May 1971, ALL 1/1, FCO 7/2001, TNA. 
420 Castro-Gómez, ‘Colombia: “The Cataluña Movement”,’ p. 49. 
421  Memorandum of conversation between British Embassy, Bogotá and Latin 
America Department, London, 4 March 1971, ALL 1/1, FCO 7/2001, TNA. 
 179 
students succeeded in holding a policeman hostage. Violent clashes between 
the authorities and students there lasted for hours leading to the imposition of 
a curfew.422  
 
Student disturbances were not a new phenomenon to Colombia’s urban 
centres. However, the student unrest of the 1970s was more widespread than 
ever before and was an important force in challenging the Frente Nacional 
coalition. Public universities including the Universidad Nacional, Bogotá; 
Universidad de Antioquia; Universidad del Valle, Cali; Universidad Industrial 
de Santander, Bucaramanga and even students at the elite private 
universities of Bogotá – Universidad de Los Andes, Externado and the 
Javeriana joined in countrywide protests.423 A total of fifteen universities were 
closed by the government as a response to the levels of unrest, some for two 
months. Prior to the re-opening of the universities, President Pastrana issued 
a warning on August 15 1971 in which he emphasised that ‘disorders would 
not be tolerated’. 424  The repressive action by university authorities, the 
government and police ensured that the Colombian student movement was 
short-lived. However, the movement not only reflected the growing discontent 
of young people in Colombia with issues related to education but also the 
social conditions of the country. Students provided support to the wider strikes 
and protests and provided a voice for the workers’ and peasants’ who during 
this period had their own struggles to contend with. 
 
 
Guerrilla Activity 
 
The M-19 was appeared in the early 1970s. The group quickly gained the 
attention of the authorities through its favoured tactic of public terrorism. 
Named after the day of the allegedly fraudulent election of 1970, the M-19 
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made their entrance onto the Colombian political scene in January 1974.425 A 
number of M-19 guerrillas broke into the Quinta de Bolívar, a famous 
landmark and previous residence of the Libertador, Simon Bolívar, and stole a 
sword and epaulettes once owned by the national icon. Following the theft, a 
number of press offices received anonymous called threatening the M-19 ‘will 
strike again’.426 
 
By January 1979 the M-19, became known as the ‘most volatile of Colombia’s 
numerous guerrilla groups’. Unbeknown to the authorities - and practically 
under their noses - the group successfully tunnelled under a street in Bogotá 
and entered a military armoury. The M-19 quickly left with an estimated 5,000 
weapons, which included mortars, rocket launchers, machine guns and 
ammunition. 427  In 1975, the M-19 machine-gunned a high-ranking army 
general and in 1976 carried out the murder of a prominent Colombian labour 
leader.!428 These very public and high profile actions by the M-19 caused 
considerable embarrassment for the military and posed serious questions for 
the Turbay administration, since they publicly called into question the 
government’s ability to maintain basic order.  
 
The M-19’s actions were deliberately public in nature. Following the arms 
robbery, the M-19 issued a statement claiming responsibility for the theft and 
made demands for agrarian reform, salary increases for workers, an end to 
the state of siege and abrogation of the security statute – a measure 
introduced by Turbay to impose severer sentences for civil unrest which also 
placed crimes against state security under military jurisdiction. M-19 grew in 
strength and by the late 1970s, Colombian officials were increasingly 
concerned by the number of bomb attacks, kidnapping and assassinations 
perpetrated by the country’s insurgents, general social unrest involving !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dissident students and striking workers. Coupled with the economic problem 
of inflation, these problems were highlighted by the military and civilian 
leaders of the country and represented a ‘potential threat to stability’ that has 
not existed a decade before.429 
 
The FARC also made reappearances in the early 1970s. The sudden 
recrudescence of FARC activity in the departments of Tolima, Huila and 
Caquetá with a ‘substantial operation’ during September 1971 took the 
Colombian authorities by surprise.!430  Colonel Cascante, the head of the 
Military Intelligence branch of the Army Command, reported that the 
authorities had ‘some sort of warning that the FARC might become active in 
the area but the Army detachments were not prepared’.431 On September 
1971 in the town of Nieva in the Magdalena Valley area, a security force 
patrol engaged a group of FARC guerrillas. The altercation left the security 
forces worse off with three police agents and six policemen killed.432 Western 
Boyacá, the area in the low-lying medio-Magdalena region eastern Boyacá in 
the Llanos country also saw guerrilla activity. The crucial point for both the 
armed forces and guerrillas, namely the ELN was Puerto Berrio. As the bridge 
across the Magdalena River, it forms the only road link between the two 
departments of Antioquia and Santander. Bombs attacks on major oil 
pipelines were carried out by the FARC and were part of their early strategy to 
gain attention of the government and express their opposition to their liberal 
economic ideology which did not favour the peasantry.433  
 
High-profile targets were a key component of guerrilla offensives. In October 
1971, there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt of a prominent 
Colombian general followed by an explosion of a number of time bombs and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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oil pipelines at various places across the country.434 More than twenty bullets 
were fired at General Valencia’s car, two of which injured him. Reports 
showed that any of the guerrilla groups, the ELN, FARC or EPL could have 
been responsible for the attack; however there was also fierce speculation on 
the Liberal left that right-wing forces may have wanted to provoke a military 
coup.435  External influence from Cuba, China and the Soviet Union were 
thought to be the greatest driving factors for increased guerrilla activity in 
Colombia. However in his book, Guerrilla por Dentro,436 the slain ELN guerrilla 
Jaime Arenas reveals that while the founders of the ELN had been trained in 
Cuba in the early 1960s, Cuban material aid was only provided to the 
guerrillas between 1965 and 1967 on an irregular basis with much of it failing 
to reach its destination.437 
 
An interview with Gilberto Vieira White, Secretary General of the PCC 
appeared in El Popular, the Uruguayan Communist party newspaper on 
December 23, 1970. Vieira stated that the PCC continued to support guerrilla 
activities and ‘the continuation of guerrilla warfare in a necessity in Colombia 
to defeat the violence which the government inflicts on the peasant 
regions’.438 Importantly, Vieira also expressed his support for the ANAPO for 
its ‘anti-oligarchic’ rhetoric. Although the Colombian opposition was 
fissiparous and largely divided, Vieira’s support for the guerrillas and ANAPO 
and the students’ support for the peasant and workers’ strike reflect the 
opposition faced by the Frente Nacional. 
 
Dramatic ambushes and kidnapping against political targets characterised 
guerrilla activity during the early 1970s. Typically, to take just the last week of 
January 1973, the ELN staged a successful attack on a helicopter that had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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just been loaded with gold worth 550,000 Colombian pesos from a mine in 
northern Antioquia. After killing a security guard, the guerrillas made away 
with the money.439 On the same day the ELN ambushed a police patrol in 
northwestern Boyacá, killing four police. Some twelve hours later, another 
guerrilla group, possibly the FARC, took over the village of San Pedro de 
Uraba, to the north of Turbo. The takeover followed similar patterns to other 
attacks: the guerrillas attacked the police office killing four policemen, and 
then searched the village for arms, drugs and public money. 440  Around 
150,000 Colombian pesos were stolen from the Caja Agraria (Agrarian 
Bank). 441  On January 26, an attempt was made by five youths, whose 
affiliation was unknown, to kidnap the prominent sugar baron, Álvaro Caicedo 
in the centre of Cali. The failed kidnap left Caicedo with two bullet wounds. In 
response to these attacks the government announced measure to tighten 
security. Despite increasing activity and attacks by guerrilla groups officials 
still felt that they hardly presented a strategic threat to the government.442   
 
In late September 1973, the ELN suffered a serious blow. Following months of 
preparation, an Army offensive of 5,000 troops under Operation Anorí was 
launched against the guerrilla group in the Middle Magdalena and North 
Eastern Antioquia areas, leading to the death of twenty-one guerrillas. The 
attack coincided with a full-page advertisement by the Antioquian security 
forces for a one million-peso reward for the ELN leader, Fabio Vasquez 
Castaño.443 In October, the ELN suffered another attack in which the brothers 
Antonio and Manuel Vasquez Castaño were killed during the armed 
confrontation in Antioquia. Similarly the EPL suffered significant losses. By 
October 1973, it was estimated by Colonel Riveros, Commander of the 4th 
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Brigade, that the EPL numbered ‘no more than eighteen’.444 However, local 
support for the ELN in rural regions was strong. Accord to the Colonel, in 
areas ‘long neglected by the government because of their poverty and 
difficulty of access, the ELN provided rough justice, education with a strong 
propaganda content and some drugs and medical care. The ELN has filled a 
government vacuum in these areas.’445  
 
The ELN also had an effective urban network in Medellín, the capital of 
Antioquia and the second largest city in Colombia. Whilst the city was not 
used for urban terrorist activities, at least in the early 1970s, it was essential 
for communication and intelligence. In the first half of 1973, the ELN had 
kidnapped five rich Antioquians from two families for ransom and took over 
small towns, captured arms and ammunition. Whereas the ELN during these 
early Army operations lost a third of their forces, the FARC made significant 
headway in ‘carefully planned actions mounted every six months or so’.446 
Despite the fear of Colombian officials that Russian, Chinese or Cuban 
influence may have provided the guerrillas with external assistance, there was 
‘little hard evidence’ that any group – FARC, ELN, or EPL – were receiving 
arms, ammunition, money, drugs, technical assistance or training from 
outside.447 FARC activity during the 1970s was focussed around rural activity. 
Typically, in the early hours of the morning on June 10, 1974 around 140 
FARC guerrillas occupied the town of Algeciras, around 50 kilometres south 
of Neiva, the capital of the Huila department. During the occupation there was 
a shoot-out between the local police and guerrillas and an estimated 500,000 
million pesos of goods were taken. The theft of goods and money was a 
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common tactic used by guerrillas as ‘restocking exercises for food, clothes 
and medicines’.448 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The activities of Colombian insurgent groups have been largely annexed by 
the wider debate of communist infiltration and criminality. This account of 
guerrilla activity during the 1970s has illustrated the political nature of criminal 
activity. High profile targets, military personnel and local elites were targets for 
insurgent groups, although due to the nature of these actions, it was and still 
is difficult to ascertain the culprits of kidnappings. One of key features of 
unrest in Colombia during the 1970s is the increasing urban nature of unrest. 
This is largely due to the growing dissatisfaction of urban dwellers, many of 
which were recent migrants to the country’s towns and cities from violence 
ridden rural areas in the aftermath of La Violencia. During the 1970s, the 
ANAPO movement and the ANUC emerged as the voices of the poor, 
however failed to live up to their promises to deliver social and agrarian 
reform for the masses. 
 
As Colombia emerged from the constraints of the Frente Nacional coalition, 
little had changed in terms of the political system. The traditional political 
parties remained closed as extremist factions on the left grew. A booming 
population and high levels of unemployment, despite warnings from the 
international community, were ignored. The issue of social and agrarian 
reform to alleviate the country’s social ills remained unaddressed. It is in this 
context in which we see a marked increase rural and urban insurgency. 
Although the drug trade has been singled out as the driver of violence, the 
role of the government in perpetuating conflict has not been addressed. As 
Colombia entered the 1980s, the level of state sponsored terrorism increased 
markedly in a bid to rid the country of ‘subversive activity’. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Negotiating Peace, 1980-1989 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The preceding chapters have outlined, violence in Colombia is a historical 
phenomenon that comes in many forms and these can be broadly separated 
into four categories: paramilitary violence used by landed elites against rural 
land invasions, guerrilla warfare, crime, and acts of violence committed by 
criminal gangs. This was certainly the case during the crisis of La Violencia 
and continues to plague the country to the present day. During the Frente 
Nacional years, Colombia saw the mobilisation of rural campesinos, students, 
trade unionists and insurgents. Despite the rhetoric of ‘social change’ and 
‘agrarian reform’, by the end of the 1970s, little had changed in terms of policy 
outcomes. This is largely illustrative of the paradoxical nature of the 
relationship between the Colombian state and its people. The 1980s reveal 
this paradox is its full glory. This decade saw the initiation of a long process of 
negotiations between the guerrilla organisations and the Colombian 
government and the beginning of an overtly sustained attack against attacks 
on various elements of Colombian society, including human rights activists, 
journalists, union leaders and campesinos. The political genocide of the left in 
Colombia was the result of the ideological collusion between the state and 
paramilitary forces that were bound by their common goal of countering the 
guerrilla forces as part of a subterranean struggle that had little to do with 
narcotics. Although insurgent groups, namely the FARC are associated with 
the drugs trade, paramilitary involvement in this area is far more prominent.  
 
The rise in drug cultivation and increase in violence in Colombia post 1980s 
are often cited as correlating trends. Both the “new wars” and the “greed vs. 
grievance” theories suggest that the drugs trade and the criminal activity 
associated with it drove the high levels of violence and increased levels of 
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paramilitarism in Colombia.449 However these theories have neglected the 
decades of violence that preceded the drugs trade, and in particular the role 
of the state in perpetuating violence. The idea that “greed” has fuelled conflict 
particularly disregards the demographic problem facing Colombia in the post-
La Violencia era. Indeed, correlation of increasing levels of drug production 
and violence does not mean causation. According to a department-level study 
carried out by Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres and Curtin, ‘coca cultivation is 
not a major in explaining differences in leftist guerrilla violence levels in 
Colombia’. In geographical terms, ‘there appears to be minimal physical 
overlap of coca cultivation and guerrilla violence’.450 It is important to test this 
causality given that violence in Colombia – as we have seen - has deep 
historical roots. 
 
By the 1980s, a political impasse had developed between the government 
and insurgent groups. The lack of legal employment and the downfall of the 
ANUC under the counter-reformist policies during the previous decade, in 
which over 100 local level advocates from the ANUC were killed, provided 
rural support for insurgent groups. 451  The ‘limited nature of the peasant 
achievements reflected the immense power of the Colombian landowning 
class’, which with the help of the state ‘curbed the belligerency of the 
peasantry’.452 However, the repressive measures in urban and rural areas 
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against the campesinos, trade unionists and students led to the increasing 
radicalisation of armed groups.  
 
 
Security Advances 
 
In January 1980, the Colombian government claimed spectacular security 
advances. On January 19, a presidential press announcement claimed that 
the ‘subversive movements in Colombia have been severely battered by the 
military authorities and no longer pose a threat to the security of the state’. 
The Colombian Army Intelligence Services detained 1373 persons, of whom 
221 remained in state prisons. Four ‘people’s prisons’ created by guerrilla 
groups, namely the M-19 to hold hostages had been uncovered.453 More than 
1600 military operations were undertaken by the Security Forces leading to 
the recovery of vast stocks of weapons and ammunition, as well as Army and 
Police equipment.454 On January 22 1981, further anti-guerrilla operations 
against the FARC and M-19 were launched. This involved 4000 Colombian 
soldiers in the department of Caquetá.455 The relatively low estimates for the 
number of insurgents encountered did not always correspond with their 
significantly stronger statistics for kills, capture and trials. Whilst the 
Colombian government’s wish to not disclose accurate numbers of insurgents 
is not surprising, what was remarkable was the way in which insurgent losses 
reported from the operations between 1979 and 1982 were quickly replaced 
with new fighters.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Minister of Defence, General Camacho Leyva was keen to underline the 
security advances to the political leaders in Bogotá. In a speech to the House 
of Representatives, which was later published as a booklet for dissemination 
as the ‘Security Statute’, he outlined the increased punishments to be handed 
down for ‘subversive activities’. Most interestingly, General Camacho pointed 
out that subversive groups which had ‘been in rebellion for more than 25 
years were criminal rather than political’.456 In his ‘rapid sketch’ of ‘subversive 
groups’, he defined the M-19 was ‘an urban group, specialising in kidnapping 
and holding victims in People’s Prisons.’ Members of the group, he insisted, 
had also ‘indulged in a large number of depraved activities’ such as 
‘homosexuality, prostitution, fraud and attacks on banks’.457  The Defence 
Minister’s efforts to frame insurgents in both urban and rural Colombia as 
depraved criminals illustrates the profound lack of mutual understanding 
between political elites in Bogotá and the majority of the Colombian 
population. Indeed, the latter over decades of government abandonment, 
policies and military action had become increasingly alienated from Bogotá, 
which was a direct result of government policies. 
 
Despite these much vaunted security advances, the Colombian Armed Forces 
were far from winning the war. Deficiencies in training, equipment, command 
and control significantly hampered the Colombian security forces. The armed 
forces suffered all the classic travails of counter-insurgency and often found 
themselves falling into ambushes. Moreover, guerrilla groups were quickly 
able to recuperate. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how the guerrilla groups 
were able to revive so quickly despite sustained operations by the Armed 
Forces. However, it is clear that thousands of rural dwellers were at the very 
least sympathetic to the cause of insurgent groups and a good number of 
them were willing to take up arms. 
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The Diversification of Insurgency 
 
The M-19 represented what might be described as the intellectual militants of 
the Colombian armed conflict. The group traced its origins to the allegedly 
fraudulent elections of 1970. For the Colombian government and international 
observers the M-19 was a ‘curious mix of ANAPO members, which combined 
elements of both left and right wing ideology’ and claimed to offer a ‘popular 
alternative to the Liberal and Conservative oligarchy’.458 Consisting of well 
educated, middle-class urbanites, the M-19 did not see themselves as 
‘populists’. In an interview with the Colombian magazine Cromos in mid-April 
1980, the leaders of the M-19 stated ‘we are not populists, but revolutionary 
and nationalistic guerrilla fighters’. The ‘vague’ political stand of the M-19 was 
clearly the main weakness of the group, since it lacked a strong ideological 
brand. However according to the group’s leadership at the time it was ‘not 
necessary to be on the right or the left to face up to the problem of 
dependency; what you have to be is patriotic’.459  
 
For the Colombian government, the M-19’s lack of clear ideology was by far 
the weakest element of the organisation. Whilst the M-19 called for the 
overthrow of Colombia’s traditional political elite, no viable alternative was 
offered. Despite these weaknesses, by the early 1980s and following internal 
intelligence reviews, the M-19 was still regarded by the government as ‘the 
largest, best-trained and widest urban terrorist organisation’, presenting ‘a 
serious threat to urban law and order’.460  The M-19 was geared toward 
carrying out ‘spectacular’ and symbolic attacks. In 1974 the group claimed 
responsibility for the theft of Simón Bolívar’s sword. In 1976, following a brief 
lull in activities, the M-19 reappeared and orchestrated the kidnapping of the 
leader of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (Colombian Labour 
Confederation, CTC), José Raquel Mercado, whom the group accused of 
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being ‘devoted to imperialism’ and a ‘traitor of the working class’.461 On April 
1976 his corpse was found in a public park. In 1978, the M-19 carried out a 
lightening raid on the Nicarguan Embassy and briefly kidnapped the 
Somocista Ambassador, marking a clear signal to the Colombian authorities 
of the M-19’s solidarity with the Sandinistas. In January 1979, the M-19 
carried out a tunnelling operation into a Colombian Army barracks and made 
away with around 6,000 small arms and 14,000 rounds of ammunition. Given 
the relatively small size of the M-19, which the Colombian authorities 
estimated to be 400 at the most, the success of their operations was 
startling.462 The flamboyant and very public nature of the attacks in urban 
areas alarmed the government and garnered widespread publicity for the 
group. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a chronology of the M-19’s 
successes and failures in their attempt to achieve political change in 
Colombia. However, it is important to highlight the increasing militancy of the 
M-19, beginning with their initial symbolic action of making away with the 
sword of Simón Bolívar. Whilst in official terms, government officials 
repeatedly highlighted the criminal nature of the M-19 and the threat posed by 
their actions in terms of international terrorism, there appears to be a 
misunderstanding of the political project of the M-19. For Colombian officials, 
the lack of political coherency from the M-19 as to what their alternative to the 
political status quo meant that they were seen as a criminal, rather than a 
militant political organisation. 
  
In fact their lack of coherency owed much to the heterogeneous make-up of 
the group. The founders of the M-19 consisted of around 20 well-educated, 
middle-class urbanites that came from a range of political organisations. 
These included insurgents who had served with the FARC, members of 
Colombia’s Congress; radical members of the Liberal party and previous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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supporters of the MRL; followers of the slain priest, Father Camilo Torres, 
former members of the ANAPO movement and other politically minded 
individuals. M-19 sympathisers have published a broad swathe of literature 
that engages with the political problems of Colombia and provides a 
comprehensive chronology of the evolution of the M-19. But it has to be 
conceded that, while critical in tone, there is little conceptual coherence.463  
 
It was the M-19’s next move that attracted widespread international attention. 
On 27 February 1980, the M-19 seized control of the Dominican Embassy in 
Bogotá during a reception to celebrate Dominican Independence Day. As a 
result, many hostages were caught in the net, including the ambassadors of 
Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Mexico, Switzerland, the United States, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. Together with other diplomats from Bolivia, Jamaica, 
Paraguay and Peru, they were held for 61 days. The Colombian authorities 
had supposedly received reports some ten days earlier that an attack of the 
Dominican Embassy would take place. 464  The reaction of the US 
Ambassador’s bodyguards once they realised that an attack was taking place 
was to open fire and this action resulted in the death of an M-19 member and 
a bodyguard, with several other people wounded. The exchange of fire ended 
with an M-19 member holding the US Ambassador out of a window shouting 
for a cease-fire. The M-19 issued their demands; the release of 311 political 
prisoners of various organisations in police custody or prison as well as the 
payment of $50 million US dollars. Armed with automatic weapons and 
grenades, the Colombian government took the threat to blow up the Embassy 
seriously. 
 
The hostage takers eventually flew to Cuba with their captives and were 
cheered by Colombians when they arrived at the airport. Although no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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prisoners were released, they secured a payment of $2.5 million US dollars. 
The leader of the M-19 at the time of the siege of the Embassy of the 
Dominican Republic was Carlos Toledo Plata, a former surgeon and former 
ANAPO member in the House of Representatives. According to the 
Colombian Defence Ministry in 1979 the group included a number of well-
educated professionals and academics.465 Secrecy of the highest level was 
maintained within M-19, with different cells having no knowledge of one 
another.466  
 
The M-19 was able to use this offensive to their advantage. One of the ‘novel 
features’ of the occupation of the Embassy was that the M-19 permitted their 
hostages to speak to their respective Embassies, families and government at 
least once a day by telephone as well as allowing telephone interviews with 
some foreign media outlets. This maximised the publicity of the occupation 
and also gave them leverage in negotiations by the withholding of information. 
In a surprise turn of events the M-19 also gave in the government’s demand 
that all female hostages be released as a condition for the start of dialogue. 
This is particularly important as females were also part of the M-19’s 
operation, therefore the presence of the female hostages would not have 
presented a great difficulty. Moreover, the acceptance of Red Cross supplies, 
the compassionate release of the Austrian Ambassador (whose wife was ill) 
and the M-19’s willingness to allow medical practitioners to make frequent 
visits to attend to hostages gave a human face to the guerrillas. These 
‘reasonable’ practices of the M-19 suggest that the urban insurgent group 
wanted to gain public support for their cause and come across as ‘reasonably-
minded protestors’.467 
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For the Colombian government, the siege of the embassy raised the spectre 
of ‘international terrorism’. 468  An official statement from the Colombian 
government through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diego Uribe-Vargas, 
stated that ‘the government has realised that the violent occupation of the 
embassy was a reflection of the new types of war being waged in different 
regions by terrorist groups against legal regimes’.469  The M-19 realised the 
limitations of their attack on the embassy and by March 19 1980 had reduced 
their demand of the release of 311 prisoners to 20. The M-19’s list of ‘political 
prisoners’ was not well received by the government and judiciary. According 
to Uribe-Vargas, the ‘political prisoners’ in question were not ‘misguided and 
harmless idealists, but common criminals, who in the course of their criminal 
activities, have never stopped at any moral barrier’.470 
 
Whilst the M-19 was not successful in achieving their demands, President 
Turbay recognised that the M-19 had achieved their main objective: gaining 
widespread publicity for their cause. Importantly, the M-19 had also ‘taken the 
leadership of the country’s guerrilla movements’ as some of the ‘important 
prisoners’ whose release was demanded belonged to other groups.471 The 
siege raised serious questions about the claim’s of security advancements by 
the Colombian government. The Colombian Army had boasted successes 
against the FARC as well as the M-19. Between August 1979 and February 
1980, the Army claimed to have killed 36 FARC guerrillas and captured a 
further 136.472 In October 1979, the Minister of Defence, General Camacho 
Leyva claimed that 95 per cent of the arms stolen by the M-19 in the military 
raid in January 1979 had been recovered. The trial of 219 alleged members of 
the M-19 than began in November 1979 seemed to substantiate the General’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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remarks. The accused included a former member of the Military Court, Carlos 
Villamil Franco, who according to the Colombian army was ‘M-19’s second-in-
command’.473 A total of 53 of the 219 were tried in absentia including the M-19 
leader, Carlos Toledo Plata. However, according to the Toledo Plata in an 
interview with the Spanish daily El País in December 1979, ‘only half of those 
on trial’ were members of the M-19.474 Whilst it is difficult to determine for 
certain whether Toledo Plata was correct in his estimations, the subsequent 
siege of the embassy did present some serious questions about the 
Colombian government’s ability to counter the increasing threat from the 
various armed guerrilla groups. The raid on the armoury was a blessing in 
disguise for the Colombian government as it served as the perfect pretext for 
launching an offensive on the guerrillas. The subsequent siege however 
demonstrated the limited capabilities of the government to counter its internal 
security problems and the escalation of violence, which was largely a result of 
failure of the government to address the agrarian question and urban poverty 
from La Violencia. 
 
The intellectually minded M-19 represented a challenge to the government 
and discredited the traditional political establishment. The group was able to 
garner significant publicity for its cause and importantly to demonstrate the 
humanistic element of the organisation through its open communication and 
symbolic gestures. What differentiated the M-19 from the other groups that 
were engaged in a war against the Colombian state? Firstly, it was a mix of 
both Marxist, nationalist and populist political thought. A communiqué issued 
following the arms raid in January 1979 listed the various political demands of 
the M-19 that included agrarian reform, increase in the minimum wage excess 
of the increase in the cost of living, freezing of basic food prices, restrictions 
on monopolies, respect for basic human rights and the lifting of the state of 
siege, which the country had endured throughout the Frente Nacional years 
and beyond. Whilst the demand for agrarian reform correlated with the 
demands of the other guerrilla groups such as the FARC and ELN, the M-19’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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demands specifically made reference to the growing cost of living and internal 
socio-economic situation, which in urban areas was a bourgeoning problem 
due to the increase of migration within Colombia from rural to urban areas. 
The M-19 saw itself as an umbrella organisation for the various guerrilla 
organisations and called for unity and the establishment of ‘revolutionary army 
of workers, peasants and the exploited masses’.475 
 
The continued factionalism of the left in Colombia created a political impasse. 
The M-19 recognised this as a weakness and an obstacle to achieving 
political change in Colombia. However, it was not only ideological differences 
that drove persistent factionalism; the various movements also suffered from 
significant disagreements over military strategy. Carlos Toledo Plata, the 
founder of the M-19, stated that the main difference between the M-19 and 
other leftist movements in the country, such as the FARC and the Communist 
Party, was that the latter believed that the nature of the armed struggle 
against the Colombian state should begin in rural areas in the tradition of Mao 
and emulators such as Ché.476 
 
The reaction of the international press to the siege of the Embassy of the 
Dominican Republic was largely predictable. The Sunday Times in their 
assessment of the events reported the M-19 as ‘common criminals’.477 This 
rather crude and incorrect statement is reflective of the lack of understanding 
of revolutionary movements in Latin America, which at the time were not 
limited to Colombia. Interestingly, whilst the impact of the FARC was 
recognised in ‘influencing the structure of land ownership and local politics in 
some areas’ of Colombia, in 1980 the Andean Group concluded that ‘the 
FARC provides no real threat to the security of the Colombian state’.478 The 
M-19’s fundamentally political nature is underlined by its eventual transition to 
democratic politics in the 1990s. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In the short term, the termination of the M-19 siege seemed like a major 
political triumph for President Turbay. The outcome was peaceful and his 
negotiation strategy was a success. The M-19 initial demands of $50 million 
US dollars, the release of 311 prisoners and safe conduct out of Colombia 
were staunchly opposed by the Colombian government. The M-19 finally 
settled for safe conduct to Cuba and an agreement that the OAS Human 
Rights Commission would monitor the remaining stages of the M-19 trials and 
ensure that the accused were defended in line with the law. Although the M-
19 reportedly received $2.5 million US dollars from ‘private sources’ in return 
for the release of some hostages, the Colombian government succeeded in 
holding their staunch position and not conceding to the main demands of the 
M-19.479  
 
Messages of congratulations flooded the Presidential Office in Bogotá from 
leaders of countries from around the world. However, the fact remained that 
despite intelligence reports, which warned that an attack on the embassy was 
likely, the Colombian government had failed to respond. Moreover, the 
Dominican Ambassador’s request for protection for his reception had been 
ignored. It was not only the actions of the Colombian government that brought 
the siege to a peaceful end. Without intervention from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the OAS Interamerican Human Rights 
Commission and several private Colombian citizens with experience in 
negotiating with guerrillas such as the M-19 and the FARC, a peaceful 
solution could not have been possible. Whilst President Turbay took the credit 
for arranging the cooperation of these groups and citizens, diplomats judged 
that he ‘waited much longer than seemed necessary’ to bring the parties 
together.480 
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In the long term the publicity gained by the M-19 was a serious blow to the 
government. By lowering their demands and allowed medical care to reach 
the ill hostages and releasing all female hostages, the M-19 show-cased a 
humanistic side to their military-political project. It was ultimately the M-19 
who received the credit for the bloodless outcome of the siege. Whilst 
President Turbay avoided appeasing to the demand for the release of 
prisoners, his unwillingness to insist on genuine investigations into allegations 
of wrongful arrest and torture of civilians by the security forces was not only 
foolish but gave the M-19 further credibility. The issue of human rights abuses 
in Colombia had begun to receive serious international attention from 
Amnesty International, the International Court of Justice, the Organisation of 
American States and the Catholic Church, as well as from NGOs within 
Colombia. One of the most prominent internal figures bringing attention to this 
issue was the ex-President Carlos Lleras.481  President Turbay offered to 
extend a form of amnesty, recognising ‘the quality and intelligence of the 
leaders and inviting them to pursue their aims by means of normal political 
opposition and the ballot box’ but this was not well received by leaders of the 
M-19.482 Seven of their leaders remained in jail and preparations were already 
underway for further operations.  
 
The peaceful resolution of the Embassy siege also opened up a space of 
public debate about resolution between M-19 and politicians from different 
parties. During the next few years, the Betancur government and M-19 both 
embarked on what has been called a ‘War for Peace’, which resulted in the 
government signing peace agreements with the M-19 and EPL. Yet these 
agreements were merely a truce, a tactical device in a deadly struggle for 
political and military legitimacy on the parts both of the government and the 
guerrilla movement.  
 
Guerrilla activity persisted into the summer of 1982 despite an amnesty by the 
government. Following a number of bomb attacks on police stations in the city 
of Cali in July and August 1982 and a robbery of a Caja Agraria (Agrarian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Bank) in Cauca where one million pesos were stolen in Cauca, the political 
spokesman of the M-19 announced the suspension of operations on 
September 19. Although some of the leaders of the group were hoping to take 
the government’s offer of an amnesty, this sentiment was not shared 
throughout the ranks of the M-19. Jamie Bateman, one of the founders and 
leading commanders of the M-19, felt that ‘the armed struggle with the Army 
must continue, and that, whilst the M-19 will lay down its arms to achieve 
peace, it will not surrender them’.483 
 
The campesinos in areas of guerrilla activity suffered tremendously. In the 
departments of Caquetá and Putumayo they were often caught between the 
cross fire between guerrillas and the Army. A typical situation for a peasant 
farmer in these departments would consist of giving in to guerrilla demands 
for supplies, the threat of kidnapping or murder if they did not meet the 
demands and subsequent persecution from the Army for ‘helping the 
guerrillas’. According to reports by peasants, they would be held by the army 
for interrogation ‘for several weeks’ where they would be subjected to ‘ill-
treatment and torture’.!484 The departments of Caquetá and Putumayo were 
total military movement zones with an 1800 to 0600 hours curfew, and most 
importantly with no movement on the rivers. This had a serious impact on 
economic activity, as it was very difficult for farmers to move their produce to 
Florencia, the principle market in the area to sell goods.  
 
 
Human Rights 
 
Colombia’s human rights record received little attention compared to its Latin 
American counterparts during the Cold War era. Whilst much of Latin America 
was ruled by the authoritarian and brutal military dictatorships during the 
1970s and 1980s, Colombia remained a democratic ‘anomaly’. However, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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country’s democratic status obscured the murky reality of a de facto 
authoritarian security state in which political killings were commonplace and 
resulted in the deaths of thousands. In December 1986, the British 
government pushed for answers on the death of a political refugee who 
resided in London, Heber Marin Cotrini. The 29 year old had dedicated his life 
to human rights work and was active in the Comité de Solidaridad con los 
Presos Politicos, a committee that worked with political prisoners. On the day 
Marin was due to return to England, he was found dead, showing signs of 
torture.485 Following the death of Marin and a subsequent investigation which 
was pushed for by the British Embassy, members of the Marin family and 
lawyer representing them were victims of harassment by the police.486 Within 
the first six months of 1986, Amnesty International had reported the killing of 
more than 600 Colombians, including left-wing activists, trade unionists, 
teachers, community workers and homosexuals.487 
 
In May 1984, Colombia was once again under a state of siege. This was in 
response to the murder of the Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, which 
was widely reported to be the work of drug traffickers who had offered two 
million Colombian pesos for the killing of Bonilla.488 Whilst the country was 
under a state of siege, the military was able to make full use of their extended 
powers. Throughout the year of 1985, Amnesty International was inundated 
with reports of abductions by the military. One of these cases included the 
detention of Angel Hernandez Tamayo, a community leader in one of the poor 
neighbourhoods of Medellín. According to reports, Hernandez was taken into 
custody Army’s Forth Brigade along with his wife and two children on 
November 20 1985. Although the wife and children were shortly released, 
Hernandez remained in custody by the military under the charge of the illegal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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possession of firearms. However, information provided to Amnesty 
International suggested the Hernandez’s role as the director of a local 
newspaper, La Voz del Barrio (the Neighbourhood Voice), which was critical 
of government policies and the military presence in Medellín was behind his 
detention.489 On April 14 1985, Guillermo Quiroz, a well-known leader of the 
peasant movement, ANUC was found murdered on a road from Cartagena 
and Barranquilla. Five men who identified themselves members of the military 
intelligence arrested Quiroz at his home in San Jacinto, Bolívar, however the 
arrest was not formally acknowledged by authorities and reported to human 
rights organisations as ‘disappeared’. Quiroz had previously received death 
threats from several landowners and two days prior to his abduction, the local 
ANUC headquarters were searched by uniformed army patrol that asked for 
the whereabouts of the rural leader. 
 
Alongside this, Colombia saw a new political phenomenon in the form of 
regionalism and separatism.  In April 1982, indigenous communities of 
archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina launched an 
international campaign to draw attention to the ‘anti-human treatment’ of the 
natives. Since 1947, the Colombian government had promoted the extensive 
migration of Spanish speaking, Catholic mainlanders. Local residents claimed 
that they had been dispossessed of their land through juicio de pertenencia, a 
costly mechanism in which indigenous communities would have to renew their 
documents to prove ownership of land. The Colombian government 
constructed housing on land that could not be claimed by the local population. 
Army and police brutality towards the native residents of the archipelago was 
documented in the report disseminated to the international community, 
including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. These included arrest and 
subsequent deaths from torture, numerous sexual violations, work place 
discrimination and the enforcement of Spanish as the official language.490 All 
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these developments, while quite separate in origin, undermined Colombia’s 
political cohesiveness. 
 
The state of siege was intended to bring about a reduction of violence, 
however conversely it served to increase tensions between the Colombian 
populace and the state. The widespread arrests, detention, torture, 
disappearances and murders of progressive members of society at the hands 
of the military, police, paramilitaries during the 1980s marked one of the 
institutionally repressive periods of Colombia. The Colombian authorities 
provided little answers to the questions of the whereabouts of detainees by 
family members. Under the state of siege, civilians could be held ‘for up to six 
months without being charged’. The Armed Forces acknowledged that they 
had been ‘inundated with the flood of cases’ which has been passed to the 
military courts creating an ‘enormous back-log’.491 Many of the cases reported 
by international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International 
noted the lack of acknowledgment by the police and military for the detention 
of civilians.  
 
Alongside the multiple insurgencies and alarming rates of human rights 
abuses committed by the Colombian authorities, the bitter internal divisions 
with the Liberal and Conservative parties continued through the 1980s. The 
Conservatives were split between the Ospino-Pastranistas led by ex-
President Misael Pastrana Borrero and the Alvaristas led by Alvaro Gómez 
Hurtado, the son of the ex-President Laureano Gómez.492 By 1980, the three 
proposed Liberal presidential candidates were all occupying diplomatic posts 
around the world and party lacked a cohesive electoral plan. The traditional 
political parties were now highly fissiparous and were unable to ‘formalise the 
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aspirations’ of the Colombian people, and while this was not a new problem, it 
exacerbated the increasing militarisation of some sectors of society.493  
 
This was also reflected in the texture of Colombian intellectual culture, which 
was now almost completely separated from the political mainstream. The 
landscape of Colombian universities witnessed unprecedented changes 
during the 1970s. Dr Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, renowned Colombian political 
scientist and later diplomat, was the founder of the Political Sciences Faculty 
at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá. In his analysis of the situation facing 
the country’s university Cepeda noted the rapid expansion of the university 
population in Colombia, which was approaching 300,000 students.494 Most 
importantly, noted how universities had polarised sharply to the left ‘as radical 
thought had infiltrated at both teacher and student level’. According to 
Cepeda, ‘many campuses had become virtual fortresses’ with students 
engaging in guerrilla activities with various revolutionary groups including the 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left, FARC and the ELN.495  
 
 
Negotiating Peace: Colombia’s ‘Peace President’ 
 
The 1982 elections were particularly significant for Colombia. Firstly, the 
victory of the Conservative candidate Belisario Betancur meant that for the 
first time since 1946 the Liberals had been ousted from power electorally. 
Secondly, the electoral turnout was the highest in the nation’s history. A total 
of 6.8 millions votes were cast, with some 55 per cent of the electorate casting 
their votes. This was a relief for Colombian officials given the growing political 
apathy and absenteeism of elections in the previous four decades. Thirdly, the 
balance of Colombia’s electorate had transformed from rural to urban. Despite 
the continuance of insurgent activity, particularly by the M-19 in Bogotá and 
Cali, the elections were a remarkable success in terms of little disruption and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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an overall optimistic picture in terms of political engagement from the 
electorate. Once again, this underlines Colombia’s unusual problems as a 
functioning democracy with high growth rates and yet it is plagued by endemic 
violence and social fragmentation. 
 
President Betancur announced an ambitious economic and social 
development plan following his inauguration. Seven departments and two 
intendencias affected by insurgent activity were to be the main beneficiaries of 
the plan which covered health, education, employment, training schemes, 
agriculture and livestock programmes, small business projects, rural 
electrification and road construction. The plan required the ‘close participation 
of the Armed Forces’ that were to immediately carry out four priority 
programmes in the zones which had suffered the most from the armed 
struggle. 496  This $800 million US dollar project was unsurprisingly well 
received by the electorate, however, the ‘government gave no indication’ of 
how it intended to finance it.497 In a country where tax avoidance was a 
chronic problem, it would mean the substantial diversion of relatively scarce 
resources from over-populated urban areas, which suffered from high 
unemployment rates, to under-populated rural areas.  
 
Meanwhile, President Betancur initiated the first of Colombia’s negotiations 
with the various guerrilla movements. In his inaugural address in August 
1982, the President stated ‘I extend my hand to those who have taken up 
arms, that they integrate themselves in the full exercise of their rights within 
the framework of the decisions of parliament’.498 Betancur’s first step was to 
appoint General Fernando Landazábal, an officer who had publically 
recognised both the political and military dimension of the guerrilla problem, 
as the Defence Minister. In September 1983, a reconstituted and enlarged 
Peace Commission of 40 members was established, which was to be headed 
by ex-president Carlos Lleras. In his opening speech Lleras outlines the three !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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objectives of the commission: the reintegration of guerrillas into normal life; 
transformation of the regions affected by problems of public order; and finally 
general uplift in the social and economic conditions of the country. 499 
However, following this initial air of optimism, the Peace Commission’s role in 
assisting the government’s action plan was put on hold, largely due to Lleras 
having resigned his chairmanship because of ill health. One would think that 
decades of chronic levels of violence, multiple insurgencies, and widespread 
socio-economic problems would have pushed the government to follow 
through with the Peace Commission, however in Colombia, this is simply not 
the case.  
 
The action plan for peace proposed by President Betancur was both 
ambitious and politically difficult. The proposed reintegration into society for 
guerrillas who accepted the amnesty was an enormous task. None of the 
guerrilla groups unanimously agreed on accepting the terms set by Betancur. 
Moreover, the social and economic conditions in some parts of the country 
were so dire that taking up arms was a path taken by many unemployed and 
underemployed men and women. As a result, the peace efforts delivered a 
temporary truce rather than lasting peace and reflected temporary exhaustion 
on the part of the antagonists rather than a mutual desire for resolution. 
 
For many Colombians during the 1980s, Betancur was known as the ‘Peace 
President’. His efforts towards achieving a lasting solution to the armed 
conflict between the guerrillas and Colombian state had however failed. The 
wave of popular support that greeted Betancur in 1982 electoral victory had 
waned considerably by the end of his presidential term. The failure of the 
government to hold a peace accord with the M-19 following the Siege of the 
Palace of Justice in 1985, in which almost half of the country’s Supreme Court 
justices were killed and growing levels of violence in urban areas, repeated 
claims of paramilitary-military alliances and human rights abuses tainted the 
image of the ‘Peace President’.500 It is important to note here that relatively !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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little information is available on the Siege of the Palace of Justice and much of 
the events are shrouded in mystery with regards to the disappearances of 
those who were inside the Palace of Justice at the time of the siege. However, 
it is certainly true that there was a concerted effort on the part of the 
Colombian authorities to shed responsibility for the extrajudicial killings that 
took place.  
 
In the midst of rampant killings by state authorities, the 1980s saw the 
opening of the Colombian Political system. The creation of the political wing of 
the FARC, Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, UP) represented an opening of 
the elitist Colombian political system for the first time in its history. However, 
Betancur was unable to control the political genocide that followed. In 1985 at 
the onset of the establishment of the UP, the FARC complained that their 
political wing were ‘unable to campaign openly for the March congressional 
elections because of assassinations within their ranks, perpetrated by military 
inspired agents’. The PCC also considered itself a target of bombs and 
military harassment. The fears of the left were not unfounded. Within a 
decade of the UP existence it is estimated 3000-5000 of its members were 
killed.501 The failure of the Colombian government to curb such disturbing 
levels of political violence had a lasting legacy on the future of guerrilla 
warfare in Colombia. Most importantly, it served to deepen the guerrilla’s 
mistrust of the Colombian government and for many of those serving in 
various guerrilla ranks, the political genocide was proof that the electoral path 
would not serve their cause in the long term. 
 
In the 1986 general elections, the UP only received 1.4 per cent of the vote. 
Whilst this may suggest little success, the votes were enough to grant five 
seats in the Senate, nine in the Chamber of Representatives, fourteen 
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deputies, 351 councilmen and 23 municipal mayors on a local basis.502 
However, soon after the elections, elected members of the Colombian 
parliament were killed with reports suggesting the involvement of the police or 
military personnel.503 On 30 August 1986 the newly elected official to the 
Chamber of Representatives, Leonardo Posada was shot on a street in 
Barrancabermeja in the department of Santander.504 According to reports, 
Posada had just left an official meeting and was walking along the street with 
two companions when he was shot by assassins on a motorcycle. After the 
first few shots left him slightly wounded, his assailants returned and shot him 
again. Posada died in hospital a few days later. Posada had spent much of 
his political career as a city councillor for Barrancabermeja and served on the 
Peace Commission for the Magdalena Medio region, which had suffered 
heavily from violence. Many councillors who had represented the region with 
political opposition parties had also been previously killed, allegedly as part of 
extrajudicial executions.505 
 
Killings of UP members were widespread. On 1 September 1986, Pedro Nel 
Jiménez Obando, a senator of the UP representing the department of Meta 
was shot dead by two gunmen on a motorcycle in Villavicencio, the capital of 
Meta, whilst waiting for his daughter to come out of school. Jiménez was 
convinced of the military-paramilitary alliances and was known to be gathering 
evidence to substantiate his claims. Previously the senator had provided the 
country’s Attorney General with the names of police and army officers that 
were believed to be responsible for the abduction of María Eugenia 
Castaneda who ‘disappeared’ on 14 August 1986.506 President Betancur’s 
peace process was unable to withstand these sort of determined and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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murderous attacks by extremists from the right, determined to resist the 
broadening of Colombian politics.  
 
It is largely accepted that guerrilla violence increased during the 1980s. 
However, contrary to the conventional wisdom in this area, the mid-1980s saw 
a dramatic reduction in organised guerrilla activity. Given the failure of the 
amnesty offered by the Betancur administration this outcome was the polar 
opposite of what one would expect. An uneasy peace broke out and on April 1 
1984, the FARC announced its ‘agreement in principle’ to a truce from 31 
May. This was intended to lead to a more comprehensive negotiated end to 
its military activities and permit the ‘reintegration of the guerrillas into the 
constitutional life of the country’.507 Similar agreements followed with the M-19 
whilst the ELN remained defiant. Although guerrilla activity certainly 
decreased, it did not cease and military training and the stockpiling of 
weapons continued in earnest. The guerrillas had not disarmed and significant 
amounts of the national territory remained under the control of the guerrillas 
who were later able to use this to bargain with the government.  
 
Remarkably, during the same period there was an alarming increase in 
‘miscellaneous violence and especially kidnapping for ransom’.508 Given that 
many cases were unreported in the press and set against the background of a 
high degree of news management on part of the government - this is 
particularly significant as an indicator of trends of violence during the 1980s. 
In particular, this would suggest an undue prominence given to violence 
perpetrated by paramilitaries and criminal gangs rather than isolated criminal 
acts by individuals. 
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Economic Woes and Violence 
 
The main problems faced by President Betancur were violence linked to the 
country’s historical economic and social ills. His exceptionally high levels of 
support in the poll for the presidency, the signal of an upward trend towards 
increased political participation from the electorate and the attempts to 
achieve peace by the government, certainly brought a sense of optimism. In 
terms of the economy, whilst Colombia’s situation was far better than her 
Latin American counterparts, the fiscal deficit of $295 million US dollars was a 
cause of concern for the Betancur administration as the most ‘immediate 
difficulty’ facing the government was a case of ‘simply lack of pesos’.509 The 
early 1980s also saw cutbacks in the manufacturing industry, which was an 
expected symptom of the global recession but also due to structural 
weaknesses. The Colombian textile industry had priced itself out of the market 
and by 1982 it found itself at the mercy of ‘contraband and relentless 
competition from the Far East’. Moreover, interest rates remained high with 
unemployment and sub-employment ‘patently growing’.510 Betancur therefore 
faced the formidable task of simultaneously stimulating the economy, 
reducing inflation and increasing the tax yield. This most certainly could have 
not have been achieved at once or even within one term of his presidency. 
 
The old habit of not paying taxes was by far one of the most pervasive and 
damaging of Colombia’s economic problems. Indeed, no Colombian 
administration had managed to effectively tackle this issue. Like its Latin 
American counterparts, Colombia relied on indirect taxes, however corruption 
and the ease in which fraudulent papers could be created caused the 
government to lose much of its income. During Betancur’s administration a 
number of tax policies were put into place to stimulate the economy. His plan 
to increase the export tax rebate from 6 to 15 per cent was intended to help 
businesses, and whilst it was welcomed by industries its most immediate 
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effect was to further reduce tax receipts.511 His policy failed to appease the 
elites as when Betancur attempted bring about new taxes his relationship with 
Congress soured. Betancur’s relationship with the legislative branch was 
particularly important during his administration, since he also needed 
Congress on side to pass legislation to bring about a peace treaty with the 
various guerrilla groups.  
 
The government’s pledge to inject huge sums of money for infrastructural 
work was a core element in its strategy to reduce the guerrilla influence. 
Accordingly, the country’s economic situation certainly raised wider questions 
of the government’s ability to follow through on its security pledges. For 
example, Betancur’s promise of low cost housing was in serious jeopardy only 
months after this electoral victory because the Housing Corporation had ‘no 
money to buy land or finance construction.512 In October 1985, the Colombian 
foreign minister, Ramírez Ocampo made an appeal for international aid to 
fund the country’s ‘rural pacification’ project. Ocampo’s message was clear: 
‘the basic cause of Colombian rural violence was social deprivation’.513 With 
the help of the UNDP, the government drew up a social plan for peace and 
identified the minimum essential infrastructure required in areas that suffered 
from violence. The estimated cost was $730 million US dollars, $410 of which 
would need to be raised externally.514 
 
Ocampo’s request was not well received by the international community. 
According to one British official the response to Ocampo’s appeal was 
‘several buckets of water tipped over his head’. 515  For many developed 
countries, Colombia simply did not meet the requirements for international aid. 
Typically, for the Austrian and Danish governments Colombia’s per capita 
GDP specifically ruled out the option of bilateral aid. In his response, Ocampo 
stated that he realised that ‘this was not a field to attract commercial loans’, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and ‘whatever Colombia’s overall per capita income the infrastructure required 
in the affected areas was beyond its resources’. 516  This encapsulated 
Colombia’s dilemma - the country was too strong to attract aid but too weak to 
attract loans and inward investment. President Betancur’s attempt at 
achieving internal security through peace processes and infrastructural 
reforms were largely a failure. Colombia did not have the means to fund such 
projects and the state security services were ideologically aligned to 
paramilitary forces that unleashed violence on progressive members of 
Colombian society and leftist politicians. 
 
 
The Military-Paramilitary Alliance  
 
By 1982, Medellín, once the industrial powerhouse of Colombian industry, had 
transformed itself into one of the most dangerous cities in the country. The 
chairman of Medellín city council, Álavro Restrepo Londoño proclaimed that 
the city was ‘passing the worst crisis of its history; it is a moral crisis, an 
unemployment crisis and an economic crisis, which the state seems incapable 
of solving. There is even a reasonable doubt over who really holds power 
here – the local authorities, the military, the subversive groups or the 
mafias’.517 The ‘mafia’ Restrepo made reference to yet another armed faction 
that emerged during the early 1980s: Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS, Death 
to Kidnappers). This underlined the way in which, in Colombia, violence 
spawned further violence. 
 
Those associated with unions were particularly vulnerable to kidnapping and 
murder. In January 1982, the leader of the Tobacco Workers’ Union, Luis 
Javier Cifuentes, was kidnapped and brutally murdered. His death was 
followed by the killing of four other union leaders in Medellín. According to 
reports, three of the union leaders were taken away by ‘well-organised groups !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of heavily-armed men, who identified themselves as members of army 
intelligence, B-2’. During the same period at least twelve other union officials 
from CSTC received death threats for their ‘participation in the subversive 
general strike in October 1981’.518 The death threats typically proclaimed that 
‘communists have no homeland, and so have no place in Colombia. They will 
die’. Union representatives pointed out that ‘Medellín’s problems were closely 
associated with the crisis of the city’s traditional base, particularly in 
textiles’.519  
 
In the early 1980s, Medellín suffered an industrial decline. This resulted in the 
closure of factories and large-scale unemployment in an area that was the 
country’s traditional industrial powerhouse. Violent crime was not new to 
Medellín. However, the decision of drug baron’s to take a hand in social and 
political conflicts injected a new element to an already appalling situation, the 
rise of paramilitarism. Paramilitaries, the use of armed civilians by political 
elites, local leaders and the Armed Forces, is hardly a ‘new’ phenomenon in 
Colombia.  Local residents have provided authorities with intelligence, local 
knowledge and logistical support for decades particularly in rural areas. The 
growing threat from guerrilla groups and their support base in rural areas 
further increased the central importance of armed civilians as allies.520 The 
declaration of a state of siege in Colombia throughout its six decade long 
conflict has allowed the government to pass a series of decrees that have laid 
the legal foundations for the ‘active involvement of civilians in the war’.521 
 
Since 1948 a state of siege has been renewed periodically making it an 
almost permanent feature of political life in Colombia. The state of siege is a 
juridical institution, which is ‘put into effect to deal with irregular situations in 
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the public life of the country’.522 Under state of siege, the Executive is able to 
implement decrees that ‘abrogate rights by transferring broad judicial and 
political powers to the military, with no or little civilian oversight’.523 President 
Turbay’s Decree 1923, aptly named the Security Statute, gave the police 
judicial powers to deal with the ‘disturbance of public order’ covering a broad 
range of social protest. For the leading Colombian historian Francisco Leal 
Buitrago, these conditions allowed the Armed Forces ‘to expand its autonomy 
in matters of public order to unprecedented levels’.524 Decree 1290 passed in 
1965 cleared the way for civilians accused of ‘subversive activities’ or 
supporting guerrilla groups to be sent to military courts where proceedings 
were secret and legal rights for the defendants were suspended. Courts 
martial for civilians continued until 1987 and were reintroduced in 1996. This 
is most troubling as the term ‘subversive activities’ came to encompass a wide 
range of actions by civilians. ‘Government critics, trade unionists, community 
organisers, opposition politicians, civic leaders, and human rights activists’ 
along with ‘non-violent protestors for land, education, human rights, better 
wages, health care, public services’ were labelled as subversives.525 For the 
Defence Minster, General Camacho Leyva social protest was the ‘unarmed 
branch of subversion’.526 
 
Most importantly, decrees declared during a state of siege have often been 
converted into permanent forms of legislation that have subsequently 
formalised paramilitarism and the use of armed civilians in Colombia. Decree 
3398 in 1965 temporarily legalised the arming of civilians by the Ministry of 
Defence. 527  However, in 1968 Law 48 made Decree 3398 permanent 
legislation authorising ‘the executive to create civil patrols by decree and for 
the Defence Ministry to provide them with weapons restricted to the exclusive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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use of the armed forces’. Law 48 has been frequently cited by the Armed 
Forces as the ‘legal support for all paramilitaries’ in Colombia.528  
 
The 1980s was marked by increasing collusion between the state and 
paramilitary forces in terms of tactics. The MAS appeared on the scene on 
December 3, 1981. A helicopter flew over the city of Cali dropping leaflets 
announcing the formation of the paramilitary death squad. The MAS was 
formed by drug king pins in response to the kidnapping of Martha Nieves 
Ochoa by the M-19. This person was the sister of the infamous Ochoa 
brothers of the Medellín drug cartel. According to an investigative report by 
the Miami Herald, entitled ‘The World’s Deadliest Criminals: The Medellín 
Cartel’, a general assembly of Colombia’s drug traffickers took place in 1981 
to counter the guerrilla threat.529 One of the first fruits of their activities was 
the capture of the wife of an alleged guerrilla. She was found chained up in 
Medellín and handed over to the authorities whilst MAS continued to hold her 
husband.530 Thereafter, MAS ordered the kidnapping and murders of M-19 
members, leading to the release of Nieves and a clear victory for the drug 
king pins.  
 
The MAS model, perceived as brutal but effective, was soon adopted by the 
military. The first unit to do so was the Bárbula Battalion in Santander’s Puerto 
Boyacá. The town’s mayor, Captain Oscar de Jesús Echandía proposed this 
at a meeting of ‘local Liberal and Conservative party leaders, businessmen, 
ranchers, and representatives from the Texas Petroleum Company’ in 
1982.531 In order to rid the area of ‘subversives’, a paramilitary organisation 
was created with tactical support of the military.532 The name adopted for this 
paramilitary organisation was MAS; the same name used by the drug !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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traffickers. Money was raised through businessmen and ranchers to gather 
food, clothes, arms and funds ‘to pay young men to fight’.533 By 1983, MAS 
was conducting joint operations with the military against opponents, including 
progressive members of the Liberal party and political activists. These early 
operations marked the beginning of a deadly cycle of paramilitary violence 
that would cost the thousands of lives. 
 
Many civilians who were trained under MAS later carved lucrative careers as 
paramilitaries. Among the civilians who received training from the military 
were the Castaño brothers who went on to form the largest paramilitary 
organisation in Colombia, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, 
United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia). Vicente, Carlos and Fidel Castaño 
were the sons of an Antioquian cattle rancher who was kidnapped and 
subsequently killed by the FARC in 1981. Vowing to take revenge for the 
death of their father, in the mid 1980s the Castaño the brothers formed the 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (ACCU, Peasant Self 
Defence Groups of Córdoba y Urabá) in the departments of Antioquia and 
Cordobá, where the Castaño family owned land.  
 
By 1982 the Colombian government registered 240 groups associated with 
MAS. The newly inaugurated President Betancur ordered the Procuraduría, 
the government agency charged to investigate reports of abuses by 
government agencies, to open an investigation.534 The Procuraduría, Carlos 
Jiménez Gómez presented his findings on February 20 1983. Out of the 163 
individuals found to have links to hit squad MAS, 59 were active duty police 
and military officers.535  Despite the damning report of the practice of the 
Armed Forces in Colombia, Jiménez’s report did not achieve justice of any 
kind.536 His attempt to launch a larger investigation was met with resistance 
and the Disciplinary Tribunal ruled the case belonged to the military. This 
resulted in all charges to be dismissed. According to a comprehensive Human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rights Watch report on the military-paramilitary partnership in the 1980s, 
many of the officers highlighted in the Jiménez report went on to commit 
further atrocities. These include Captain Echandía, commander of the Bárbula 
Battalion in Puerto Boyacá; Colonel Alvaro Velandia, commander of the 
Patriotas de Honda Battalion in Honda, Tolima; and Colonel Ramón Emilio Gil 
Bermúdez, commander of the Comando Operativo No. 10 in Cimitarra, 
Santander. 537  The failure of the Colombian government to address the 
problem of impunity in the police and Armed Forces was an age-old problem 
that bred a deep mistrust for the authorities. It is representative of the 
government’s inability to arbitrate conflict between various groups and the 
implicit involvement of state forces in widespread and grotesque human rights 
abuses. 
 
The operations of MAS and guerrilla organisations spanned Colombian 
society. Investigative journalists also found themselves embroiled in the 
conflict. In March 1982, María Jimena Duzan, a journalist for the national daily 
El Espectador, was kidnapped by the M-19 and flown to the Caquetá to 
interview M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. Her kidnapping and subsequent 
reporting resulted in the publication of several articles on her experiences in 
El Espectador. Jimena’s reporting of the M-19 brought her to the attention of 
MAS who responded by placing a bomb at the front door of her home.538 In 
the week prior to the Congressional elections held on March 14, MAS claimed 
responsibility for the death of the lawyer Jorge Enrique Cipagauta, who was 
defending the M-19 leaders at the military trial in La Picota prison, Bogotá. He 
was victim to a drive-by shooting by two men on motorcycles whilst he was at 
the wheel of his car. Following Cipagauta’s assassination, his colleague 
lawyer Miguel Cano Morales told Radio Caracol that MAS was ‘no less than a 
part of the B-2 security branch of the Army who were intent on murdering 
trade unionists, lawyers and other professionals. Following this allegation, the 
Defence Minister dismissed the matter of Cipagauta’s death and implied that 
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Cano was ‘a habitual liar’.539  Cipagauta was not the last of the lawyers 
defending the M-19 in the La Picota military trial who were threatened or 
killed.  
 
The Colombian Armed Forces were under pressure to address MAS from the 
outset of its establishment. No member of the MAS was arrested since its 
inception in November/December 1981. In order to dispel the widely held 
belief that the Armed Forces were ‘either actively, or passively’ involved, the 
Minister of Defence, General Fernando Landazábal, issued a letter with 24 
documents to the Attorney General, Carlos Jiménez. These documents were 
said to be evidence gathered by the Armed Forces on MAS signalling the 
cooperation of the army with investigations.540 General Landazábal’s letter 
was subsequently published in the Colombian press and was specifically 
intended to distance the Colombian Armed Forces from paramilitary groups. 
He not only made reference to members of MAS but also shed light on two 
other groups, MAOS (Death to Cattle Rustlers) and CAFIES (Punishment to 
Swindlers) who had also declared war on the insurgent groups.541 By the end 
of the 1980s, the political genocide of the left and the military-paramilitary 
links had escalated the already spiralling levels of violence, which now 
involved the widespread killing of insurgents, campesinos, human rights 
activists, politicians, judges, journalists and trade unionists. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Violence in Colombia post-1980 has been traditionally framed in terms of the 
‘War on Drugs’. For US foreign policy practitioners and specialists as well as 
theorists of civil conflict, the Colombian conflict is emblematic of a war driven 
by criminality. By contrast, this chapter has outlined the increasing political 
and social nature of the Colombian conflict in the 1980s. The importance of 
the ideological collusion between the state and paramilitary forces resulted in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the killings of thousands of civilians and leftist politicians. Violence in 
Colombia during the 1980s was fused with political ideology. Indeed, 
progressive members of the Colombian government still maintained the 
importance of underlying social and economic problems as a key driver of 
internal insecurity.  
 
President Betancur – the Peace President brought in a wave of optimism 
during the country’s first peace process. However, the subsequent failure of 
the government to protect the political wing of the guerrillas led to a political 
genocide of the left wing and progressive members of Colombian society, 
which continues until today. Indeed, the extreme violence perpetrated against 
the left during the 1980s lingers in the memory of those sitting at the 
negotiation tables in Havana today during the country’s most recent attempt to 
secure peace. It is important to note that despite the repeated failure of this 
approach to resolving the conflict, negotiations are still in progress and are 
supported as the means to peace by the political establishment.  
 
 
 
 !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
Chapter Eight 
 
Waging War, 1990-2002 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
During the 1990s the crisis facing the Colombian nation intensified. The rise of 
powerful paramilitaries with the help of the Armed Forces, insurgent attacks 
and widespread human rights abuses corroded all aspects of social life and 
threatened the integrity of the nation itself. Whilst the drugs trade has affected 
virtually every aspect of Colombian life, the problems facing the country, 
including the oldest and largest insurgency in the Americas and growing 
paramilitary forces, have deeper historical roots that stretch back over 
decades.542 The lives of most Colombians following the Second World War, 
and especially since the assassination of the Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 
1948, have been spent under a dark cloud of social violence and whilst the 
historical roots to the violence in Colombia are important, this new period 
signalled an acceleration which entrapped an entire society in a vicious cycle 
of action and counter-action. 
 
While this thesis asserts the fundamental importance of the agrarian question 
and economic and security grievances, nevertheless, the growing intensity of 
violence provoked important international repercussions. This included 
strained diplomatic ties between Colombia and neighbouring countries, such 
as Venezuela and Ecuador, the diverting of economic aid by multilateral 
organisations, warnings from various government as well as non-
governmental organisations regarding the violations of international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
542 Garry Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (London: Zed Books, 2011); 
Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez and Ricardo Peñaranda, LAS FARC (1949-1966): De la 
Autodefensa a la Combinación de Todas las Formas de Lucha (Bogotá: Instituto de 
Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, 1991); Jacobo Arenas, Cese el 
Fuego: Una Historica Política de las FARC (Bogotá: Oveja Negra, 1985); Daniel 
Pécaut, Las FARC: ¿Una Guerrilla sin fin o sin fines? (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial 
Norma, 2008); Alfredo Rangel, ‘Las FARC-EP: Una Mirada Actual’ in Malcolm Deas 
and María Victoria Llorente, (eds.) Reconocer la Guerra para Construir la Paz 
(Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1999) pp. 21-51. 
 220 
humanitarian laws, together with widespread ecological damage from the 
cultivation of illicit drugs and problematic eradication methods.543 Colombia 
increasingly gained world attention during the 1990s as one of the most 
dangerous countries in the world. The internationalisation of the conflict 
fostered a complex movement for peace. As illustrated in chapter one of this 
thesis the varying diagnoses of the Colombian conflict has resulted in a wide 
array of policy prescriptions, which range from counterinsurgency operations, 
counternarcotic programmes, revised international drug laws and negotiations 
between the state and country’s armed actors. 
 
The 1990s signalled the continuation and intensity of violence in Colombia. 
The academic interest in the civil war in the post-Cold War era is 
representative of broader shifts within academia and policy-making circles in a 
post-Cold War world. The emerging consensus that the complexity of intra-
state conflict in the countries of the global South could no longer be explained 
through traditional interstate power relations led to the emergence of new 
explanatory paradigms. In the case of the Colombia, the democratic nature of 
governance has obscured the murky reality of a security state. Insurgency, 
organised crime and social violence are often intertwined and can be part of 
single situation.544 
 
The 1990s saw the continuation of negotiations from the previous decade with 
some success. Peace agreements were signed with M-19 and splinter armed 
groups, however failed to include larger insurgent groups, such as the FARC 
and ELN.545  Paramilitary violence expanded under an official government 
programme, Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (Special 
Vigilante and Private Security Services, CONVIVIR), which effectively 
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legalised paramilitarism.546 Colombia’s dysfunctional democracy is a paradox. 
The unending nature of negotiations in the Colombian case offers the image 
of bargaining with violence, however state sponsored terrorism 
simultaneously persists. Whilst the country is an example of successful 
negotiations, the conflict is also representative of a never-ending war. Indeed, 
partial negotiations in the country have not dealt with the overall breadth of 
the violence. Importantly, negotiations and advancements by the Colombian 
government and military have often served to reposition the principle actors in 
the conflict by creating new divisions and delegitimising the political forces 
from below.547 
 
 
Insurgency in the post-Cold War Era 
 
The increase of drug cultivation and violence based on national level statistics 
is widely taken to indicate a lack of ideology in driving violence. This is highly 
problematic since it neglects the historical processes of the Colombian conflict 
unaddressed and negatively impacts the chances of successful international 
and government conflict resolution policies.548 Ideology is still at the core of 
the Colombian insurgency and paramilitary violence. Indeed, as the preceding 
chapter illustrated, the ideological collusion between the state and paramilitary 
forces drove much of the human rights abuses and continues to do so until 
present day. The country’s largest insurgent group, the FARC, acknowledges 
the ‘ideological crisis brought by the end of the Soviet Union’.549 However, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FARC’s socialism is characterised by a ‘redefinition of the role of the state and 
a strategic opposition to economic imperialism’.550 Central to this ideology is a 
pan-regionalist discourse of Bolivarianism, which is built upon the legacy of 
the leader of independence, Simón Bolívar. The discrediting and narrow 
definition of ideology in security literature is largely reflective of a lack of 
understanding of countries in the global South and the persistent applications 
of external grand narratives to explain conflicts. 
 
The adoption of a Bolivarianism ideological model enabled the FARC to 
strengthen in social, political, economic and military terms. The combination of 
nationalist and left-wing ideals saw the abandonment of the traditional 
ideological goal of the establishment of a classical socialist-state model. 
Bolivarianism makes the FARC unique in comparison to other long-standing 
insurgencies around the world.551 It has allowed the FARC to construct a 
broad agenda that encompasses a wide range of issues from political 
participation, agricultural development policies and social protection for the 
lower social classes. The ideological evolution of FARC from Marxist-Leninists 
to Socialists has also impacted the nature of its competition with the 
Colombian state.552 For the FARC, with its highly ideological framework, the 
Colombian authorities are seen as a power with a non-legitimate origin 
defending the interests of an oligarchy against the majority of the population. 
Whilst in the post-Cold War era the FARC have not formally rejected this 
discourse, they have heightened their critique of the government’s 
incompetence in what they view as the nation’s most pressing problems - 
social inequality, crime, and deficient public services, whilst presenting 
themselves as a more credible alternative for good government for the 
majority of the population.553 
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During the 1990s, the FARC also increased its capacity in providing social 
services to the population in areas as health, education, and public order. The 
guerrillas have historically presented themselves as a fairer and more efficient 
alternative to the Colombian government and established themselves as a 
parallel state, providing social services. Although the manner in which these 
services were provided and the proposals for the construction of a new 
government were developed from a set of a less narrow ideological criteria, 
they ultimately clashed with the prevailing political culture of Colombia. What 
differentiates the FARC is that its search for ‘good government’ has been the 
primary focus of their political ideology.554 
 
Ideology is a key component of the Colombian conflict. The preceding and 
current chapters have highlighted the increasing political nature of the conflict 
from 1946 through an exploration of the relationship between the Colombian 
state and its people – the dysfunctional democracy. Ideology has been 
important throughout the evolution of this current phase of cycle for the 
Colombian state, paramilitary forces and insurgent groups. One of the 
greatest challenges for ending any civil conflict is establishing a consensus 
over the diagnostics of the conflict. The notion of civil wars being driven by 
“greed” or “criminality”, problematically strips conflict of ideology and is 
reflected of an arguably ethnocentric view of the global South, as external 
paradigms take precedent as explanatory frameworks. In the 1990s, a new 
paradigm emerged within development and US foreign policy literature - failed 
states. 
 
 
The Failed State Paradigm and the Colombian Conflict in the 1990s 
 
A strong Colombian state has never existed for a large majority of the 
country’s citizens. We have already seen how the country’s long tradition of 
private justice and a rural violence, which has involved the active assistance 
of the authorities in suppressing social movements, strikes, student protests !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and peasant leagues over decades. Since 1946, Colombia’s governance over 
the previous seven decades has been largely under a state of siege, that has 
allowed the state to introduce repressive measures whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the importance of the agrarian question and social and 
economic grievances. The country’s dysfunctional democracy was further 
undermined during the 1990s, leading to some claims of Colombia’s situation 
to warrant the label ‘failed state’.555  
 
The ‘failed state’ paradigm is representative of yet another external grand 
narrative applied to the global South. The prevalence of this notion in the 
post-Cold War era is based on the persistence of Cold War discourse on the 
nation state, that revolves around binary oppositions of failed and successful 
that are decided by Western states.556 In the case of Colombia, the ‘failed 
state’ paradigm, as in the case with US foreign policy literature and theories of 
civil conflict, tends to focus on the symptoms of state failure – the drugs trade, 
rather than the conditions that have led to state failure. Colombia holds the 
oldest, and arguably strongest, democratic tradition in the region. The country 
has experienced stable economic growth over decades as well as the 
widespread use of violence by the authorities and civilians. In the midst of 
state sponsored violence, the avoidance of real reform in the agrarian sector 
led to the increasing radicalisation of rural campesinos. In this context, 
perhaps, Colombia is best conceptualized as a ‘successful failed state’.  
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For Colombianists and regional specialists, the shortcomings of the state are 
part of a historical process of violent state building.557  The terms ‘partial 
collapse’558 and ‘precarious state’559 have been applied to provide explanatory 
paradigms on the Colombian state during La Violencia and the Frente 
Nacional period. Historical analyses of the state in this literature have taken 
into account the differences between state presence in regions of the country 
and how local populations have been integrated into national life through the 
Liberal and Conservative parties, local power networks and social 
movements.560 The application of external grand narratives and the labelling 
of Colombia as a ‘failed state’ during the 1990s emphasised the impact of the 
drugs trade on the state. Whilst this is certainly an important element of the 
conflict, the term itself is nevertheless problematic. The historical and internal 
processes of violence are ultimately misplaced as the diagnoses of the 
problem is the drugs trade, rather than economic and security grievances. 
 
 
The Constitution of 1991 and Reforms 
 
Colombia entered the 1990s in the midst of a bloody electoral campaign. In 
the three years leading up to the election of May 1990, three presidential 
candidates were assassinated, including the Liberal candidate, Luis Carlos 
Galán, who was widely expected to win, 19 car bombs resulted in the death of 
300 people, hired hitmen killed 250 policemen, insurgent groups blew the 
Caño Limón Coveñas oil pipeline 125 times and paramilitary violence against 
the Colombian left killed thousands.561 In August 1990, the Colombian courts 
were dealing with approximately 1,200,000 criminal trials, however none of 
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the people related to these cases was in the custody of the Colombian 
authorities.562 
 
In the ensuing climate of crisis, less than 25 per cent of the Colombian 
electorate voted to approve the creation of a Constituent Assembly. The 70 
chosen delegates were empowered to draft a new constitution for the country. 
The Assembly produced an inclusive initiative that sought ‘to strengthen the 
unity of the Nation, and ensure its people life, community (convivencia), work, 
justice, equality, knowledge, liberty, and peace within a democratic and 
participatory juridical framework that guarantees a politically, economically, 
and socially just order’. 563  Paradoxically, by the end of the decade the 
Colombian state exercised less control over its territory.  
 
For policy makers in Bogotá and Washington, the Constitution of 1991 
represented some successes. It ‘strengthened the checks and balances of the 
political system in an effort to endow political institutions with greater 
legitimacy after decades of limited participation and low representation’.564 
However, within Colombia there was considerable frustration with the 
unfulfilled promise of peace.565  Perhaps the most important failure of the 
Constitution of 1991 was the continuing electoral weakness of third parties 
which persisted despite the reforms, and which has permitted the two 
traditional parties to continue to dominate the political scene, especially 
Congress, which was in charge of the implementation of other aspects of 
reform. The absence of the country’s largest guerrilla group, the FARC, from 
the Constituent Assembly along with the absence of the paramilitaries was 
also particularly unhelpful given their central role in the ongoing violence. 
Moreover, severe restrictions were placed on the issues of major economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and agrarian reform and the Colombian military remained untouchable.566 In 
hindsight, it is hardly surprising that the Constitution of 1991 was a failure in 
terms of achieving ‘peace pact’. The rhetoric of change from the government 
raised the expectations of the rural classes and ultimately failed them, as it 
was this group that suffer the most in terms of human rights abuses and 
economic and security grievances. The Constitution of 1991 was largely 
brought into place due to necessity rather than political drive. Indeed, the 
fragmentation of the Colombian political system was also evident within the 
Constituent Assembly. The notable absence of the main armed factions 
resulted in what can be better described as a ‘political pact’ rather than a 
‘peace pact’. 
 
The Constitution did little to change the corrupt and clientelist nature of 
Colombian politics. Post-constituent Congresses that were elected in 1991, 
1994 and 1998 and were increasingly dominated by the traditional political 
class that the Constituent Assembly had attempted to displace in 1991.567 The 
politicians, through the process of gradually recovering control in Congress 
were able to block the implementation of many aspects of the new 
Constitution. The imbalance between an overly powerful president and a 
weak Congress further hindered attempts to address the nation’s problems in 
terms of policy implementation. According to Archer and Shugart, although 
Colombian presidents hold significant constitutional powers over legislation, 
they frequently appear unable to accomplish policy agendas that are 
nominally endorsed by their own parties due to low partisan powers and the 
difficulty in achieving stable majorities in Congress.568 Presidents therefore 
rely on ad hoc deals with power brokers and who demand patronage - further 
illustrating the manner in which powers have been crafted in such a way to 
serve the interests of the clientelistic rank-and-file party members.  
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The Colombian Constitution of 1991 represented a serious attempt at the 
democratisation of the political system. The election of a Constituent 
Assembly in the country was an unprecedented political development. The 
Constitution sought to widen and restructure the channels of political 
participation and create oversight of the state by society, which were 
translated into an extensive Bill of Rights. In legal terms, it was a quantum 
leap towards institutionalising democratic participation and strengthening the 
rule of law in Colombia. The political diversity of the Constituent Assembly 
included former members of the M-19 and activists that marked a significant 
shift toward a more democratic state. However, the question of agrarian 
reform continued to loom large. The disparities between rich and poor, 
economic and security grievances as well as the political genocide of the left 
continued throughout the 1990s. The increase in violence during the 1990s 
could be explained in terms of the gap between heightened expectation and 
the political reality of the achievements of the new Constitution, however also 
of particular relevance is the economic stagnation of the country, which 
coincided with an increasing insecurity. The 1990s therefore, despite 
important changes, marked a low point in the overall effectiveness of the 
Colombian national government.  
 
 
The Agrarian Question  
 
Lamentably, given the importance of the agrarian issue in Colombia in relation 
to the evolution of violence in the country, it is rarely mentioned in the 
scholarly work on Colombia during the 1990s. Theorists of civil conflict and 
US foreign policy specialists draw correlations between the increase in drug 
cultivation and violence, there placing emphasis on the political economy of 
the civil conflict. For critics of the US foreign policy, the continuation of US 
counterinsurgency assistance drove much of the violence.569 The hegemonic 
power of the US and its support for corrupt Colombian administrations in the 
midst of widespread human rights abuses is given special attention. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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thesis has illustrated the importance of the agrarian issue and economic and 
security grievances as a fundamental motor of violence since 1946. The 
1990s were no different. The avoidance of serious reform and the inclusion of 
the main warring factions in the political processes of 1991 were deeply 
problematic.  
 
It is remarkable that given the importance of land in the cultivation and 
production of narcotics that the agrarian issue is not given much attention. 
Coca, marijuana and poppy, like any other crop, must be cultivated. The 
increase in drug production has had an unprecedented impact on the 
distribution of land in Colombia. The landed elite that built their fortunes 
through the drugs trade and mining commodities such as emeralds, amassed 
huge swaths of fertile land in contested areas, including the departments of 
Magdalena,570 Cesar, Urabá, Putumayo, Meta, Córdoba, Bolívar and Boyacá. 
A World Bank report in 1994 showed that between from the reforms of the 
1960 to 1990, INCORA an estimated 1.07 million hectares of land to 60,000 
families. Additionally, it also created 256 reserves that covered 2.5 million 
hectares of land.!571 As discussed in chapters six and seven, whilst these 
reforms benefitted 37,000 rural families, the counter-reform period of the 
1970s negated much of the work here to improve the lives of rural 
Colombians. This problem was further amplified during the 1980s onwards. 
According to World Bank estimates, recent landowners through the drugs 
trade and mining industry acquired 4.4 million hectares of land, worth a 
staggering $2.4 billion US dollars.572  
 
This trend of drug cultivation is important in terms of the agrarian question. It 
has ultimately led to the transformation of Colombia as ‘net importer of its 
main foodstuffs and ruining its traditional cash crops’ in the process. This has 
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further exacerbated the rural problem and land concentration. 573  The 
Colombian government has historically avoided real agrarian reform and 
despite the increasing complexities of this given the increase in the cultivation 
of drugs, successive Colombian governments compounded the rural problem 
with the introduction of extractive industries, creating further divisions between 
the state and the rural population. The subsistence peasant economy was 
undermined during the 1990s through the developmental strategies of the 
state. Land occupied by campesinos, indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities were targeted throughout the 1990s; land speculators, 
agribusinesses, multinational corporations consisting of oil, gold and coal 
mining companies were all keen to advance their interests in rural Colombia, 
which furthered land concentration in the hands of a few.574  This raises 
serious questions about the role of the state in the perpetuation of violence 
and raises doubts about the reforms of 1991 that claimed to address the issue 
of minority rights. The 1991 Constitutional Reform and the subsequent 
National Commission on Indigenous Policy (CONPAPI), within the office of 
indigenous affairs (DGAI) and the Special Commission for Black Communities 
did little to stop the widespread abuse of human rights amongst the most 
vulnerable and destitute in conflict ridden zones during the 1990s.575 
 
Whilst drugs have been at the forefront of the debate over post-Cold War 
violence in Colombia, the role of licit trades are largely ignored. Indeed, the 
cultivation of drugs is not the only industry that has exacerbated the issue of 
land tenure. The mining industry, production of palm oil as well as traditional 
crops all became embroiled in an increasingly complex conflict that centred on 
the issue of land. During the 1990s, paramilitaries developed their alliance 
with the Armed Forces to rid the country of insurgents, costing the lives of 
thousands of progressive members of Colombian society from journalists, 
activists, lawyers and poor campesinos. The take over of communal lands by 
palm oil companies in Urabá, Chocó is illustrative of the challenges faced by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the local populations in rural Colombia. In 1996, the army and paramilitaries 
launched an offensive, known as ‘Operation Genesis’; a counterinsurgency 
strategy rid the area of FARC influence.576 Aerial bombardment, massacres, 
forced disappearances and torture led to the displacement of an estimated 
17,000 civilians.577 Although the Colombian conflict is rarely conceived of in 
terms of fighting along ethnic lines, indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
populations have been subjected to the vast majority of the human rights 
abuses.578  
 
Palm trees covered the land that was previously occupied by the local 
population. Many returned to find their land labelled with ‘Private Property’ 
signs. Army and paramilitary patrols in the area countered the efforts to 
resettle the land. Remarkably, by 2004 one palm oil company, Urapalma had 
acquired 5,654 hectares of land. In 2006, the Minister of Agriculture confirmed 
that ‘at least 25,000 hectares of palm oil cultivation in the area of Jiguamiandó 
and Curvaradó river basin did not have legitimate titles for the land’.579 The 
complicity of government officials in the forced sale of land and the 
displacement of thousands through the paramilitary alliance spread to other 
licit industries. With the expansion of the banana business in the department 
of Magdalena, violence perpetrated against trade unionists accordingly 
increased. In the town of Ciénaga, an estimated 2,000 people subscribed to 
various unions in a single month, causing widespread repression. According 
to a report in the Colombian daily El Tiempo from Ciénaga, when a mother 
learned her son joined a trade union, she would make the sign of the cross 
and pray. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the angel of death !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hovered constantly over those associated with union activism during the 
1990s.580  
 
Security-related payments were also made by foreign multinationals. The 
‘Chiquita Brands scandal’ revealed more than a decade of security-related 
payments to insurgents, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and 
government sponsored militias. The banana company also paid paramilitary 
for security services that extended to intelligence on insurgent operations and 
were pressured by the Colombian military to finance paramilitary and militia 
groups.581 Former militia chiefs in the emerald business have also gone on to 
lift the lid on the use of paramilitary forces to carry out numerous 
assassinations and massacres to terrorise local populations. Colombian 
billionaire and owner of reported one million hectares of land, Víctor Carranza 
Niño, or the ‘Emerald Czar’, was reported to have been behind the Miraflores 
massacre, which the Colombian security forces ‘had facilitated from beginning 
to end’.582 A report of the strike, in which dozens of campesinos were killed, 
was given to the American authorities in Bogotá by an unknown source ‘a little 
over a week before the attack’. It was speculated that ‘Miraflores was on the 
short list’ of paramilitary expansion, who were due to ‘fly in because it was 
safer that way’. In a conversation with the US Ambassador, Myles Frechette, 
the Colombian Defence Minister, Gliberto Echeverri Mejía, dismissed the 
warming as ‘apocryphal’. The Commander of the Armed Forces, General 
José Manuel Bonett ‘also minimised the likelihood that paramilitaries would 
strike’, as ‘they would need to fly in supplies and reinforcements’ to the rural 
area in order to carry out the attack, which ‘the Armed Forces would not 
permit’. Nevertheless, five days later, on October 18, the paramilitaries arrived 
in Miraflores by air, carried out their killings and subsequently flew out.583 
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The expansion of extractive industries during the 1990s is inextricably tied to 
the increase in paramilitary and guerrilla violence. For proponents of the 
“greed” school, this is driven by the desire of economic gain on the part of the 
irregular armed groups.584 This significant misrepresentation of the Colombian 
conflict does take into account the “greed” from above. Paramilitary groups, or 
privatised armed groups, have a long history in Colombia. These 
organisations have been pivotal in protecting the property rights of the landed 
against the rural land movement and threats posed by insurgent groups. 
Paramilitaries have therefore played a central role in the large-scale land 
grabbing process with the tacit involvement of the state through the military-
paramilitary alliance.585 In the early 1990s, paramilitaries included armed men 
working for drug cartels, clandestine military counterinsurgents and self-
defence groups created by local elites.586  However by 1997, the diverse 
networks of paramilitary groups emerged under an umbrella organisation – 
the AUC, led by the Castaño brothers.587 
 
 
Self Defence Groups and the Rise of the AUC 
 
The expansion of the paramilitary forces in the 1990s unleashed violence in 
rural areas. By 2002, the AUC consisted of an estimated 15,000 combatants 
funded by landowners, businesses and cartels.588  During this period, the 
paramilitary groups gained momentum as political protagonists in their claim 
to be an alternative to the insurgent groups and assumed its role as a 
counterinsurgency organisation, which as illustrated in the previous chapter, 
was a direct result of the collusion between military and paramilitary forces. In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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military terms, the paramilitaries maintain that unlike the army – which is 
engaged in a conventional war against the guerrillas – their armed 
confrontation is an irregular war. Strikingly, both the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries explain their origins in almost identical terms – for the guerrillas 
the ‘incapacity of the state to fulfil specific economic, social and cultural 
obligations’ and for the paramilitaries the state’s inability to guarantee ‘public 
security with regards to life, property and freedom of all citizens’. The 
Colombian conflict is therefore a narrative of two opposing forces against an 
enemy – the absent state.589 
 
The Colombian state ‘lacked the will’ to counter the paramilitary problem.590 
These forces were particularly useful to the Colombian authorities in 
combating insurgent groups. It was largely expected that ‘informational links 
and instances of active coordination between military and paramilitaries’ were 
likely to continue despite the widespread human rights abuses and killings. 
The Colombian Armed Forces ‘suffered a number of demoralising defeats at 
the hands of guerrilla forces’. This included an Army Outpost at Las Delicias, 
close to the Ecuadorian border, on August 30, 1996. Dozens of Colombian 
forces were captured and injured and a further 54 were killed in this single 
attack. In the midst of the growing mobilisation of campesinos in rural areas, 
these attacks made the military-paramilitary alliance ever more useful to the 
Armed Forces.591 The paramilitaries emerged as the Colombian state’s ally 
against the insurgents.592 However, this relationship, which was something of 
an open secret, had to content with Colombian public opinion.  
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In July 1997, the killing of dozens of civilians in the town of Mapirpán was 
spread across the pages of the Colombian daily newspapers.593 Paramilitary 
massacres against civilians in this case and others in Barrancabermeja and 
Puerto Alvira raised important questions of the inability and indeed the extent 
of the desire of the state to curb the paramilitary threat.594 The Masacre of 
Trujillo (Massacre of Trujillo) is one of the most widely publicised of human 
rights violations in Colombia. Between 1988 and 1994, a series of murders 
were perpetrated by paramilitaries with the active complicity of the Colombian 
security forces that resulted in the deaths of 342 civilians in the town.595 A wall 
of impunity surrounded this case, which was broken down by the persistence 
of the Centro de Memoria Histórica, led by leading Colombian historian 
Gonzalo Sánchez. The reopening of this case reveals the depths of the murky 
alliance between members of the country’s Armed Forces and paramilitaries. 
For Sánchez, the impunity in the Trujillo massacre was not ‘simply a symptom 
of state impotence or a lack of resource’. Instead, ‘it is part of the logic that 
surrounds and/or these crimes. It is precisely this impunity that guarantees 
that the crimes can continue being committed, that the perpetrators can 
continue committing them, and that those responsible are not punished’.596 
The sheer brutality of the killings included detailed accounts of torture and the 
dismembering of civilians as part of a counter-subversive operation. One 
civilian army informant who participated in the murders stated that killings 
‘were carried out by cutting off the limbs and heads of the still living victims 
with a chain saw’. His testimony was corroborated with over a dozen other 
witnesses.597  The reporting of massacres carried out by paramilitary groups 
helped galvanise public opinion and brought intense scrutiny on the 
Colombian security forces. This has subsequently exercised a catalytic effect 
on the relationship between the Colombian state and its people. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Paramilitarism enjoyed a degree of legality under the rubric of ‘private 
vigilante groups’. In 1996, the government of President Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998) promoted creation CONVIVIR. The legalisation of paramilitarism 
is a favoured tactic of Latin American states. The CONVIVIR in many ways 
functioned like the Peruvian Rondas Campesinas, which contributed to the 
dismantling of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Guatemalan ‘civil 
patrols’ and more recently the Mexican vigilantes that are driving out violence 
with government forces.598 For Colombian authorities local civilians were seen 
as a highly effective force and intelligence source to counter the growing 
insurgency in rural areas. This highly problematic method of enforcing security 
from above has cost the lives of thousands of Colombians. It is widely 
estimated that paramilitary violence has been responsible for ‘80 per cent of 
non-combatant killings in the country’.599 
 
The CONVIVIR operated under the Directorate of Security and Surveillance of 
the Ministry of Defence. In official terms, the objective of the private vigilante 
groups was to provide logistical and intelligence support to the Armed Forces. 
Within a year, over 500 CONVIVIR were established and 9,633 were armed 
through the programme.600 One of the main supporters for this controversial 
system was the then Governor of Antioquia, Álvaro Uribe, who went on to win 
the presidency in 2002. During his two-year governorship, CONVIVIRs 
displaced an estimated 200,000, mainly in Urabá region of Antioquia. Which 
accounted for 18 per cent of the total number of displaced people in Colombia 
at the time.601 CONVIVIRS were declared illegal in 1999 following a public 
outcry of the atrocities carried out by the groups of armed militia. However, as 
expected, the Colombian state struggled to recover the arms and munitions 
and the operation of some of these groups continues today.602 According to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Guillermo Pardo of the Consultoría de Conflicto Urbano, CONVIVIRs 
operations in Medellín currently extend to the ‘sale of drugs, child sexual 
exploitation and the organisation of illegal gambling’, which illustrates the 
pervasive nature of paramilitarism in Colombia and how the official state 
sanctioning of armed groups has spiralled violence during the 1990s.603 
 
The AUC, led by Carlos Castaño, followed a brutal strategy of social 
cleansing. In order to eliminate the influence of the FARC and the ELN, the 
rural population was terrorised. For the AUC, if the civilian population refuses 
to have any contact with insurgent groups for fear of retribution by the 
paramilitaries, then the groups such as the FARC and ELN will eventually lose 
support. However, these methods are incredibly questionable in achieving 
their aims. The country’s largest insurgent group, the FARC, was able to bear 
the escalation of military and paramilitary attacks. Arguably, the widespread 
terror furthered the case of the FARC in rural areas. It allowed the insurgent 
groups to present themselves as legitimate adversaries in the conflict. 
 
 
The Administration of César Gaviria, 1990-1994 
 
President César Gaviria sought to change the relationship between the 
Colombian military and the state. In order to achieve this, Gaviria created the 
role of Presidential Secretary for Defence and Security. Although the reforms 
of the 1990s, as discussed earlier in this chapter, failed to make the 
necessary changes in military matters, it was an unprecedented change. The 
executive branch could now assume a role that was previously strictly 
reserved for the Ministry of National Defence. This allowed Gaviria to make 
civilian appointments in a bid to create a system of civilian oversight, which 
illustrates the recognition that the problems facing Colombia were political 
rather than military in nature. 604  President Gaviria was able to achieve !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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successes where previous administrations had failed. This included the 
successful negotiated peace agreements with small splinter insurgent groups, 
and most importantly, the M-19, who participated in the Constituent Assembly 
that produced a new constitution in 1991. For Gaviria Constituent Assembly 
was an opportunity to create a ‘new Colombia’.605 
 
However, Gaviria failed in persuading the FARC and ELN to participate in the 
creation of this ‘new’ country. Negotiations largely failed due to the conditions 
placed by the insurgent groups and the Colombian government. It is important 
to note that these negotiations were taking place in the midst of political 
genocide of the left that has continued since the mid-1980s. The Colombian 
government demanded that the guerrillas lay down their arms before any talks 
began whilst the guerrillas insisted on security guarantees, which the military 
found unacceptable. 606  For Marc Chernick ‘the outcomes of the peace 
initiatives of the Gaviria administration were partial peace agreements, major 
constitutional reform, expanded guerrilla activity, higher levels of violence, and 
dirty war’. 607  This was indeed a mixed result, however the Gaviria 
administration marks a high point for negotiations between the government 
and the insurgent groups. This period was also marred by significant military 
failures, in which the FARC and ELN were able to make significant advances, 
and the same observation could broadly be made regarding paramilitary 
forces. 
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The Administration of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) 
 
President Ernesto Samper is notorious for his alleged connection with the Cali 
Cartel that plagued his administration.608 Due to these repeated accusations, 
Samper’s government expended much of their time and energy in protecting 
his presidency rather than addressing the increasing political violence and in 
particular the paramilitary problem. Revenues from narcotics infiltrated the 
recently reformed Colombian political system with an estimated $6 million US 
dollars received from the Cali drug cartel in Samper’s presidential campaign. 
Accordingly, Samper’s administration marked a low point in US-Colombian 
relations and resulted in the decertification of Colombia.609 In 1998, the US 
Department of State concluded that this controversy ‘significantly diminished 
the president’s moral authority and political ability to govern’ and as a result, 
‘the control of the central government over the national territory was 
increasingly challenged by longstanding and widespread internal armed 
conflict and rampant violence – both criminal and political’. Under Samper’s 
presidency, Colombia’s security conditions had deteriorated significantly. By 
1998, the Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practice suggested that 
the insurgent groups had ‘significant influence in 57 per cent of the nation’s 
municipalities.’ 610  Despite enduring attacks from both the military and 
paramilitary forces, the FARC continued to make advances and exercise its 
authority against the state. In August 1996, the FARC captured sixty members 
of the Colombian Armed Forces in the Amazon jungle region. In order to 
secure the release of the military personnel President Samper was forced to 
remove all remaining troops from the area.  
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Administration of President Pastrana, 1998-2002 
 
President Andrés Pastrana’s preferred means of achieving peace was the 
renewal of the state’s negotiation process with the FARC and ELN. Under 
these negotiations an agreement with FARC was reached. A ‘demilitarised 
zone’ of 16,266 square miles (around the size of Switzerland) in the Amazon 
jungle region was under the control of FARC until 20 February 2002 when 
negotiations formally ended’.611  In July 1998, a historic meeting occurred 
between the then president-elect and the commander-in-chief of the FARC, 
Manuel Marulanda. This provoked a tremendous amount of public 
enthusiasm. After years of failed peace processes many Colombians felt that 
the new president could finally broker a meaningful peace agreement. In the 
months following Pastrana’s visit, the Colombian government and the FARC 
began talks with regards to the establishment of a liberated zone (despeje) in 
the south central region of the country, one of the FARC’s strongholds. 
 
On November 7 1998, the Colombian government granted the FARC a 
despeje for around ninety days. In this agreement, the Colombian military 
forces were extracted from the region and allowed the FARC to run a parallel 
government, which included a judicial system and police force. Serious peace 
negotiations began with the FARC in the despeje in early January 1999. 
Despite these advances, the leader of the FARC Manuel Marulanda did not 
turn up to greet President Pastrana for the opening ceremony and in the 
following three years numerous peace dialogues were frozen and cease-fires 
broken.612 The lack of trust between the two parties and increasing political 
opposition to the despeje led to the spectacular failure of this round of peace 
negotiations. Despite repeated attempts at negotiations, in the midst of 
widespread state-sponsored paramilitarism and an on-going counter-
subversive campaign, Colombia entered the 21st century with the largest 
humanitarian crisis in the hemisphere.   
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Conclusion 
 
The 1990s saw the further deterioration of Colombia’s security conditions. 
During this period, the number of deaths linked to the activities of paramilitary 
groups exceeded that of the insurgents and the connection between the 
paramilitary groups and the Colombian military continued to develop apace. 
At the same time, successive governments made overt attempts at achieving 
peace through repeated rounds of negotiations. Colombia’s conflict during the 
1990s has been largely framed through a post-Cold War frame which has 
heavily emphasised the ‘ideological void’ nature of violence in the global 
South.  
 
Colombian violence during the 1990s not only increased because of the drugs 
trade. Both licit and illicit trades are heavily embroiled in the war system, 
which is perpetuated by a combination of globalisation and internal factors. By 
2002, the country had endured 56 years of violence with no end in sight and 
at an enormous human cost. Importantly, this decade marked a further 
exacerbation of the agrarian problem and the exponential growth of irregular 
armed groups, in which the issue of land tenure was ignored at the state level 
despite attempts for reform and peace. Indeed, global demands for 
Colombian products such as gold, coal, emeralds, oil and palm oil has been 
one of the factors exacerbating the issue of land in Colombia since the 1990s. 
Through an exploration of the relationship of the global, regional and local 
factors in relation to the central question of land in Colombia we are better 
placed to understand the solutions that are needed on all three of these levels 
in terms of policy.  
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Chapter Nine 
 
The Long Road to Peace: 2002 – the Present Day 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ !
 
By the advent of the 21st century Colombia was deep in an abyss of violence. 
Colombian citizens were at the mercy of the country’s eight warring factions: 
the Colombian Army, National Police, CONVIVIRs, paramilitaries allied with 
the AUC, criminal gangs involved in a myriad of illicit trades as well as three 
guerrilla groups, the FARC, ELN and EPL. Colombia’s future looked bleak. 
Violence had infiltrated almost every part of the country’s political, social and 
economic processes.613  Although Colombia’s political elite in Bogotá may 
have not wanted to declare the country a ‘failed’ or ‘failing state’, in 
humanitarian terms Colombia’s situation was more troubling than ever 
before.614 In 2002 alone, the violent situation cost the lives of some 33,500 
Colombians. A further 1,358 were forcibly disappeared and 412,000 
displaced.615 Yet remarkably, little more than a decade on from the election of 
Álvaro Uribe in 2002, the Colombian counterinsurgency efforts have been 
heralded a ‘success’ and a ‘model’ for other far-flung violent states, such as 
Afghanistan. The Colombian intelligence operatives are seen as the ‘masters 
of today’.616 For US foreign policy analysts and security experts, Colombia is 
the success story of the Global War on Terror.617 
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Álvaro Uribe: Security Advances 
For the former Colombian president, Álvaro Uribe, the Global War on Terror 
provided a complimentary framework for the definition of the country’s internal 
security conditions. According to Uribe, who was president from 2002 to 2008, 
Colombia did not face an internal armed conflict, but rather a terrorist 
struggle.618 Under this rubric, Colombia security was framed as a democratic 
nation confronted with a threat from terrorists. In order to combat the lack of 
state authority, which was viewed as a fundamental motor of violence, a 
stronger state presence through military means was deemed necessary.619 
Uribe’s electoral banner, mano firme, corazón grande (firm hand, big heart), 
was aimed at demonstrating his willingness to confront the insurgent threat. 
During the election campaign, Uribe unveiled the Democratic and Security 
Policy (DSP), the centrepiece of the Uribe administration. The ambitious 
policy package offered the Colombian electorate the promise of democracy 
and security with a strong emphasis on a change from the approach of 
previous governments that were characterised by an almost non-stop process 
of failed negotiations and national security approaches, in which unchecked 
powers led to widespread human rights abuses. 
Uribe’s DSP marked a change in the governmental approach to the conflict. 
The breakdown of negotiations between the Colombian state and the FARC in 
February 2002 allowed Uribe to redefine the conflict and present the DSP as 
the single solution to the conflict.620 In order to combat the threat of terrorism 
against the democratic Colombian state, peace was ‘to be born out of state 
authority’. For Uribe, ‘in the fight against terrorism it is not the sovereignty of 
nations that counts, but the sovereignty of democracy. It is a struggle between 
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the sovereignty of democratic nations against the sovereignty of terrorism’.621 
The country’s Defence Minister between 2002 and 2003, Marta Lucía 
Ramírez, emphasised the idea that the security of the state is jeopardised by 
vacuums that permit non-state threats to flourish.622  
The DSP called for a strong Colombian state and the active cooperation of the 
citizenry. From 2002, the Colombian people were invited to join what was 
deemed a popular war effort against ‘terrorists’. The DSP outlined the role of 
the Colombian people by specifying that security is ‘the result of a collective 
effort by the citizens: it is the responsibility of all’. In this context, ‘active citizen 
participation, co-operation in the administration of justice and support for the 
authorities all play a major part in the strengthening of the justice system and 
democracy’. These are ‘constitutional duties which every citizen must strive to 
fulfil’.623 Uribe called for ‘solidarity between citizens and solidarity with the 
security forces’ and redefined the role of the Colombian state in the conflict. 
For Uribe, ‘the Armed Forces and National Police represent the coercive 
element of the Constitution’.624 The security forces were explicitly excluded 
from the role in the perpetuation of violence. According to Uribe, ‘they are not 
“actors” in a war or conflict and should not be put implicitly on the same level 
as the terrorist organisations which they confront’.625  The framing of the 
Colombian conflict as democratic state labouring under the threat of terrorism 
legitimised the state’s use of military action and extraordinary use of non-
democratic measures to achieve ‘peace’.  
How democratic is the DSP? Given the lack of civilian oversight over the 
military and intelligence services and the history of human rights abuses at 
the hands of the armed forces, the DSP was particularly problematic. In 
August 2002 a state of ‘internal commotion’ was declared. Special powers 
were granted to Colombia’s security forces including the ‘interception of 
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private communications, the detention of citizens, and the searching of private 
property without specific charges, and in certain cases without prior judicial 
authorization’. The military presence in conflict-ridden zones involved 
‘roadblocks, curfews, restrictions on movement, house-to-house searches, 
and detention powers.’626 Whilst these measures were justified to the public in 
order to effectively pursue irregular armed forces, these measures were also 
indiscriminately applied to the rural civilian population. 
Networks of informants were established in which the citizens were paid to 
provide intelligence on ‘narco-terrorists’ or paramilitary activity. A programme 
of soldados campesinos (peasant soldiers) was introduced to support the 
military efforts. In August 2002, as many as 15,000 soldados campesinos 
were deployed. Indeed, civilian soldiers were seen as an essential 
contribution to Uribe’s war effort; at the time of Uribe’s electoral victory, 
Colombia had fewer soldiers per hundred thousand inhabitants than its 
relatively peaceful Latin American counterpart Chile.627 This is remarkable 
given the long of history of violence in Colombia. However, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Uribe’s previous attempt at arming civilians under the 
CONVIVIR programme led to widespread human rights abuses and in many 
cases the AUC acted as an umbrella organisation for the disparate vigilante 
groups. Most importantly, the incorporation of civilians in military operations 
blurred the line between civilians and combatants, which ultimately threatened 
the stability of rural conflict zones.628 Although the DSP was presented as a 
significant change from previous approaches to national security, in reality, it 
was alarmingly similar to conventional security strategies where military 
responses to internal threats dominate.  
During the Uribe administration, significant advances were made against 
irregular armed groups. According to official figures released by the country’s 
intelligence services, DNI and the Colombian government, the armed 
offensive against the FARC and ELN has dramatically reduced the number of 
irregular combatants. The country’s largest insurgent group, the FARC, has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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seen its numbers cascade from an estimated 20,766 members in 2002 to 
7168 by 2013.629 The ELN at its apex commanded an army of close to 
5,000. 630  Today its numbers are estimated at 1,380.631  Furthermore, the 
disarmament programme, DDR, led to the demobilisation of over 40,000 
combatants with 18,000 weapons surrendered by 2007.632  Despite these 
impressive figures, the question of how to reintegrate such a large number of 
former combatants looms large. Moreover, the number of those combatants 
who have returned to paramilitary activity is unclear.633  
In a country where more than half of the population are employed in the 
informal sector, it is perhaps unsurprising that the many former combatants in 
paramilitary organisations have turned to criminal enterprises.634 The rise of 
the ‘bandas emergentes’ (Emerging Bands or BACRIM) is particularly 
troubling for the Colombian state as evidence suggests that this emerging 
group largely consists of former paramilitary combatants. According to Luis 
Alberto Bonilla of the Human Rights Ombudsman Office, the victims of 
BACRIM violence who approach his office reported the same human rights 
crimes that victims of the AUC reported in the 1990s and early 2000s. This 
includes forced displacement, targeted killings and enforcing the social control 
of rural communities.635 A report by Human Rights Watch concluded that the 
involvement of BACRIM in the terrorising rural populations ‘is the greatest 
threat to Colombians trying to reclaim stolen land’ during the almost seven 
decade long conflict.636 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In recent years a series of scandals involving the military and intelligence 
forces has shaken Colombian politics.637 Former members of the paramilitary 
group, AUC, have insisted that their organisation bankrolled the electoral 
campaign of Uribe.638 Around 30 members of Congress and a further 30 
lawmakers were implicated in the ‘parapolítica’ scandal, related to links 
between the Uribe administration and paramilitary death squads.639 The ‘falso 
positivos’ affair revealed that an estimated 3,500 innocent Colombians from 
rural areas were killed by the military forces and presented to the authorities 
as insurgents belonging to the FARC and ELN in a bid to inflate body 
counts.640 The Colombian Army’s practice of killing innocent civilians is not 
new phenomenon. Declassified material reveals that as early as 1994, the US 
government was aware of the ‘body count mentality’. Field officers who did 
not show ‘records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity (wherein the majority of 
the military’s human rights abuses occur) disadvantage themselves at 
promotion time’.641 
 
Uribe’s administration reshaped the representation of the conflict. Poverty, 
environmental degradation through crop fumigation and mining, political 
exclusion, humanitarian crises and rural underdevelopment are seen as 
effects of ‘narco-terrorism’ rather than as conditions for the emergence of 
violence. 642  The Colombian government during 2002-2008 portrayed the 
country as a democratic nation-state, where democracy can only be exercised 
based on the principle of state authority and state presence driven by military 
operations.643 The government is turn presented as fighting ‘terrorism’ for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cause of national development and democracy. The fundamental driving 
motors of Colombia’s conflict were undermined during the Uribe 
administration. However, instead of offering an alternative solution to violence, 
the DSP saw the increase use of conventional security measures through 
military operations in a bid to improve the security conditions of the country. 
 
 
Juan Manuel Santos: The Return of the Agrarian Question 
 
Uribe’s successor following his failed attempt at securing a third presidential 
term was the former Minster of Defence, Juan Manuel Santos.644 It was widely 
expected that Santos’ victory would see a continuation of Uribe’s hard-line 
military policies. However, only 18 months into his successor’s first term, 
Uribe emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of President Santos. As 
the Minister of Defence, Santos was keen to continue to implement Uribe’s 
security build up, however in his role as president, Santos’ approach differed 
significantly. In July 2013, at the public hearing on the Legal Framework for 
Peace, Santos stated that he as ‘the President of the Republic, on behalf of 
the Colombian state acknowledges responsibility for the human rights 
violations in the armed conflict. For Santos, the ‘Colombian state has been 
responsible in some cases by default, in other cases by direct action of some 
government agents of serious human rights violations and breaches of 
international humanitarian law’.645 This historic speech marked the first formal 
acceptance of the role of the Colombian state in the violence in the almost 
seven decade long conflict. Public apologies were offered to individual 
communities that had suffered at the hands of state security forces. One of 
these cases is that of the Peace Community of San José de Apartado, who 
were accused by the former president Uribe of being allies of the FARC and 
subject to a counteroffensive operation leading to ‘deaths of several villagers, 
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including two minors’.646  Once again the diagnosis of the Colombian conflict 
was redefined, with the issue of land at last emerging on the political agenda. 
This is of particular importance as it shows the limitations of the external 
grand narratives that are applied to the Colombian conflict. The agrarian issue 
continues to be at the crossroads of peace in Colombia.  
 
Importantly, Santos recognised that additional policies were necessary in 
order to achieve peace. One of the first policies of the Santos administration 
was the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras (Victims and Land 
Restitution Law, Law 1448) in June 2011. The law was presented as a 
mechanism that would facilitate the restitution of millions of hectares of land 
that were stolen in Colombia’s conflict. 647 One of the main achievements of 
this law was the re-recognition of land as a fundamental motor of violence in 
the country and the restitution of land as the key to achieving a lasting peace. 
Law 1448 marked the first serious attempt by any Colombian government to 
address the conflict through the issue of land and marked a significant shift to 
previous attempts at reform – the burden of proof to prove land ownership 
was moved to favour victims and provided extensive rights to land restitution 
than previous legislation.648  Under this legislation ‘all victims are granted 
rights to damages, restitution of prior living conditions, a range of social 
services, and special protection in legal proceedings’. Those who have been 
displaced as a result of the violence ‘are entitled to the return of their land or, 
in certain circumstances, to an equivalent plot of land or monetary 
compensation’.649  For the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Juan Camilo Restrepo, Santos’ land restitution law ‘is as or more important 
than the Law 200 of 1936’, the Agrarian Reform Law under Alfonso López 
Pumarejo’s Revolución de la Marcha.650 The law also established a day for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the ‘remembrance and solidarity with victims’ on the symbolic date of April 9 
when Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in 1948.651  
 
However, significant obstacles to the implementation of Law 1448 remain. 
The provisions to deal with land restitution have ‘provoked strong opposition 
from both sectors of society who fear it may jeopardise their control of lands 
seized illegally through human rights violations, and those seeking the return 
of lands they were forced to abandon’.652 The security of those returning to 
stolen land poses serious risks, with many facing threats, violence and death. 
The refusal of the Colombian government to acknowledge the continued role 
of paramilitaries, who have often colluded with state security forces, despite 
the reported successes of the DDR process poses significant problems for the 
successful implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law. According 
to a report by the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, in 2009 paramilitary 
forces were responsible 32.9 per cent of displacements where the 
perpetrators have been identified, more than any other armed group.653 As the 
majority of paramilitary activity today is defined as criminal, under the rubric of 
BACRIM, victims of paramilitary violence have little chances to access 
protection under the Victims and Land Restitution Law.654 The definition of 
‘victims’ under this law is also problematic. A victim is defined as a person 
who has suffered a violation of human rights as a result of the conflict since 
1985. Civilians who suffered prior to this may still be considered as victims, 
however are not entitled to damages or restitution.655 
 
The true scale of land theft through Colombia’s almost seven decade long 
conflict remains unclear. According to the Minister of Agriculture and Rural 
Development the total amount of stolen land is ‘not four but two million 
hectares that are estimated to have been stolen in the conflict’, which is ‘the 
conclusion reached in the course of numerous calculations including those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
651 Francisco Miranda, ‘9 de Abril: ¿Por Qué Gaitán?,’ Semana, April 9, 2013. 
652 Amnesty International, The Victims Land Restitution Law, p. 5. 
653 Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, Colombia: La Metáfora del Desmantelamiento 
de los Grupos Paramilitares, Segundo Informe de Balance Sobre la Aplicación de la 
Ley 975 de 2005 (Bogotá: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2010) p. 41. 
654 Amnesty International, The Victims Land Restitution Law, pp. 6-7. 
655 Summers, ‘Colombia’s Victims’ Law,’ p. 226. 
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undertaken by the Commission Following Public Policy on Forced 
Displacement’.656 However, Restrepo’s estimations do not correspond with 
the figures provided by numerous reports and investigations carried out by 
inter-governmental and international organisations. In November 2005, the 
Office of the Comptroller General revealed that between 2000 and 2005 
alone, ‘2.6 million hectares had been stolen after the members of 265,000 
households had been forced to flee’. According to the World Bank estimates, 
by 2005 a total of 4 million hectares of land were forcibly taken or abandoned 
as a result of the violence.657 The Third Public National Verification Survey of 
the Rights of the Forcibly Displaced Population carried out in 2010 estimated 
that ‘more than 6.6 million hectares of land had been misappropriated or 
abandoned between 1980 and July 2010.658 The lack of consensus on this 
key element of land restitution is one of the most pressing problems that face 
the implementation of Law 1448 and is illustrative of the varying opinion on 
what exactly constitutes as the illegal appropriation of land. 
 
US foreign policy specialists and civil conflict theorists have been silent on the 
issue of land in Colombia. As we have seen, the agrarian question has 
featured remarkably little in both these areas of scholarship. However, despite 
the conventional wisdom on the Colombian conflict, which has focussed 
heavily on the drugs trade and criminal activity, the agrarian question and 
economic and security grievances remain at the core of the Colombian 
problem. The Human Development Report of 2011 summarises the problem 
facing Colombia, which unsurprisingly does not differ significantly from the 
challenges faced in 1946. Land concentration remains in the hands of few, 
with 52 per cent owned by 1.15 per cent of the population. The overall Gini 
coefficient index for Colombia, at 0.58 is one of the worst in the world, 
reflecting the persistent levels of inequality in the country that surpass that of 
its Latin American counterparts.659 It is estimated that 20 million Colombians, 
45.5 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line, with 16.4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
656 Amnesty International, The Victims Land Restitution Law, p. 12. 
657 ibid. 
658 ibid. This figure excludes those lands collectively owned by Afro-Colombians and 
indigenous communities. 
659 ‘Tierra Concentrada, Modelo Fracasado,’ Semana, September 25, 2011. 
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per cent living in extreme poverty.660 The importance of the agrarian question 
and the socio-economic situation of rural Colombians are underlined by the 
discussions currently taking place on the negotiating table at Havana. As one 
leading Colombian commentator noted, for the first time in half a century, ‘the 
two parties are speaking the same language’.661 
 
 
Peace Negotiations: 2012 to the Present Day  
Recent developments in Colombia reveal much about the complexities of the 
country’s security situation. On September 4 2012, a decade after the last 
round of failed peace talks, President Santos announced the start of formal 
negotiations between the Colombian state and the FARC. Santos’ decision to 
press for a negotiated solution to the armed conflict was unexpected given his 
role as the Minister of Defence during the previous administration. Perhaps 
the person who was most taken back by Santos’ decision was his 
predecessor and political ally at the time, Uribe. The public rift between two of 
the most prominent men in Colombian politics, referred to as the ‘the war 
between the presidents’,662  is illustrative of the fissiparous nature of the 
political system and the varying diagnoses of the conflict that persist within the 
country. Uribe use of Twitter to express his dismay at the current negotiations 
has attracted international attention; he has gone as far as to describe his 
former Minister of Defence as a ‘traitor’ and ‘scoundrel’.663 For Uribe, ‘future 
generations will be pained by the current weakness of negotiations with 
terrorists’.664 Uribe’s discontent with his former underling is so strong that in 
2012 he formed his own political party, the Centro Democratico (Democratic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Centre), to block Santos’ initiatives and challenge the incumbent leader’s re-
election campaign in May 2014. 
Peace negotiations under Santos’ administration are point of contention in 
Bogota. However following the military successes against the FARC and the 
demilitarisation of the AUC, it highlights that military action is not the only way 
to achieve peace. The FARC have suffered huge losses along with the ELN 
since 2002. The weakening of these insurgency movements in terms of 
numbers of combatants and territory and the opportunities presented by 
Santos for a broad negotiation agenda have created an air of optimism for 
both parties. The future of the Colombian peace process now rests in the 
hands of the electorate. The upcoming election in the midst of the most 
promising negotiations in Colombia’s conflict will without a doubt have a large 
implication on not only the path of the peace process, but also on the 
legislative changes on the restitution of land during Santos’ administration. In 
June 2013, the Colombian government rejected the FARC’s request for the 
postponement of the election. 665  This is not surprising given the strong 
tradition of elections in the country, that have taken place every four years 
with almost no breaks throughout the history of the republic. Although there is 
no doubt the election in the comings months will continue as normal, Uribe’s 
political onslaught on Santos comes at a crucial moment that endangers the 
future of peace.  
The current peace agenda covers five major points: land reform and rural 
development; political participation; illicit drugs; rights of victims and peace 
deal implementation. So far agreements have been reached on two of the 
points on the agenda; a partial agreement on land reform and rural 
development as well as on the thorny issue of political participation. Although 
the negotiations in Havana have been somewhat lengthy, one of the most 
important achievements of this process is an agreement on two of the most 
contentious elements of the conflict. A joint statement from the FARC and 
government in May 2013, following the partial agreement on land reform read, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘this agreement will be the start of a radical transformation of rural 
Colombia’.666 In November 2013, a full agreement on political participation 
was announced with the FARC chief’s negotiator stating that it is ‘an important 
step in the right direction to end the conflict and achieve a real democracy in 
Colombia’.667 Although the exact details of the agreement between the two 
parties remain unclear and will do so until the final point of agenda is agreed 
upon, these developments confirm the convergence of the Colombian state 
and the FARC to ensure the economic and social development of rural areas, 
the continued restitution of land, political guarantees for those entering 
electoral politics and the creation of new political parties. The relative 
successes of these initial rounds of negotiations are certainly promising for 
both the Colombian government and the FARC. One of the most likely 
outcomes of the agreements with the FARC is the prospect of negotiations 
between the government and the ELN. However, as the FARC is by far the 
strongest of the insurgent groups, it is likely that the negotiation with this 
group will set a precedent for the agenda between the government and the 
ELN. 
The current round of negotiations is focussed on the issue of illicit drugs. The 
FARC has proposed a ten-point plan that aims to rid the country of narco-
trafficking. The centrepiece of this proposal is the de-criminalisation of drug 
usage.668 Although the issue of FARC’s link to the drugs trade through the 
funding of its war machine from taxing traffickers has been a historical source 
of contention between the government and the insurgent group, there is some 
room for optimism in reaching an accommodation in this area. The Summit of 
the Americas, held in Cartagena, Colombia in 2012 marked the first open 
declaration of the failure of the war on drugs by a number of Latin American 
leaders. The historic summit led to a ‘game-changing’ report on global drugs 
policy, The Drug Problem in the Americas, which was initiated by President 
Santos, and presented to international bodies, as well as to US President !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Barak Obama in May 2013. The extensive study marked the first high-level, 
multilateral study produced by Latin American governments examining drug 
production, trafficking, distribution and the relationship between the drugs 
trade and organised crime, which fundamentally questioned the effectiveness 
of current legislation.669  
Given the international repercussions of the drugs trade, the response of the 
US and European governments to the negotiations is particularly 
disappointing. The Obama administration’s response to the negotiations with 
the FARC has been somewhat lukewarm, with no coherent position or open 
support for the peace talks, despite the loosening of drug laws in some US 
states in recent months.670 Cocaine consumption in the UK is the highest in 
Europe, however London has offered little open support to the Colombian 
peace process on this crucial element of the agenda.671 As the contender for 
the Conservative party in 2005, the current Prime Minister, David Cameron 
advocated ‘more liberal drugs laws’ and called on the government to ‘initiate a 
discussion within the UN about alternate ways – including the possibility of 
legalisation and regulation – to tackle the global drugs dilemma’.672 However, 
as the leader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister, Cameron has 
been largely silent on the issue of drug reform, only speaking to refuse his 
support for a Royal Commission on drug reform. 
By contrast, the Deputy Prime Minister of the UK, Nick Clegg, has been 
somewhat more vocal on the issue of drug reform following his recent visit to 
Colombia. Clegg called for a ‘proper debate’ and the ‘need for a different 
strategy’ on drugs, in which cooperation with ‘international partners such as 
President Santos and his government in Colombia’ is necessary to tackle the 
problem of drugs, both at home and the source country.673 Clegg should be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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commended on his efforts to raise the profile of the peace process and the 
role that the UK should play in international drugs debate. However, Clegg’s 
rather naïve and shortsighted account of the conflict did not take into account 
the contribution that foreign investment and business could make to peace.  
Clegg’s visit marked the largest UK trade delegation ever to have been sent to 
Colombia. Representatives from over 40 businesses included HSBC, Rolls 
Royce and Shell as well as the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh and 
Warwick.674 Clegg is not misguided in his opinion that economic development 
is needed in Colombia, but we must ask ‘what type of economic 
development?’ In a country that has been ravaged by conflict for almost seven 
decades alongside steady economic growth and foreign investment, ethical 
development is desperately needed. If foreign governments are to lend their 
support to the Colombian peace process they must also ensure that their 
delegations in seminars such as ‘Business is Great’ where Clegg addressed a 
multitude of Colombian and UK organisations, are aware of the human cost of 
business. Economic development, as we have seen in the case of Colombia, 
does not always result in jobs, poverty reduction, a greater respect for human 
rights and improved levels of democracy. Colombia remains one of the most 
unequal societies in the world. Throughout Colombia’s history, social conflict 
as a result of economic development has led to widespread human rights 
abuses, from the expansion of coffee plantations in the late-eighteenth 
century to palm oil and banana plantations in more recent times. Perhaps one 
of the most obvious shortcomings of the current peace negotiations is the lack 
of significance given to licit industries in the perpetuation of violence. Recent 
levels of protest and social unrest are illustrative of the wider social 
challenges faced by Colombia, which will undoubtedly persist regardless of 
whether a peace agreement with the FARC is reached or not. 
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The Continuation of Social Unrest   
 
Colombia has a long history of social conflict and strikes. Despite recent 
security advances against insurgents, the country like many of its Latin 
American counterparts faces significant problems with social unrest. Since 
2013, Santos has experienced a wave of protests and disruption from farmers 
and workers across various sectors of the economy. The failure of successive 
Colombian governments to address the needs of small-scale farmers, such as 
improved road to get their produce to markets and subsidies to counter the 
soaring costs of inputs, has resulted in outbreaks of violence between 
campesinos and the country’s security forces.675 Three years into the Santos 
administration, critics of the government across the country mobilised to 
highlight the repeated failed promises on improving the country’s 
infrastructure, which in an largely agricultural country that is geographically 
divided by two mountainous areas and a large swathes of jungle, is necessary 
to enable small farmers to earn an income.676  
 
Journalist, Jonathan Glennie recounted his meeting with farmers in 
Catatumbo in the department of Santander, one of the centres of the current 
social unrest. The farmers in Catacumbo explained that their potatoes and 
onions ‘were selling for a pittance’, and whilst they were ‘desperately trying to 
avoid the temptation to grow coca’ it was increasingly difficult to avoid this 
fate, which would bring further troubles to their homes.677  This is not a 
problem that is faced by a few Colombian farmers; it is widespread across 
rural regions. In October 2013, a two-week long farmers strike and roadblocks 
crippled transportation in the country.678 The coal industry, today Colombia’s 
second largest export, was also crippled by strikes and protests that resulted 
in the halting of 70 per cent of coal mining in February 2013.679 In August 
2013, 30,000 supporters of the strikes, mainly consisting of students, staged a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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peaceful march on the streets of the nation’s capital, Bogotá, which quickly 
deteriorated into a violent altercation between the protesters and the security 
forces. 
 
The government’s response to the recent wave of unrest was questionable. 
Many Colombians deplored President Santos’ dismissal of the protests as 
‘non-existent’.680 Indeed, the heavy hand of the Colombian state reappeared 
with images of rural campesinos dressed in traditional ponchos being met with 
riot police wearing amour spread across the Colombian newspapers. In his 
justification for the response of the state, the Defence Minister, Juan Carlos 
Pizon, stated that the protests were ‘infiltrated by FARC rebels’.681 The use of 
tear gas and armoured police to counter the protesters has led to a plunging 
of Santos’ approval rating, which in the midst of the most importance peace 
negotiations in the nation’s country and a nearing election in May 2014 may 
have grave consequences. Whilst the focus of much of the scholarly attention 
on the tragic case of Colombia has been on the transformation of the conflict, 
continuities in the fundamental drivers of social unrest and violence remain. In 
order to achieve peace, the Colombian state must address the social and 
economic needs of its country. Whilst the agenda at the negotiation table in 
Havana is an impressive start, the long road to peace in Colombia still lies 
ahead. And yet, for the first time in the country’s conflict since 1946, it can be 
confidently said that peace is realistically within reach for Colombians, and 
whilst the attendant social reforms may not be revolutionary, they could mark 
the beginning of a real transformation.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
The overriding contribution of this thesis lies in the application of an Area 
Studies approach. Within the various sub-disciplines of the Social Sciences 
that deal with conflict and security a number of theoretical perspectives have 
emerged that seek to explain violent conflict on a trans-national basis. Civil 
war is a pressing policy concern; it causes tremendous human suffering, stalls 
economic development and leads to political instability that can last for 
decades. In a globalised world the risk of spill over is increased and it is often 
entangled with the interests of distant powers. The idea that since the end of 
the Second World War the prevalence of civil war in the global South has 
increased forms the basis of studies in the areas of Global Governance, 
International Security and Development Economics. However, it is worthy to 
note that the onset of new civil wars has dropped appreciably since the mid-
1990s. This is important for two reasons: firstly, it would suggest that civil 
wars by and large tend to be part of a longer historical trend in the country; 
and secondly, civil wars can, and in some cases do, last for decades. 
 
The theories of “New Wars” and “Greed vs. Grievance” have greatly 
influenced the analysis of civil conflict in the global South. New Wars scholars 
share a consensus on the negative impact of globalisation. Whilst their 
detractors have focussed their concerns on whether “new wars” are distinct 
from earlier forms of conflicts, particularly in the post-Cold War era, the 
debate within the “new wars” literature is firmly grounded on a critical view of 
globalisation and in particular the impact of this for global security. Increased 
global interdependency has come with its fair share of problems. For 
Colombia, global processes such as free or increased levels of trade, 
movement of capital and the expansion of extractive industries have had a 
particularly negative impact – they have exacerbated the issue of land, which 
has been the primary motor of violence since the coffee boom of the 19th 
century. In a globalised world, the industries of gold, emeralds, coal and oil 
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mining as well as the international drugs trade are embroiled in a cocktail of 
violence that involves a myriad of irregular armed actors and the Colombian 
state. This body of literature provides an important insight into the way global 
trends can impact civil conflict and in particular is useful in its characterisation 
of violence, which for Kaldor includes state failure and a social transformation 
driven by the intensification of global interconnectedness and liberal economic 
forces; the breakdown of public authority leading to ‘irregular’ armies; an 
increase in ethnic conflicts rather than ideology and territory; a phenomenal 
rise in civilian casualties; the targeting of civilians as objects of war; a 
dependence on internal sources of finance, and massive international 
involvement in the form of foreign media, aid organisations, military advisers, 
and volunteer forces.682 
 
However, this approach does provide an insight into the relationship between 
the global, regional and local dynamics. The danger in the sole focus on 
global trends is that paradoxically it can limit our knowledge by leading to a 
neglect of more local and even regional trends. Although global changes and 
pressures have undoubtedly had an impact on the security of Colombia, most 
prominently in recent years through the explosion of the drugs trade, this 
thesis places emphasis on the structural problems rooted in the domestic 
political, social and economic spheres of the country and the relationship 
between these dynamics on a historical basis. In this regard the use of an 
area studies approach is important in highlighting the ways in which global 
trends, in terms of the Cold War, War on Drugs, Global War on Terror, 
international trades and extractive industries can interact with regional and 
local conflict dynamics. In short, this thesis uses interdisciplinary insights from 
violence in Colombia on a historical basis that broadens the current 
characterisation of violent conflict through the deployment of regional and 
local perspectives to complement the global ones.  
 
Both the “New Wars” and “Greed vs. Grievance” schools of thought highlight 
the prevalence of criminality in driving violence. This is particularly important !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in policy circles as one of the main forms of military action against Colombian 
insurgents has taken the form of counter-narcotics operations. The idea that 
criminality drives violence can certainly provide us with an insight into the 
duration of conflict. However, it terms of causality it is important to look to 
more local dynamics. Indeed, if the Colombian government were to defeat the 
insurgent forces and continue with their recent successes, the demise of 
insurgency would not necessarily mark the end of organised violence. In this 
regard, this thesis offers a more nuanced and localised perspective of factors 
that drive violence. 
 
Earlier cycles of violence and unresolved issues of land tenure have fed 
subsequent cycles of conflict in Colombia. However, the focus of this thesis 
has been the most recent cycle of violence, from 1946 to present day with an 
emphasis on internal drivers of violence – political, economic and security 
grievances in the form of poverty, political exclusion and human rights abuses 
that have persisted for almost seven decades. In this context the political, 
economic and social conditions in which violence has developed is explored 
with relationship between armed conflict and multiple forms of violence and 
criminality. 
 
An Area Studies approach has enabled this thesis to move beyond the global 
and criminal trends to provide a ‘bottom up’ approach to conflict analysis 
through the application of insights from a range of literature and archival data.  
This has revealed insights from the internal politics, society, economy, history 
and geography reveal a complex linage of violence that is rooted in the issue 
of land. In particular it has explored the role of the Colombian state and 
provided a critical analysis of the country’s political systems that are both 
central to the conflict and any peace which may be achieved. Social scientists 
have an implicit focus on global trends and forces, whereas Area Studies 
specialists develop knowledge of specific countries and regions. This thesis 
bridges this divide by establishing a symbiotic relationship between the two 
areas. In particular this thesis advocates that Area Studies must build on the 
general theoretical frameworks that highlight global trends and complements 
this with insights from a country level analysis of violence and security. 
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Equally, area specific knowledge can contribute to the understanding of wider 
dynamics by providing in depth analyses which social scientists rely on to 
produce accurate generalisations of global trends. 
 
The secondary level contribution this thesis makes is in the deployment of 
transnational archival data sets. Archival datasets are not commonly used by 
Social Scientists who study conflict as there is a desire to study global trends. 
The use of a range of archival material from the UK, USA and Colombia as 
well as classified material obtained through Freedom of Information Requests 
is a unique element of this thesis and provides a rich, analytical insight into 
the local dynamics and development of conflict in Colombia. In particular, it is 
useful in highlighting the complexities of the political system and how this has 
contributed to insecurity. This includes political factionalism and partisan 
violence and the political exclusion of the left, which are the central elements 
of the structural weaknesses of the Colombian state that have driven political 
and social instability.  
 
This study has incorporated the impact of La Violencia for the Colombian 
conflict. This is a particularly important element of the thesis in highlighting the 
humanitarian catastrophe caused by this period of violence and also the ways 
which La Violencia consolidated an elitist political system where the threat of 
the masses and social revolution launched the two main political parties into a 
constitutionally bound power-sharing pact. The Frente Nacional coalition not 
only excluded the opposition but also led to the question of the legitimacy of 
the Colombian political elite. The agrarian issue is continuum throughout the 
violent history of Colombia, however it was La Violencia that brought this to 
the forefront of the political agenda. The counter-reform period in the 1970s, 
which effectively signalled the abandonment of agrarian reform by the political 
elite, had disastrous effects for the country in two ways: firstly, it increased 
rural support for insurgent groups, and secondly, it did not resolve the 
problem of under and unemployment thereby creating thereby neglecting a 
workforce that that went on to cultivate marijuana and coca in rural areas.  By 
the 1980s the traditional political parties remained closed as extremist factions 
on the left grew. A booming population and high levels of unemployment, 
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despite warnings from the international community, were ignored. The issue 
of social and agrarian reform to alleviate the country’s social ills remained 
unaddressed. It is in this context in which we see a marked increase rural and 
urban insurgency. 
 
The poor choices of the political elite and the structural problems of the 
Colombian political system have bred insecurity. The threat of insurgent 
groups has further exacerbated the state sponsored violence since the 1980s, 
in which the ideological collusion between the state and paramilitary forces 
has resulted in the killings of thousands of civilians and leftist politicians. 
Whilst the focus of much of the scholarly attention on the tragic case of 
Colombia has been on the transformation of the conflict, this thesis has drawn 
out the continuities in the fundamental drivers of social unrest and violence 
remain. In short, it argues that in order to achieve peace, the Colombian state 
must address the social and economic needs of its country and address the 
agrarian issue. Whilst the agenda at the negotiation table in Havana is an 
impressive start after seven decades of violence, we will have to wait until 
2016 to see the outcome of the full rounds of negotiations and the programme 
of implementation. 
 
This research is of particular importance for other conflict-ridden countries of 
the world. Latin America today is the only region of the world with a rising 
homicide rate. However, it is also one of the most economically vibrant 
regions of the world. In terms of the nexus between conflict and economic 
development we must assess this in terms of the political and social 
structures of a country. This is of particular importance in a globalised world 
where economic development and trade is seen to be the solution to poverty 
and insecurity. In terms of the future developments of this research the 
limitations of the work must be addressed.  
 
This thesis has had its challenges and limitations. In particular, the lack of 
data from within Colombia and the resources to spend considerable amounts 
of time in the country to carry out further data collection has resulted in a 
reliance on archival material, the majority of which is from outside of 
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Colombia. However, since the original submission further fieldwork has been 
carried out which will enable the thesis to move into a monograph with 
insights into various rural movements, the development of criminal networks 
and importantly the role of extractive industries in the Colombian conflict. This 
will enable the monograph to engage with broader issues such as the 
interaction between global, regional and local dynamics further. Quantitative 
material from within the country also provides an interesting insight to local 
dynamics and allows a micro-level dataset which brings out country-level 
nuances, in which the research can explore the links between drug 
production, extractive industries, geography, state presence and violence. 
Following the monograph, it would be particularly useful to explore violent 
conflict with an Area Studies approach in a comparative context. It is hoped 
that this will be achieved through a comparative study of violence in Colombia 
and Mexico to provide a regional perspective on violence with lessons for 
other Latin American countries that are battling their own internal security 
dilemmas.  
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